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This Ph.D. thesis examines the role of drones in US grand strategy based on their use by 
successive US administrations post 9/11 in 'targeted states' (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, 
Somalia, and Libya) in pursuant of different typologies of grand strategies. Since 9/11, drones 
have been used for targeted killing operations and for dismantling terrorist organizations. 
However, while drones on the battlefield present tactical benefits and are attractive to modern 
militaries and political decision-makers, their use has several unintended consequences. These 
include the negative impact in targeted states, destabilizing international politics and, 
undermining US strategic objectives. These are real problems that have not been adequately 
explored in the existing literature on the topic. To address this gap, the overarching research 
question of the thesis investigates how drones support or undermine US grand strategy. In 
doing so, the thesis attempts to determine the broader strategic ramifications of drone use for 
US grand strategy beyond their short-term tactical relevance. 
Furthermore, it probes the political and strategic goals they supposedly advance and the 
consequences of drone proliferation for US strategic objectives at the national and global level. 
The thesis draws on publicly available data sets on drone strikes in targeted states since 9/11. 
It utilizes the international relations theories of realism, liberalism, and security dilemma theory 
to explain drone use and their intersection with US grand strategy. 
To examine the research questions, the utility and impact of drones in facilitating the grand 
strategy of successive US administrations before and after 9/11 are analyzed. Case analyses of 
the aftermath of drones in Afghanistan and Pakistan are undertaken, and the impact of 
continued drone diffusion among state and non-state actors is assessed. The thesis finds that 
continued use of drones by the US as a central counterterrorism tactic and an offensive war 
strategy in targeted states undermines US grand strategy. It does so by creating contradictory 
outcomes: on the one hand, it eliminates terrorists, but on the other, it causes anti-Americanism, 
the death of non-combatants, and generates unintended blowback. The significance of this 
thesis is that it supports the contention that the tactical use of drones has strategic ramifications 
that serve to undermine US grand strategy in the long term. These speak to a broader point 
about the evolving nature of modern warfare and its intersection with powerful emerging 
technologies. As these new technologies are integrated into warfighting and come to play an 
ever-larger role in statecraft, there needs to be a much more robust assessment and debate about 
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"Violence is by nature instrumental; like all means, it always stands in need of guidance and 
justification through the end it pursues."1 
1.0 Introduction 
The lethal weaponization of drones as part of the broader United States' counterterrorism (CT) 
strategy in the 'war on terror' (WOT) can be described as a tale of "Two Cities." For one "City" 
(the United States, referred to in the rest of the thesis as "US"), drones are tactical instruments 
for facilitating leadership decapitation and targeted killing operations while minimizing the 
cost and risk of warfare. In the other "City" (targeted states – especially Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, which make up the core focus in this thesis), drones elicit adverse reactions due to 
collateral damage, territorial violations, and the blowback of anti-Americanism in the aftermath 
of targeted strikes. However, while drones effectively achieve the short-term goals of US CT 
operations, the broader strategic implications of their continued use, due to their countervailing 
impacts in targeted states, raise critical considerations for US grand strategy.  
Furthermore, while drones have caused a great deal of controversy, they have come to be seen 
as valuable military assets. These present a paradox and research problem that is worth 
investigating. States intend to pursue the advancement of drone technology; however, there are 
various fears that they can destabilize international relations, create powerful surveillance tools, 
and increase in profoundly dangerous ways for US security.  In this way, while drones may 
present tactical benefits and be attractive for modern militaries, the unintended consequences 
of their use, the negative impacts, and how they could destabilize international politics and US 
strategic objectives are problems in need of further investigation. 
This introductory chapter provides the basic context, assumptions, research themes, questions, 
and the hypothesis that informs the research investigation. The chapter sets the scene for 
examining the controversial aspects of drones and how their continued use by successive US 
administrations since 9/11 raises questions around their utility for furthering US strategic 
objectives. The chapter is organized into five parts. The first part provides the background that 
informs the research inquiry. The second part explores the research themes and issues 
underpinning the investigation throughout the thesis. The study's research aim, objectives, and 
                                                             
1 Arendt, H. (1970). On violence. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. 
2 
 
rationale are outlined and discussed in the third part. The fourth part examines the study's 
methodology, and the final part summarizes the chapter organization for the rest of the thesis. 
1.1 Background to the study 
Drones, also known as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), are pilotless, remotely controlled, 
precise munitions with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.2 Since 
the September 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks, armed drones have been deployed as part of US 
standoff weaponry and multidimensional CT strategy in targeted states – which in this thesis, 
refers to Afghanistan and Pakistan, where the US has conducted continuous drone strikes 
against al-Qaeda, the Taliban and their affiliates following 9/11. The legal architecture for the 
use of drones within and outside declared battlefields is predicated on the Authorization for the 
Use of Military Force (AUMF) – a joint resolution ratified by the US Congress on 18 
September 2001 and has since been used by successive US administrations since 9/11. The 
resolution authorizes the US president: 
"To use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations 
or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist 
attacks that occurred on 11 September 2001, or harbored such organizations or 
persons, to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United 
States by such nations, organizations or persons."3 
Drones introduce what Samuel Moyn terms "riskless warfare"4 and, based on the interpretation 
of the AUMF, engender what Rusell Christopher conceptualized as "imminence in justified 
targeted killings"5 in the ongoing WOT. As Horowitz and colleagues note, "one reason to kill 
rather than capture a suspected terrorist is that arresting militants in war zones and unstable 
areas where they are found is far riskier for US forces than killing through an unmanned 
drone."6 The benefits of drones in CT operations stem from a range of capabilities, including 
quick decision making, maneuverability, combat readiness, situational awareness, remote-
sensing, battlefield damage assessment capabilities, and its ability to track, monitor, and 
                                                             
2 Johnson, J. (2020). Artificial Intelligence, Drone Swarming and Escalation Risks in Future Warfare. The RUSI 
Journal, 1-11. 
3 Senate Joint Resolution 23 107th Congress, September 18, 2001 in Congressional Record, 147 (2001), 
https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ40/PLAW-107publ40.pdf (Accessed February 15, 2020). 
4 Moyn, S. (2013). Drones and imagination: a response to Paul Kahn. European Journal of International 
Law, 24(1), 227-233. 
5 Christopher, R. (2012). ‘Imminence in Justified Targeted Killings,’ in Finkelstein et al., Targeted Killing, 256 
6 Horowitz, M. C., Kreps, S. E., & Fuhrmann, M. (2016). Separating fact from fiction in the debate over drone 
proliferation. International Security, 41(2), 7-42. 
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eliminate terrorist targets in hard-to-reach areas.7 The precision and remote capabilities of 
drone weaponry have been argued to lower the risk of soldier deaths by preventing dangerous 
deployments, minimizing the cost and risk of warfare, and giving US military commanders 
asymmetric advantages in waging war from a distance relative to the traditional boots-on-the-
ground that defined past wars.8  
US presidents, officials, military commanders, policy analysts, and scholars have made strong 
arguments in favor of their use due to their tactical benefits and efficacy in eliminating high-
value terrorist targets (HVTs) and broader US CT operations. For example, Leon Panetta, a 
former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in 2009, boldly declared that drones 
are the "only game in town"9 for controlling, disrupting, and dismantling terrorist leaders and 
organizations. American University Professor, Audrey Cronin, shared similar views, asserting 
the "US is safer when the drones take out high-level terrorist leaders and groups."10 However, 
beyond the tactical utility of drones and the defense for their continued use as a CT weapon 
and an instrument of statecraft, their broader political and strategic implications within and 
outside targeted states for US strategic objectives remain a contested issue.  
First, it is not clear from the existing US drone policy what specific roles drones play in 
furthering US security objectives in the post 9/11 environment. Current studies have focused 
on the tactical and operational uses of drones for US CT operations; however, the broader 
strategic ramifications have remained an underappreciated area in literature. This thesis is an 
effort to unpack the strategic impacts and contribute to the discussion by plugging the gaps in 
this overlooked area. 
Second, much of the official data on CIA covert drone operations in targeted states have 
remained classified and hidden away from the public and Congressional scrutiny. While it may 
be necessary to classify certain military operations as top secret, as Jacqueline Hazelton argues, 
covert drone operations have made "empirical assessment of the actual effect of drone strikes 
speculative due to limited evidence from the US government."11 Although the Obama 
administration, on 22 May 2013, declassified and established new operating procedures for 
                                                             
7 Ibid. 
8 Boyle, M. J. (2015). The legal and ethical implications of drone warfare; Hazelton, J. L. (2012). Drones: what 
are they good for? Parameters, 42(4/1), 29. 
9 Panetta, L. (2009) AFPAK Drone strikes are the only game in town. New Perspectives Quarterly 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5842.2009.01090.x (Accessed 14 May 2019) 
10 Cronin, A. K. (2013). Why drones fail: when tactics drive strategy. Foreign Affairs, 92, 44. 
11 Hazelton, J. L. (2017). Drone strikes and grand strategy: Toward a political understanding of the uses of 
unmanned aerial vehicle attacks in US security policy. Journal of Strategic Studies, 40(1-2), 68-91. 
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drones in areas of active hostilities based on the Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG), the 
Trump administration reversed course. Further, it broadened the latitude for CIA covert drone 
operations through the Principles, Standards, and Procedures (PSP).12 This has perpetuated 
the institutionalization of covert targeted killings away from international legal attention and 
exempted the CIA from declaring its operations to the American public as required under the 
US military's Title 10 code.13  
Third, the precedent set by US CT operations using drones suggests it will engender negative 
impacts for modern warfare, interstate military balance, and strategic competition – due to the 
ethical, moral, and legal concerns they cause within and outside targeted states – that are 
difficult to dispel. Furthermore, as drone technology continues to diffuse among non-state 
actors and US rival and regional competitors in the post 9/11 environment, the long-term 
strategic implications are worth investigating to ascertain the potential impact for US grand 
strategy. As Michael Boyle avers, "there remains a strong need for the US to engage in a serious 
analysis of the strategic costs and consequences of in the use of drones, both for its security 
and the rest of the world."14 This thesis will consider the arguments for and against drone 
proliferation and its impacts on US grand strategy in later chapters. 
Fourth, the controversial aspects of the US drone programme resulting from civilian deaths, 
territorial violations, and sovereignty issues in targeted states also question their utility as a CT 
tool for accomplishing broader US strategic objectives in targeted states and for US soft power 
as a global promoter of liberal democracy. As David Kilcullen and Andrew Exum posit, drones 
engender a "death from above and outrage down below"15 There are suggestions in the 
literature that this triggers political and public opposition and spurs terrorist retaliation and 
insurgencies in targeted states against drones. However, further investigation of these shreds 
of evidence is necessary to ascertain their impact on US strategic objectives. 
Understanding the intersection of drones with the US grand strategy is a vital aspect of this 
thesis because drones have strategic and not just tactical implications, and understanding how 
                                                             
12 Executive Office of the President, “Presidential Policy Guidance: Procedures for Approving Direct Action 
Against Terrorist Targets Located Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities,” 
https://www.justice.gov/oip/foialibrary/procedures_for_approving_direct_action_against_terrorist_targets/down
load (Accessed 11 June 2019) 
13 Fuller, C. (2018). The CIA's Drone War and the civilianization of warfare. In, Barros, 
Andrew and Thomas, Martin (eds.) The Civilianization of Warfare. Great Britain. Cambridge University Press, 
pp. 221-240. https://doi:10.1017/9781108643542.012 (Accessed 16 June 2019) 
14 Boyle, M. J. (2013). The costs and consequences of drone warfare. International affairs, 89(1), 1-29. 
15 Kilcullen, D., & Exum, A. M. (2009). Death from above, outrage down below. New York Times, 16, 529-35. 
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they support or undermine security, scholars in academic literature have underappreciated US 
grand strategy. For instance, Kilcullen and Exum argue that the US drone campaign is a 
strategic error against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. They claim that drone strikes make it harder 
to secure local partnerships with civilians, organizations, tribes, and relevant authorities on the 
ground in targeted states, that are necessary to uproot and defeat terrorism and terrorist groups 
in the long term.16 Thus, while drones may be tactically relevant as a CT tool, plugging the gap 
on the strategic ramifications of their use (as successive US administrations since 9/11 have 
continued to rely on it) is timely and imperative in understanding the broader utility of its 
weaponry.  
MIT Professor Barry Posen conceptualizes grand strategy as "a nation-state's theory about how 
to produce security for itself, primarily against military threats,"17 including the military means 
for accomplishing it.18 (the broader conceptual debates and definitions of grand strategy are 
explored in the next chapter). Since 1945, the US grand strategy has undergone two major 
transitions in response to external threats and systemic changes in the international security 
environment. The first transition took place during the early period of the Cold War and lasted 
till the 1990s. This was a change from a containment strategy – focused on preventing the 
spread of Communism to a defensive liberal strategy – that sought to preserve Washington's 
hegemony, its preeminent power position in the post-Cold War, and its willingness to engage 
in democratic promotion. The second transition took place in the aftermath of 9/11. The 
emergent strategy in this period championed forced democratization and global intervention 
missions as reflected in the 2002 Bush Doctrine and the 2003 Iraq invasion.19 This strategy 
underwent further changes and modifications during the Obama and Trump Presidency (later 
explored in chapters 5 and 6 of the thesis). Irrespective of the grand strategic vision pursued by 
these different administrations after 9/11, drones have continued to feature prominently in the 
quiver of the US CT arsenal deployed against terrorist organizations in targeted states. 
However, understanding the precise political and strategic utility of drones within the ambit of 
US grand strategy is tricky. First, grand strategy is not cast in stone. Often, it is reflective of 
decision makers' perception of beliefs and threats, quirks, and inclinations.20 This indicates that 
                                                             
16 Ibid 
17 Posen, B. R. (2014). Restraint: A new foundation for US grand strategy. Cornell University Press 
18 Ibid (Posen, B. R., 2014) 
19 Miller, B. (2010). Explaining changes in US grand strategy: 9/11, the rise of offensive liberalism, and the war 




while articulating a clear grand strategy is essential, it often relies on military power to secure 
and advance its goals. When the use of that power – the tactics and strategy – is flawed or sub-
optimal, it makes statecraft (the use of diplomatic and military means to advance a states' 
interest) counterproductive or ineffective, which affects the efficacy of the military instrument 
in accomplishing strategic objectives.21   
Second, a grand strategy's effectiveness depends on the relationship between the means utilized 
and whether they successfully lead to desired strategic ends. More precisely, how the political 
ends and military means achieve core national security objectives.22 Linking this with US CT 
operations in targeted states and the concerns that drones have raised various moral and 
political concerns due to civilian deaths, militant retaliation, and anti-American sentiments, 
questions whether drones are beneficial or adverse for US security interests. As John Brennan, 
a White House CT Adviser, put it, "an action that eliminates a single terrorist but causes civilian 
casualties can inflame local populations and create far more problems – a tactical success but 
a strategic failure."23 Furthermore, as some evidence suggests, "rather than tackling the real 
drivers of extremism, drones create an ideal environment for al-Qaeda to grow and 
propagate."24 Though shreds of evidence suggest that drones have been effective for leadership 
decapitation25 and in disrupting terrorist organizations26, they have not led to the demise of 
terrorist groups or completely prevented the replacement of a dead terrorist leader. This lead to 
the next point concerning drones as either a defensive or offensive tool for US statecraft within 
and outside targeted states. The bottom line here is that stated US drone policy is at best 
ambiguous on whether drones are crucial military assets, a strategy for power projection, or 
tools of coercive diplomacy – the actual or threatened use of force in accomplishing state 
security objectives. To better understand, this thesis considers US drone policy and the degree 
to which it specifically outlines the role of drones and what they do and do not achieve. Thus, 
making deeper inquiry into the role of drones in US grand strategy all the more critical.  
                                                             
21 Posen, B., & Ross, A. L. (1993). Competing US Grand Strategies. Defense and Arms Control Studies Program, 
Centre for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
22 Ibid 
23 John Brennan (2010) quoted in Enemark, C. (2011). Drones over Pakistan: secrecy, ethics, and 
counterinsurgency. Asian Security, 7(3), 218-237. 
24 Boyle, M. J. (2015). The legal and ethical implications of drone warfare. 
25 Jordan, J. (2009). When heads roll: Assessing the effectiveness of leadership decapitation. Security 
Studies, 18(4), 719-755. 
26 Cronin, A.K., (2012). Ending terrorism: Lessons for defeating al-Qaeda. Routledge. 114 
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The following section explores the research themes and issues that provide the study's 
analytical boundaries.  
1.2 Research Themes and Issues 
Drones, before 9/11, were mainly used for ISR purposes. The contemporary use of drones in 
targeted states raises several critical considerations for US grand strategy with underlying 
political and strategic implications. These considerations form the overarching thrust of this 
research. 
The first consideration is the effect drones generate in targeted states due to mounting public 
objections and frustration about their use and impact on US grand strategy. This is due to the 
perception that "drone strikes excite vehement opposition in targeted states by offending 
deepest sensibilities, fostering instability, and engendering a legitimacy crisis through its 
persistent use."27 This thesis addresses this consideration by exploring literature on the 
blowback effect of drones in targeted states. Precisely, it examines the impact of anti-
Americanism, anti-drone protests, and terrorist retaliation and its ramifications for the grand 
strategy of successive US administrations after 9/11. 
In a study on the impact of drone strikes on the people of Pakistan's Federally Administered 
Tribal Area (FATA) and North West Frontier Province (NWFP), it was reported that the 
aftermath of drone strikes "damaged the social fabric of FATA"28 and the "negative effects 
contribute to the atmosphere of lawlessness and chaos which incentivize terrorism and 
militancy."29 However, there are divergent perspectives in the literature on their actual impact 
in targeted states.30 Available evidence claim that drone killings create a desire for revenge 
against the US based on four points. First is the notion that unintended deaths of civilians cause 
greater antipathy to drone use. As Kilcullen and Exum note, "every one of these dead non-
combatants represents an alienated family, a new desire for revenge, and more recruits for a 
militant movement that has grown exponentially even as drone strikes have increased."31   
                                                             
27 Nathaniel C. Fick, David J. Kilcullen, John A.Nagl, and Vikram J. Singh, “Tell Me Why We’re There? Enduring 
Interests in Afghanistan (and Pakistan),”. Centre for 24 2010 Special Operations Essays a New American Security, 
22 January 2009. https://www.cnas.org/node/675  (Accessed March 10, 2019) 
28 Aslam, M. W. (2011). A critical evaluation of American drone strikes in Pakistan: legality, legitimacy, and 
prudence. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 4(3), 313-329. 
29 Ibid 324 
30 Shah, A. (2018). Do US drone strike cause blowback? Evidence from Pakistan and beyond. International 
Security, 42(04), 47-84; Bergen, P., & Tiedemann, K. (2011). Washington's Phantom War: The Effects of the US 
Drone Programs in Pakistan. Foreign Aff., 90, 12. 
31 Kilcullen, D., & Exum, A. M. (2009). Death from above, outrage down below. New York Times, 16, 529-35. 
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Second, the notion that the death of a militant leader triggers reprisal attacks and encourages 
militant recruitment and terrorist violence. Third, the idea that drones violate the territorial 
sovereignty of targeted states and generate countervailing outcomes within the domestic 
politics that fuel support for visceral anti-American sentiments.32 The fourth emanates from the 
hostilities against the government of targeted states that support the machinery of US drone 
operations.33 While this evidence suggests there is nexus between public anger and drone use 
in targeted states, further inquiry is needed. This thesis will seek to provide a fuller 
investigation to ascertain how it impacts US grand strategy. 
This further calls into question the political utility of drones as a tool of statecraft in targeted 
states. This is premised on the view that the continuation of targeted killings potentially 
backfires on the US by sowing seeds of discontent in targeted states. As a result, rather than 
decimate and dismantle terrorist organizations, it catalyses more upheaval, loss of support for 
US counterinsurgency (COIN) and CT efforts, and engenders what Gallarotti Guilio termed 
the "disempowerment of US foreign policy in the Middle-East."34  
The second consideration relates to the implications of civilian deaths in the aftermath of drone 
strikes in targeted states for US grand strategy. Several studies have explored this ramification 
for US CT operations, but there is a shortage of literature on the impact on US grand strategy. 
Compared to manned aircraft, drones can precisely eliminate their intended targets with 
minimal collateral damage.35 This is against the backdrop that drone strikes rely on their ISR 
capabilities, and before a targeted strike order, the identity of the targeted person is confirmed 
in real-time by military, intelligence, and legal officials to prevent accidental deaths.36 This 
has, however, not been the case, as evidence based on the most accurate publicly available data 
sets on the casualty figures suggests that drone strikes have continued to increase the death of 
non-combatants in targeted states in successive US administrations post 9/11 (a reference to 
table 1 below). 
 
                                                             
32 Okpaleke, F. N., & Okoli, A. C. (2020). The strategic efficacy of drones for US grand strategy. AUSTRAL: 
Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations, 9 (18). 
33 Boyle, M. J. (2013). The costs and consequences of drone warfare. International affairs, 89(1), 1-29; Hudson, 
L., Owens, C. S., & Flannes, M. (2011). Drone warfare: Blowback from the new American way of war. Middle 
East Policy, 18(3), 122-132. 
34 Gallarotti, G. M. (2011). Soft power: what it is, why it is important, and the conditions for its effective 
use. Journal of Political Power, 4(1), 25-47. 
35 Boyle, M. J. (2015). The legal and ethical implications of drone warfare. The International Journal of Human 
Rights, 19(2), 105-126. 
36 Ibid (Boyle, M. J., 2015).  
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Table 1: Drone Civilian Casualty figures from 2001- 2020 
US Administration Strikes Total Killed Civilian Casualty  
Bush (2001-2008) 56 397 101-138 
Obama (2009-2016) 4125 4850 -5160 924 -1124 
Trump (2017-Date) 13,358 5300 -11,340 732 -1921 
Source: Comparative data reports from The Bureau of Investigative Journalism.37  
 
Official data of CIA secretive strikes in targeted states are classified and are heavily redacted 
when published, with low civilian casualty figures. This gives the impression that its 
clandestine drone operations result in minimal accidental kills or collateral damage. On the 
contrary, anecdotal evidence published by The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ), Air 
Wars, Long War Journal (LWJ), and the New American Foundation (NAF) and other sources 
based on the local account of drone strikes in targeted states, reveal otherwise. The average 
civilian casualty figure from these investigative bodies estimates that 1550-2560 non-
combatants have died from drone strikes from 2002-2020. Yet, these data do not reflect the 
exact figures of civilian deaths in targeted states. Most reports do not consider collateral 
damages and are usually based on local intelligence reports38 (more evidence and analysis later 
in the thesis). However, this does not suppose that civilian casualty figures are based on a 
calculated guessing game; instead, it is indicative that available data sets may provide different 
statistics that approximate the actual casualty figures.  
Furthermore, as Christopher Fuller notes, "the accuracy of civilian casualty count is further 
complicated by unanswered questions regarding at what point an individual transition from 
being a civilian to an enemy combatant and thus, a legitimate target for drone strikes."39 
Presently, the US government assigns the status of "enemy combatants" in targeted states where 
drones are deployed to anyone who travels, trains, associates or is affiliated with any terrorist 
group or network regardless of their particular role.40 However, this definition is problematic 
for some reasons, and it contributes to the rising toll of civilian casualty.41 First, it is contra to 
the Geneva Conventions delineation of non-combatants. Second, it increases the likelihood of 
accidental kills and collateral damage. Third, it projects a totalitarian view of drones that 
ignores the principles of war (all these points are further examined later in chapter 8). Related 
                                                             
37 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (2020). Drone warfare. 
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war. Accessed 11 October 2020. 
38 Ibid (Boyle, 2013) 
39 Ibid (Fuller, C., 2018) pp. 221 
40 Ibid (Fuller, C., 2018) pp. 233 
41 Woods, C. (2014). Covert drone strikes and the fiction of zero civilian casualties. Precision Strike Warfare 
and International Intervention: Strategic, Ethico-Legal and Decisional Implications, 95-113. 
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to this is drone use against American citizens abroad and the risk it engenders domestic 
discontent in the US against their use. Though polling data from Pew Research42, Gallup43, and 
the Centre for New American Security44 (CNAS) show that Americans support the use of drone 
strikes in targeted states – at 62%, 65%, and 62%, respectively45 - there has been no follow-up 
survey conducted by these pollsters since 2012. A 2016 CNAS report, however, found "critical 
gaps in American public understanding of the risks associated with the lethal drone 
programme."46 Considering that drone operations are affected by domestic politics and shaped 
by its aftermath in targeted states, these findings raise further questions regarding the benefit 
of drones. 
The third consideration is drone proliferation post 9/11. Scholars argue that US CT operations 
using drones have reinforced its efficacy as a valuable technological asset capable of altering 
military balance and strategic competition.47 As Kilcullen and Exum note: 
"…The US has slain a large dragon but now lives in a jungle filled with a 
bewildering variety of poisonous snakes. In dealing with these snakes, as 
evident from US technological deployment in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, 
it has demonstrated how it fights modern wars, and as such, giving potential 
near-peer competitors a blueprint for how to counter the core capabilities that 
underpin US military superiority."48  
The continued proliferation of armed drones (which before 9/11 were limited to the US and 
Israel) among rival competitors such as Russia and China, regional competitors such as Iran, 
and non-state actors such as Hezbollah has an impact on US grand strategy. This is due to the 
potential uncertainties, vulnerabilities, and new dynamics associated with unchecked 
diffusions of drone technology – such as the risk of unprovoked strikes, use of drones against 
                                                             
42 Pew Research (2015) Public continues to back US drone attacks 
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2015/05/28/public-continues-to-back-u-s-drone-attacks/ (Accessed 8 
August 2019) 
43 Gallup (2013) New Gallup poll on support for drone strikes https://www.lawfareblog.com/new-gallup-poll-
support-drone-strikes (Accessed 9 August 2019) 
44 Schneider and McDonald, (2016) Public support for US drone strikes: when do Americans prefer manned 
over unmanned platforms? Center for New American Security https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/u-s-
public-support-for-drone-strikes (Accessed 19 July 2019) 
45 Ibid (Pew Research, 2015; Schneider and McDonald, 2016). 
46 Schneider and McDonald, (2016) Public support for US drone strikes: when do Americans prefer manned 
over unmanned platforms? Center for New American Security https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/u-s-
public-support-for-drone-strikes (Accessed 19 July 2019) 
47 Johnson, J. (2019). Artificial intelligence & future warfare: implications for international security. Defense & 
Security Analysis, 35(2), 147-169. 
48 Ibid (Kilcullen and Exum, 2009) 
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non-combatants in conflict zones, and rogue states fitting drones with nuclear weapons – all of 
which are potentially 'dangerous and costly' for the US due to the long-term political and 
strategic implications. Furthermore, apart from the likely impact of drone proliferation for 
strategic competition, great power rivalry, and international security, non-state actors such as 
al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, ISIS, and the Taliban in targeted states, can potentially use drones to 
conduct retaliatory attacks on US bases and interests globally.   
Although the US has crafted unilateral and multilateral policies to reduce uninhibited drone 
proliferation in ways that protect its strategic interests, these policies have been unable to 
control access to, export, and advancement of drones at the international level.49 Evidence 
suggests four factors account for this: First, local militias are weaponizing off-the-shelf 
commercial drones with explosives.50 Second, China's relaxed drone export policy allows 
states to purchase drones at affordable prices and without the stringent conditionalities that the 
US attaches to its drone exports – such as requiring recipient states to comply with international 
laws and not selling to non-democracies.51 Third, the impact of globalization on the 
international arms market – which encourages drone development and global sales.52 Fourth, 
the 'race' to acquire drones among countries symbolizes national prestige and status.53 These 
factors require further investigation to examine how broader questions surrounding drone 
proliferation impact US grand strategy – this is one thing that makes this original and unique. 
The above considerations underscore a gap in the literature in ascertaining how unintended 
civilian deaths, unchecked drone proliferation, and the controversial aspects of drones in 
targeted states impact US grand strategy. These issues form the main focus of this thesis. 
1.3 Research Aim, Objectives, and Questions 
In the context of the issues raised so far in this chapter, this thesis's overarching aim is to 
critically examine the role of drones in the US grand strategy. The goal is to unpack what 
drones achieve for the US in a political and strategic sense. Currently, this is an overlooked 
aspect in international relations and security studies literature.  
Specifically, the study intends to achieve the following central objectives: 
                                                             
49 Ibid (Johnson J., 2020) 
50 Ibid (Gettinger, 2019) 
51 Ibid 
52 Boyle, M. J., Horowitz, M. C., Kreps, S. E., & Fuhrmann, M. (2018). Debating drone proliferation. International 
Security, 42(3), 178-182. 
53 Horowitz MC, Kreps S.E and Fuhrmann M (2016) Separating fact from fiction in the debate over drone 
proliferation. International Security 41(2): 41–44. 
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i. To assess if drones support or undermine US grand strategic objectives. 
ii. To examine the political and strategic benefit of drones for US grand strategy. 
In achieving these objectives, the thesis explores the following research questions: 
i. Do drones facilitate or undermine US grand strategy? 
ii. What is the political and strategic utility of drones for US grand strategy? 
iii. What is the impact of drone proliferation on US grand strategy? 
These questions will attempt to demonstrate whether the continued use of drones since 9/11 is 
beneficial or harmful for US strategic objectives based on their use by successive US 
administrations since this period. Furthermore, apart from the acknowledged tactical uses of 
drones, this question unearths drones' political and strategic utility and the impact of drone 
proliferation for US grand strategy. 
1.4 Research Hypothesis 
The following hypothesis is advanced to address the above research question: continued use of 
drones by the US as a counterterrorism tactic and an offensive war strategy in targeted states 
undermines US grand strategy. It does so by creating contradictory outcomes: on the one hand, 
it eliminates terrorists, but on the other, it causes anti-Americanism, the death of non-
combatants, and generates unintended blowback. 
This hypothesis is tested in this thesis by examining:  
(i) The evolutionary drone development and its role in facilitating US grand strategy 
before 9/11  
(ii) How successive US administration post 9/11 have used drones to facilitate their 
strategic objectives 
(iii) Case analyses of the aftermath of drones in targeted states and, 
(iv) The implication of drone proliferation for US grand strategy at the national and 
global level. 
1.5 Significance of the study 
There are several reasons why this thesis is essential: 
First, although scholarship has examined the typologies of US grand strategy before and after 
9/11, there is currently no study except by Jacqueline Hazelton54 that has attempted to decipher 
                                                             
54 Ibid (Hazelton J., 2017) 
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the political utility of drones for US grand strategy. Several studies55, however, have analysed 
the different versions of US grand strategy and their underlying security implications but 
present no further discussion on the role of drones in supporting them. Also, while several 
studies56 have assessed the impact of drone use in targeted states and its broader security 
ramifications, they fail to underscore the precise political goals they accomplish for the US. 
This study bridges this gap by assessing the political utility of drones as an instrument of 
statecraft for US grand strategy. 
Second, studies have often neglected investigation into the strategic utility of drones. Much of 
the discussion has focused on the tactical side. The few studies57 that have attempted an 
assessment from a strategic perspective omit to contextualize it within US grand strategy. 
Hazelton's work comes close to making a deductive assessment from the lens of the grand 
strategies of selective engagement and restraint. Her analysis, however, precludes two other 
dominant typologies of grand strategy: primacy and neo-isolationism, and does not capture the 
strategic utility of drones in successive US administrations post 9/11. By analysing drone use 
in reference to the grand strategies of respective post 9/11 administrations, this study 
deductively examines the strategic utility of drones. 
Third, while several studies58 have examined the impact of drone strikes in targeted states and 
their security ramifications, these studies do not analyse or assess its impact on US grand 
strategy. Though an important sub-literature on drones establishes a nexus between new 
technologies and how they challenge the mainstream understanding of warfare and non-
combatants hitherto, there is a shortage of scholarship on the long-term implications for US 
grand strategy in the post 9/11 security environment. This thesis moves beyond the moral and 
                                                             
55 Posen, B. R. (2002). The struggle against terrorism: Grand strategy, strategy, and tactics. International 
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W. Bush. Cornell University Press. 
56 Ibid (see Enemark C., 2011; Boyle M., 2013; Kreps & Zenko, 2014; Boyle M., 2016) 
57 Chamayou, G. (2015). Drone theory. Penguin UK; Gusterson, H. (2016). Drone: Remote control warfare. MIT 
Press; Sauer, F., & Schörnig, N. (2012). Killer drones: The ‘silver bullet’ of democratic warfare? Security 
Dialogue, 43(4), 363-380; Shaw, I. G. (2013). Predator empire: The geopolitics of US drone 
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K. (2011). Washington's Phantom War: The Effects of the US Drone Programs in Pakistan. Foreign Aff., 90, 12; 
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ethical questions about drone strikes to examining how the continued reliance on drones as a 
CT tactic affects US grand strategy in the long-term due to their lethal use in targeted states. 
Lastly, the international sphere is constantly in a state of flux, and understanding the roles 
drones play has become all the more important in ongoing efforts to appreciate the intersection 
of politics with technology and how to strike a balance between the use of force as an 
instrument of statecraft in response to emerging and ongoing threats. Given that there is little 
research on drone proliferation that assesses its utility for grand strategy, there is a critical need 
for further study on this subject.  
1.6 Methodology 
This study draws extensively from the literature on drones and grand strategy from various 
sources, including peer-reviewed journals, think-tank research publications, policy briefs, 
official US records, and other relevant documentary sources. Considering that data on CIA 
drone strikes are mainly classified (explained later in the thesis), the study draws data from 
several academic and journalistic databases such as TBIJ, NAF, LWJ, CNAS, and Air Wars, 
assessing the aftermath of drone strikes in targeted states. Others included data sources from 
the Brookings Institution, National Counterterrorism Center, Congressional Research Service, 
and Human Rights Watch. These data sets complement the qualitative nature of this study and 
analyze the research hypothesis.59 
To make sense of the qualitative data, the study adopts a deductive evaluation technique – 
which applies previously tested theories to a research endeavour to enable further empirical 
analysis and testing of the research hypothesis.60 A qualitative research approach ensures 
conclusions reached in a study are predicated and substantiated by relevant data.61 Considering 
the impracticalities of obtaining primary data using surveys and interviews in targeted states 
such as Afghanistan and Pakistan (due to the potential risks and ethical concerns), the 
researcher adopted a qualitative approach for this research. This approach is best suited for this 
study due to its conceptual and methodological utility in explaining the intersection between 
the research phenomenon. Analysing the thesis from this prism is helpful for several reasons. 
First, it allows for a deductive analysis of the different US grand strategies based on the 
underlying theories that underpin them. This provides the analytical premise for establishing 
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the intersection between the research variables. Second and relatedly, the deductive approach 
helps to clearly distinguish between normative approximations and social scientific claims 
from the lenses of different theories.62 This facilitates better research understanding by 
separating claims based on objective causal relationships and normative preferences. Third, it 
provides a valuable way for conceptualizing the research to approximate the ideal of evidence-
based research.63 This is due to its important role in suggesting possible relationships, causes, 
effects, and dynamic processes based on empirical data.64 Fourth, it allows the research to speak 
more directly by making sense of many existing and recent studies. Analysing the role of 
drones in US grand strategy this way aids in identifying critical gaps, underpinning the research 
needs, and highlighting the agreement in literature.65 Furthermore, it enables the researcher to 
pose fundamental questions about the phenomenon comparable with empirical findings that 
suggest new questions based on apriori analysis.66 
Applying the research approach to this thesis implied the following: First, it assesses theories 
that explain the intersection between drones and US grand strategy. Second, it explores 
different academic literature on the typologies of US grand strategies, and its core aspects are 
assessed together with its intersection with drones. Next, the grand strategies of successive US 
administrations post 9/11 are examined, and the role of drones in supporting or undermining 
them is analysed. This is assessed against the backdrop of drones' political and strategy utility 
within US grand strategy. Then, the aftermath of drones in targeted states and the broader 
implications for US grand strategic objectives are appraised. Lastly, key findings are deduced 
based on critical analyses of relevant theories, empirical data, and critical literature. 
1.7 Chapter Outline 
The thesis is divided into ten chapters: 
Chapter 1 has provided the introductory background and the key research themes of this thesis. 
The next chapter, Chapter 2, contains the conceptual and theoretical review relevant to the 
thesis. The theory section applies the realist and liberalist theories as the analytical compass 
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for explaining the utility of drones for US grand strategy. The conceptual review section 
assesses the key concepts relevant in the thesis – US grand strategy and drones. 
Chapter 3 is in two parts. The first part contains an assessment of the typologies of US grand 
strategy that identifies its main elements and intersection with drones. The second part is a 
literature review section highlighting the gaps in the available literature on drones and US 
grand strategy. 
Chapter 4 establishes the historical context of this thesis and traces the utility of drones in the 
US grand strategy from World War I to the Clinton administration. The chapter examined the 
evolutionary development of drone technology and its application in previous wars that have 
aided US strategic objectives. The main argument is that though drone technology was at its 
embryonic stages before 9/11, its utility in the Vietnam and Korean Wars set a precedent that 
highlighted the tactical uses of its weaponry. 
Chapter 5 is on drone use during the Bush administration and its implication for US grand 
strategy. This chapter unpacks the efficacy of drones in accomplishing the strategic objectives 
of the Bush era. This included assessing the Bush doctrine before and after 9/11, his drone 
warfare and policies, and its impact in shaping US WOT. The main argument of this chapter is 
that though drones played a crucial role in facilitating the Bush administration's offensive 
unilateral post 9/11 grand strategy, they inadvertently set a negative precedent in targeted states 
that hampered US grand strategy. 
Chapter 6 examines Obama drone warfare vis-à-vis US grand strategy. The chapter assesses 
the Obama doctrine, the changes in US drone policy under his administration, the political and 
strategic ends of his drone warfare in targeted states, and the overall ramifications for US grand 
strategy. The main thrust of this chapter is that, though drones served as a double-edged 
strategy for facilitating the defensive neo-realist hybrid grand strategy of the Obama 
administration, like its predecessor, the aftermath of drones in targeted states engendered a 
paradox of security and restraint that served to undermine US grand strategy. 
Chapter 7 focused on drones under the Trump administration and its intersection with his grand 
strategy. The chapter deciphers the Trump doctrine, his grand strategy, and analyses the 
continuities and discontinuities of his drone warfare in targeted states. The overarching 
argument of this chapter is that although drones serve valuable purposes in espousing the 
'America First' grand strategy of the Trump administration, like the administrations before it, 
17 
 
the aftermath of drone strikes continued to engender negative outcomes within and outside 
targeted states that undermine US grand strategy. 
Chapter 8 takes an in-depth analysis of the drone dilemma in two targeted states – Afghanistan 
and Pakistan. It conducts a critical assessment of the impact of drones in these states and how 
it has shaped and influenced US grand strategic objectives. It explores critical themes relating 
to civilian casualties, anti-Americanism in targeted states, militant recruitment, and terrorist 
violence resulting from drone strikes.  
Chapter 9 assesses drone proliferation among near-peer competitors, regional competitors, and 
non-state actors and the implications for US grand strategy at the national and global level. The 
main argument of this chapter is that the continued proliferation among these actors engenders 
negative ramifications for US grand strategy. 
Chapter 10 is the conclusion, summary of findings, and critical analysis chapter. The chapter 
undertakes a rigorous re-examination of the critical issues assessed in the study and re-litigates 

















Conceptualizing US Grand Strategy and Theoretical Framework 
"Strategy is the central political art. It is the art of creating power."67 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter examines the concept of grand strategy and gauges relevant theories that provide 
the critical lens for the entire study. The theoretical literature establishes the nexus between 
grand strategy and drones by highlighting how the tactical use of force or new technologies 
can have an impact on grand strategy. The chapter is organized into two sections: In the first 
section, a conceptual review of grand strategy is undertaken. This includes an appraisal of its 
meaning, its core objectives, key instruments, and its intersection with drones. Next is the 
theory section – which examines relevant theories in international relations that provide the 
analytical utility for establishing the nexus between drone use and US grand strategy.  
2.1 Conceptual Review 
In this section, the concept of grand strategy is examined. Specifically, this section assesses the 
following questions: What does available literature say about grand strategy? What elements 
make for an effective and coherent strategy? What are the challenges and limitations of grand 
strategy? Does the US pursue a grand strategy, and if so, what are the different types? What 
are the core objectives of these variants of grand strategy, and how do drones function within 
their frame? These questions form the overarching focus of this section, and answering them 
provides the conceptual groundwork for understanding and exploring the role of drones in the 
US grand strategy. 
2.1.1 The Meaning of Grand Strategy 
Academic literature on grand strategy is expansive, so also is the manifold definitions of the 
concept. Definitions of grand strategy range from those that conceive it from strictly a 
militaristic perspective, more precisely, "as a confluence of hierarchical military interactions 
with varied external relations."68 To others that think grand strategy represents "an integrated 
scheme of interests, threats, resources, and policies with the goal of "linking a country's ways, 
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means and ends."69 This is closely related to Christopher Layne's view that it refers to "the 
process by which a state matches ends and means in pursuit of security."70 For Barry Posen 
and Andrew Ross, it is "a chain of political ends and military means whose effectiveness is 
highly dependent on the extent to which the ends and means are related to one another."71 
Contemporary definitions of the concept have not varied remarkably from definitions of the 
1990s and early 2000s (that are defined in the preceding paragraphs). A definition put forward 
by Colin Gray, a well-known American strategic studies writer in recent decades, conceives 
the term as "a purposeful and coherent set of ideas about what a nation seeks to accomplish in 
the world, and how it achieves it."72 For Gray, the utility of a strategy is dependent on the role 
it plays between bridging purpose and action with military force as the main actor. 
Nina Silove, on the other hand, views grand strategy as a conceptual minefield that can be 
construed from three perspectives: as a variable, a process, and a blueprint.73 As a variable, the 
grand strategy sets the agenda for understanding the origins of state behaviour, particularly 
how agency and structure interact to produce grand-strategic outcomes. As a process, it places 
emphasis on the need for strategic planning in decision-making, and lastly, as a blueprint, it is 
construed as the broad vision that moderates and influences future governmental behaviour.74 
The definition put forward by Hal Brands is perhaps the best applied to the context of this 
research inquiry and used as the operative definition for the entirety of this thesis. For him, 
grand strategy "Is the highest form of statecraft, which when reduced to its essence, forms the 
intellectual architecture that gives form and structure to foreign policy and the logic that helps 
states navigate a complex and dangerous world."75 
The overarching point made by Brands here is that any given grand strategy should outline a 
country's national interests, the potential threats, as well as policies that defend them.76 
Meaning, it should comprise "an integrated scheme of interests, threats, resources, that provides 
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the principles that guide a state's foreign policy and a country's theory about how it will obtain 
security and defend its national interests."77  
Having examined the meaning of grand strategy, it is important to determine what elements 
account for an effective and coherent grand strategy.  
2.1.2 Elements of an Effective Grand Strategy 
The saliency of a coherent grand strategy lies in its utility for effective statecraft. However, 
devising an effective strategy is challenging (this is examined later in this chapter). Several 
analysts78 perceive the concept as too formulaic and constrictive, particularly for the ever-
changing international security environment. Yet, the importance of a well-formulated grand 
strategy lies in the advantage it gives states in leveraging on their strengths and exploiting the 
weakness of their rivals while furthering core national objectives.  
There are different key elements that account for an effective grand strategy. First, it must 
provide clarity on the nature of the international environment. This requires identification of a 
country's highest goals, its main threats, efficacious utilization of scarce resources in dealing 
with these threats, and establishing priorities in state response. As Posen and Ross aver, "grand 
strategy identifies potential threats to a state's security and devises the political, economic and 
military remedies to those threats while ensuring that the most appropriate military instrument 
is selected to achieve the political ends in view."79 
This, however, does not translate to grand strategy being an extension of foreign policy – which 
is the overall government strategy a state pursues when dealing with other nations to achieve 
its core national objectives. Grand strategy is rather the 'mother' of foreign policy due to its 
broader scope and encapsulates the international 'vision' pursued by the foreign policy of a 
state. While it is possible to formulate foreign policy without a grand strategy and vice versa, 
the imperative of a grand strategy lies in its capacity to shape and influence the conduct of 
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foreign policy by urging the maximization of core national interests or how a nation safeguards 
and preserves its national interest.80  
Second, an effective grand strategy is aspirational and forward-looking.  This means it must 
have a degree of clarity of the short, medium, and long-term goals that can help states in 
determining where they want to go, how they intend to get there, and how leaders devise 
appropriate responses to security threats as they unfold.81 Third, it establishes a nexus between 
means and ends and the objectives and capabilities involved in identifying and dealing with 
state threats. As Inor Sloan avers, "grand strategy must be able to achieve equilibrium between 
means and ends, combining the former to achieve the latter, but also adjusting the latter so as 
not to burden the former."82  
Fourth and relatedly, it must be adaptable to the changing nature of the threats, 
multidimensional competition, and interaction prevalent in the international system. From this 
lens, an effective grand strategy is expected to demonstrate a capability to influence and be 
influenced by the behaviour of other states.83 Fifth, it must ensure that limited resources – 
military, economic, and national – are prioritized in its usage to such an extent that it mitigates 
the pursuit of contradictory goals inimical to national security interests.84 This is because states 
can be "caught" by the seemingly important needs of the moment and thus overlook the broader 
trends and growing long-term threats. For instance, US obsession with the Middle East after 
9/11 (the muscular hard power approach to 9/11 and then disastrous decision to invade Iraq) 
led them to take their eye off the ball, which is the great power competition with China and 
Russia. 
Sixth, an effective grand strategy must be operable in both peacetime and wartime in 
accomplishing a state's core national interests. Lastly, it must espouse the saliency of a 
purposeful approach to the pursuit of stated goals that prevent flaws in statecraft.85 Although 
grand strategy may not be formally articulated in the national security strategy document at all 
times, due to the behavioural aspect of statecraft (this is elaborated in the next sub-heading), it 
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must, however, establish a coherent set of thoughts and actions geared towards the 
accomplishment of core long-term objectives.  
The elements outlined above are, however, not all-encompassing as the making of a grand 
strategy is invariably a "daunting task given the limits of human wisdom and the chaotic nature 
of global affairs."86 Thus, while a grand strategy may be essential for effective statecraft, the 
problem of cohering around and implementing a particular grand strategy faces significant 
obstacles.87 Some of these challenges are examined in the next sub-section. 
2.1.3 Challenges and Limitations of Grand Strategy 
There are several limitations to forging a grand strategy that emanates from its manifold 
conceptual interpretations. First, the making of a grand strategy is often acknowledged as a 
difficult task. This is because it requires a holistic and multidimensional view of the interests, 
threats, and prioritization in the utilization of resources – that places an enormous burden on 
the ability of political leadership – on how to think out and effectively implement it.88 As 
Layton avers, "grand strategy often proffers a complicated and colluded view of the 
international events, and how a country's response to these events ought to be conditioned."89 
This can be harmful to states in a complex international environment, as it limits their response 
to single overarching frameworks that are not always amenable to changing realities. 
Related to the above, forging a grand strategy requires a willingness on the part of states to 
make hard decisions about their priorities and trade-offs. Doing so, however, necessitates a 
critical consideration of a country's highest and enduring interests. This is, however, an onerous 
task due to the chaos and unpredictable nature of the international sphere that negates holistic 
perspectives and a "one-size-fits-all" approach to world affairs.  
Another limitation relates to the task of problematizing grand strategy from a disciplinary 
standpoint. On one side, scholars construed the concept from an ecological standpoint to denote 
its holistic utility for understanding the international sphere.90 Others view it from a 
reductionist lens due to its ability to compel leaders to have "a sense of order and coherence of 
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a complicated international environment."91 However, grand strategy is hardly forged in the 
best of situations; rather, under considerable restraints and pressure that subject it to human 
fallibilities, overblown threat perception, and exaggerations of state capacity to respond to 
events. Thus, making human intelligence, value, experience, worldview, ideologies, and 
decisions critical determinants of what becomes a grand strategy – than disciplinary 
interpretations.92  
Apart from the human component of grand strategy making that hinders its articulation and 
implementation, the bureaucratic system in which a country operates is also a significant 
factor.93 This is because while bureaucracies are designed to provide expertise and direction 
for the robust implementation of a country's stated goals in world affairs, they are often hostile 
and inadaptable to change in the face of threats to the overarching interests a state pursues. This 
has played out between the neoconservatives (offensive liberal) and the liberal democrats 
(defensive liberals) in the US policy circle – that share different conceptions of the use of 
America's power and how it responds to international threats. 
Thus, what policymakers desire and what is implemented by the bureaucracy can exist as 
contrasting ideas. The arising conflict between these two spheres can hinder the effective 
articulation and implementation of an overarching grand strategy.94 In the event the 
bureaucracy implements the visions of the political leadership, the bottleneck surrounding the 
transmission process from high-level officials – that plan and craft the strategic concept – to 
the lower hierarchy that implements it risks causing policy disarticulation.95  
The third limitation borders on the suitability of grand strategy within the American political 
system – due to the constraints of democratic norms impeding its efficacious implementation 
for statecraft. This is because grand strategy is often predicated on covert and surprise elements, 
which may be deleterious for the openness, transparency, and accountability required by 
democratic systems and institutions.96 Though Russell Mead contends that "democracy is good 
for the long-term health of grand strategy due to its internal mechanism for aggregating 
interests and correcting flawed policies which are necessary for preserving the latter”97 – 
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international threats do not always conform to democratic ‘lapels’ or the projections of experts. 
Just like the 9/11 attacks, they required expediency in state response that may bypass 
democratic norms. During the George W. Bush administration, this culminated in a change 
from a defensive liberal strategy to an offensive liberal strategy that championed the goals of 
forced democratization and more assertive use of America’s power in defeating and 
dismantling terrorist organizations globally. Likewise, during Obama’s administration, it 
ushered in an era of CIA covert drone strikes.  
All these point to one thing that cohering around a grand strategy is a daunting task that requires 
a dynamic and resilient response in the face of new and emerging threats and opportunities in 
the international sphere.98 The challenge of ‘doing’ grand strategy have made US officials, 
policy strategist and scholars to ask the perennial question on the possibility of having a 
consistent, purposeful grand strategy, due to the limitations of the concept itself.99 Colin Gray 
described this as the “grandiosity of grand strategy” to explain the perplexities in 
operationalizing the concept in an applied sense.100 While the criticisms of grand strategy may 
say much about the individuals who define it than the constraints of the concept itself, the 
dilemmas associated with the concept have remained a ubiquitous challenge for successive US 
administrations. This leads to the next question of whether the US has a grand strategy. 
2.1.4 Does the US have a Grand Strategy? 
International relations analysts share differing opinions on whether the US needs a grand 
strategy or even pursues one in the first place. Those who share the pessimism that America 
has no grand strategy argue that it is impracticable.101 They share the view that grand strategy 
is a slippery concept that requires the formulation of several strategies to deal with new and 
emerging threats in global affairs.102 This, in their analysis, makes the pursuit of a grand 
strategy unrealistic for America due to changing perception of threat in international affairs. 
Also, while in theory, grand strategies should sit above political leadership and be, essentially, 
the default strategy of a state given geographic and overarching political imperatives, this is 
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not always the case. For instance, successive US administrations since the Cold War have 
pursued different grand strategies in response to the changing nature of the international 
system. This reiterates the argument made by Fuchs that “no single grand strategy is capable 
of defining the whole of America’s purpose in the world.”103 There is also the view that 
formulating a grand strategy for America is extraneous, as, given its powers, it can unilaterally 
exert its preeminent power position in reassuring partners and allies of its core goals and 
interests in the international sphere.104 
Furthermore, as Fuchs opines, “the strong gravitational pull for policymakers and experts to 
develop an overarching vision for America’s role in the world is misguided and dangerous”105 
as it “forces a simplification of a complicated world and justifies some of the counterproductive 
US policies.”106 This is analogous to what Samuel Huntington referred to as the ‘Lippman gap’ 
– to describe the gap that occurs between America’s stated goals and its capacity to deliver on 
them to be the catalyst for dangerous policy formulations.107 However, to accept the above 
arguments is to be dismissive of the historic grand strategies that the US has pursued from the 
World Wars period to the post-Cold War era. 
Aspects of modern US strategy can, arguably, be linked all the way back to George Kennan’s 
long telegram in 1946 that detailed his views on the Soviet Union and articulated US policy 
towards Communism. His view that the Soviets needed to be controlled by a policy of strong 
resistance provided the influential underpinnings for what later became America’s Cold War 
policy of containment – which focused on preventing the spread of Communism and limiting 
the sphere of influence of the Soviet’s Red Army in regions pivotal to America interest. 
However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the emergence of America as the 
sole superpower or what Charles Krauthammer describes as the ‘unipolar moment’108, 
American policymakers and analysts became preoccupied with finding an ideal grand strategy 
for the US after the Cold War. This has been termed ‘Kennan sweepstakes’ – a conscious effort 
to find a post-Soviet statement of purpose to rival George Kennan’s early Cold War concept of 
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‘containment’ of Communism.109 These produced calls for a variety of grand strategies, from 
‘neo-isolationism’ to ‘primacy,’ to ‘retrenchment’ to ‘offshore balancing,’ with various 
suggestions and ideas on how the US can maintain its unilateralism, preeminent power position 
and navigate the murky waters of the international sphere. 
Since the denouement of the Cold War, successive US administrations have sought to move 
beyond containment to a new strategic vision for the US. This led to George H. W. Bush’s 
‘New World Order’ and Bill Clinton’s ‘Engagement and Enlargement’ strategies, each 
espousing a grand strategy of its vision for America’s role in the world, albeit with their 
particular characteristics. The New World Order (NWO) strategy, as authored by the then 
Secretary of Defence, Dick Cheney, espoused the need for US leadership to establish and 
protect a new order that would prevent aggression from potential US potential competitors.110 
George H. W. Bush defines the NWO as “the peaceful settlement of disputes, solidarity against 
aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals and just treatment of people.”111 
Clinton’s ‘Enlargement and Engagement,’ on the other hand, focused on democratic 
promotion, global humanitarian intervention, and multilateralism and preventing the need for 
aggression from potential US competitors. Under George W. Bush, prior to the 9/11 attacks, 
the US embraced the strategy of ‘Democratic Globalism,’ and like his predecessors, espoused 
limited democratic interventions and the ideals of global democratic promotion.  
The 9/11 attacks, however, led to a change in the perception of threat in the international 
environment and, consequently, a change in US grand strategy. This was due to new and 
emerging threats in the post 9/11 international security environment, which included: the 
presence of rogue and autocratic states, some with nuclear capabilities and others that 
potentially aspired to acquire them; the threat of failed states and transnational actors that 
operate within them; and transnational Islamic insurgency. As a result, successive US 
administrations, post 9/11, formulated a grand strategy with an embedded CT component as 
part of its core objectives. This has been reflected in post 9/11 Bush’s doctrine of ‘Primacy,’ 
Barack Obama’s ‘Restraint’ and in Donald Trump’s ‘America First.’ For example, during the 
Bush and Obama administrations, their National Security Strategy (NSS) documents reiterated 
                                                             
109 Dumbrell, J. (2005). Evaluating the foreign policy of President Clinton, or Bill Clinton: between the Bushes. 
British Library. 
110 Homolar, A. (2011). How to last alone at the Top: US strategic planning for the Unipolar Era. Journal of 
strategic studies, 34(2), 189-217. 
111 Bush cited in Nye, J. S. (1992). What new world order? Foreign Affairs, 71(2), 83-96. 
27 
 
the goal of dismantling al-Qaeda and its abettors as one of its main goals. Likewise, President 
Trump and especially his officials (in the NSS, National Defence Strategy (NDS), and in 
multiple statements) claims to have elevated great power competition and defeating radical 
Islamic terrorism to the forefront of US strategy. A notable common instrument of statecraft in 
the facilitation of the CT aspect of post 9/11 US grand strategies has been the use of lethal 
drones. In the next section, the typologies of US grand strategies are outlined and analysed with 
a view to identifying how they intersect with drones. 
2.2 Theoretical Review 
There is currently no single all-encompassing theory that can sufficiently explain every 
phenomenon in the field of International Relations (IR). A simple analogy that comes to mind 
is the half-full and half-empty view of a glass of water filled halfway. Thus, using one 
theoretical position may establish that the glass is half-full when it may appear half-empty from 
another theoretical lens. This justifies the need for an eclectic theoretical approach that 
considers examining and applying different theoretical perspectives in advancing an 
explanation for the role of drones in US grand strategy. To this end, this thesis adopts the realist 
and liberalist theories as helpful lenses to enhance the understanding of the research question. 
2.2.1 Realism 
Realism is a dominant theory in IR that advances an explanation for the behaviour and 
interaction of states in the international realm. Realists make two main assumptions about the 
concept of power in international affairs. One, it is a relational concept, hence necessitating an 
interaction between state actors for the exercise of power. Two, it is a relative concept, meaning 
the power capabilities of states need to be measured against the power of other state actors.112 
The theoretical anchor of realism is predicated on three core elements: self-help, statism, and 
survivalism.113 Statism is the view that states are the most important actor in international 
politics. Survivalism espouses the notion that the goal of states is to ensure their preservation 
or survival in an international order characterized by the absence of international sovereign to 
moderate the behaviour and interaction of states. Lastly, self-help means that states must rely 
on themselves to guarantee their own security in the absence of a higher authority to counter 
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the use of force. These theoretical anchors are reflected in the different perspectives of realism 
advanced by scholars.  
Classical realists like Hans Morgenthau and Edward H. Carr construe IR from the lens of 
human nature, which, according to them, is self-interested and flawed. According to Hans, 
“politics is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.”114 This means 
that state behaviour is determined by human nature. Structural realists (neo-realists) like 
Kenneth Waltz, however, differ from this position and argue, “it is the structure of the 
international system that determines the behaviour of states.”115 For Waltz, “in anarchy, 
security is the highest end.”116 This construes states as security maximisers seeking to preserve 
the relative power distribution in the international realm than upset it. Hence, states are 
defensive actors that will not seek greater power if it jeopardizes their own security. This has 
also been referred to as defensive realism. Defensive realists express an aversion for hegemonic 
expansionism due to its tendency to upset a state’s predisposition to guarantee its own security, 
upend the balance of power logic and undermine its capacity to challenge any hegemonic 
affront to its own sovereignty.117  
On the contrary, Mearsheimer, in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, advances an opposing 
view to Waltz’s. This view has been referred to as offensive realism, and it is rooted in the 
assumption that “great powers are constantly in search for opportunities to gain powers (power 
maximizers) over their rivals, with hegemony as the ultimate goal.”118 This is distinct from 
defensive realism, which holds that states are security maximizers with minimal propensity to 
engage in conflict or predatory behavior towards others. As Mearsheimer posits, the inclination 
to be aggressive is not inherent in states; rather, it is a result of a constant search for survival 
in a changing international realm characterized by uncertainties and offensive military 
capabilities.119 To ascertain the validity of offensive realism, Mearsheimer tests his claims 
based on the past behaviour of states against several questions ascertaining: (i) if states are 
likely to engage in aggression and expansion as their relative power increases, (ii) the 
conditions that determine how great powers deal with threats from an aggressor, and (iii) 
whether war is more likely in bipolarity or in multipolarity. 
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Offensive realism holds that “the goal of a state is to achieve a hegemonic position in the 
international system.”120 Offensive realists perceive aggressive state behaviour as enactments 
of self-help and the importance of states exercising their relative power advantages with the 
aim of becoming a global hegemon. For Mearsheimer, there are three elements in the 
international system that warrants this. One is the absence of a central authority that can protect 
states from one another. Two is the fact that states always possess offensive military 
capabilities, and three is the apprehension that states can never be certain about other state’s 
intentions. Thus, given this fear, there is a cognizance that the more powerful a state is relative 
to its rivals, the better its chances of survival.121 Offensive and defensive realism provide a 
useful analytic lens in understanding the motivations for the use of drones in facilitating US 
CT objectives in targeted states and its grand strategy at large. Table 2 below summarizes the 
goals of realism on the use of force and approach to power and security. 
Table 2: Goals of realism on the use of force and approach to power and security 
Objectives Realism 
 Offensive Realism Defensive Realism 




Focus on superiority, power 
maximisation, hegemony, and 
unilateralism 
Focus on security maximisation 
through balancing, deterrence, arms 
control. Aversion for aggressive 
expansionism. 
Source: Author’s adaptation 
The theoretical anchors of realism offer valuable insight for explaining the rationale for drones 
in targeted states. First, it manifests self-help in that drones are used as tools of preemptive 
warfare against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the aftermath of 9/11. This is based on the premise 
that the US must constantly seek to maximize its relative power position in preserving and 
guaranteeing its own self-interest and security in the international realm. Embedded in the 
concept of self-help is the requirement that states must rely on their own capabilities in devising 
strategies that project their power and defends their territorial sovereignty. As Waltz notes, 
“states operating in a world of self-help, states almost always act according to their own self-
interest and do not subordinate their interests to those of other states or to the interests of the 
so-called international community.”122 
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This makes the lethal weaponization of drones characterizes this depiction, more precisely, in 
expressing US unilateral offensive capabilities against terrorist organizations in targeted states. 
This is evident in the drone deployments post 9/11 for several tactical and strategic purposes, 
namely: thwarting attacks by terrorist groups, dismantling terrorist organizations’ growth and 
spread, preventing terrorist groups from seizing control of states, and circumventing the 
expansion of terrorist influence.  This has also included the empowerment of local security 
forces in defeating the central nodes of terrorist activities and safe havens, providing air support 
for covert combat missions, and aiding coordinated attacks.123  
Second, “the best defence is a good defence,”124 and to ensure its survival, states must rely on 
their military capabilities in self-preservation in international affairs. The means using any 
military means to ensure its survival regardless of the moral and ethical ramifications as long 
as its best safeguards core national interests. The use of drones, despite the moral and ethical 
questions they raise in targeted states, underscores this. This further entrenches the notion that 
military power is a key tool for states and the implementation of their foreign policy, which 
demonstrably has been reflected in the choice of drones in US CT strategy. As Morgenthau 
avers, “all nations actively engaged in the struggle for power must actually aim not to balance 
– that is, equality – of power, but at the superiority of power in their own behalf.”125 Hence, to 
ensure survival, states must depend on their resources – military, economic, and strategic – in 
relation to other states and in dealing with threats to their own security and hegemonic stability. 
This means applying force in a way that best achieves the goal of self-help and projects hard 
power, as US drone warfare has evidently shown in targeted states. 
2.2.2 The Security Dilemma 
A concept related to defensive realism is the security dilemma.  A security dilemma explains a 
situation in which actions taken by a state to ensure its own security engender reactions from 
other states that undermine it.126 This is because, in a world of realism, states take measures to 
ensure their security in the context of anarchy and are inclined to respond to the actions of other 
states with additional measures of their own, especially if these measures make other states feel 
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less secure. Balance of power theorists term this ‘balancing behaviour,’ and it is perfectly 
reasonable and expected behaviour for states in a world of realism.127   
Shiping Tang128 provides an up-to-date version of the security dilemma theory. He explains the 
security dilemma theory as a fulcrum of defensive realism. His analysis of the concept from 
this prism has resulted in a more modified version of the core aspects of its proposition. Of 
which, when further expatiated, provides a useful lens for explaining the implication of drone 
proliferation for US grand strategy at the national and global level. Tang conceptualized eight 
main elements of the security dilemma: 
(i) That anarchy is the main source of the security dilemma. 
(ii) That states are uncertain about each other’s present and future intentions. 
(iii) The view is that a genuine security dilemma exists between two states with defense 
proclivities.  
(iv) States resort to the accumulation of power as a defensive mechanism. These, however, 
contain some offensive capabilities.  
(v) The dynamics of security dilemmas are self-reinforcing and often lead to unintended 
security spiral characterized by arms racing and a worsening of relations. 
(vi) That measures to increasing security by states often lead to self-defeating outcomes: 
more power but less security.  
(vii) The vicious cycle engendered by security dilemma leads to tragic results manifest in 
unintended and avoidable wars. 
(viii) Psychological and material factors regulate the severity of security dilemma.129 
Applied to drones, the security dilemma implies that the continued reliance and deployment of 
drone weaponry as US CT strategy in targeted states potentially engenders dangerous, self-
defeating impacts detrimental for the US in the long term. This is due to three main factors 
based on Tang’s analysis. First, the possibility that the continued use of drones by the US and 
its attendant unchecked proliferation triggers a security spiral, as regional and rivals 
competitors such as China, Iran, and Russia, will seek to acquire and develop drones as a 
countermeasure to ward off US offensive tendencies. Two, the consideration that states are 
perpetually unsure of other state actors’ intentions in a world of realism. Thus, while drones 
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may have been used mainly as military tools for accomplishing US CT goals and support its 
broader statecraft, rivals may perceive this as an intention to expand and therefore seek to 
increase their military powers as a result. Third, the expansion of US drone warfare heightens 
uncertainties in the international sphere that are capable of provoking unnecessary tensions in 
the global security landscape and potentially spark an arms race – as China and Russia may 
believe the US would likely use drones to target their military forces and strategic interests and 
therefore would perceptibly develop drone capabilities to match US technological advantage. 
These factors are examined in different parts of the thesis to underscore the nexus between 
drone use and the security dilemma of drone proliferation for US grand strategy. 
2.2.3 Liberalism 
The ideological premise of liberalism differs from the power-centric and state-centric notions 
of realism. Rather than share pessimism about the structure of the international realm and its 
consequence for moderating the behaviour of states, liberalism espouses the view that 
cooperation, interdependence, and multilateralism are possible among states. Proponents of 
liberalism express the belief that with proper institutions and diplomacy, state actors can work 
together to maximize prosperity and minimize conflict.130 
Liberalism provides an analytical lens for understanding world politics by offering a specific 
way to view and understand the world. Precisely, it is entrenched in the view that democratic 
promotion, international trade, free-market economies, international institutions, and 
diplomacy are pivotal for facilitating global cooperation and peace. There are, however, 
different perspectives to theorizing liberalism (see table 3 below). This distinction can be made 
into two: defensive liberalism and offensive liberalism, and they both share a consensus on the 
influence of democracy in moderating the behaviour of states and international security at 
large. Defensive liberalism advocates the use of multilateralism (interdependence) for 
advancing peace and ensuring state security, specifically, the promotion of democracy by 
peaceful means.131 Offensive liberalism, on the other hand, advocates democracy promotion 
by the barrel of the gun (force). It supports unilateralism, military assertiveness, and massive 
use of force in facilitating forced democratization.132  
Table 3: Goals of Liberalism on the use of force and approach to power and security 
Objectives Liberalism 
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 Offensive Liberalism Defensive Liberalism 




Focus on ideology promotion, 
regime change, democratic 
promotion, and facilitation of 
international cooperation 
using force. 
Focus on soft power, international 
institutions, and diplomacy for the 
promotion of world peace and 
democratic ideals. 
 
Source: Author’s adaptation 
Parsing drone use and US grand strategy from the theoretical premise of liberalism highlights 
some useful commonalities. First, it shows the connection between the use of force in 
facilitating the goals of democratic promotion and international cooperation. This might help 
explain the George W. Bush administration’s strategic objectives in Pakistan, which rested on 
three pillars: One, ensuring the bulk of US assistance after 9/11 was in the form of foreign 
military financing aimed at combating, containing, and mitigating terrorism. Two, ensuring 
that US CT initiatives in Pakistan’s NWFR and FATA included the goals of supporting 
Pakistan’s transition to civilian rule and preventing further historical ties with al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban.133 (this is analysed later in the thesis). The third pillar was ensuring that US assistance 
emphasized the disruption of Islamic Jihad, akin to what Christine Fair and Peter Chalk in their 
book Fortifying Pakistan: The Role of US Internal Security Assistance as “hard security 
apparatus.”134 The impact of which led to Pakistan playing a crucial role in the US Operation 
Enduring Freedom – by providing transit, logistical, and basing support for NATO and 
coalition forces.135  
Second, the tenets of offensive liberalism in the post 9/11 grand strategy of the Bush 
administration were demonstrated in his administration’s regime change in Iraq. While the 
Obama administration’s grand strategy espoused tenets of defensive liberalism, it, however, 
retained vestiges of offensive liberalism demonstrated by the intensification of drone strikes in 
targeted states in the first three years of his administration. This implied that despite the 
offensive nature of a military instrument, it could be employed to achieve the goals of 
liberalism. However, this is usually dependent on the goals of political leadership and the 
prevailing dynamics in global affairs, which determines its application as either a defensive or 
offensive liberal instrument. 
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In the next section, the theoretical underpinnings of realism and liberalism for the offense and 
defense argument in the US grand strategy are examined. 
2.2.4 US Grand Strategy: Betwixt Offense vs. Defense 
From the preceding analysis, it is evident that realism and liberalism are always present in the 
US grand strategy. However, what is necessary to consider is what factors account for changes 
in US grand strategy from an offense to a defense posture. Barry Posen’s analysis of military 
doctrines provides a useful way to examine this. According to him, the degree to which a state’s 
military doctrine or, more broadly, its grand strategy can be termed offensive, defensive, or 
deterrent is dependent on the state’s threat perception, behaviour, and level of interstate 
competition.136 Military doctrine is thus a reflection of competition between states or its 
absence thereof. As a result, ‘offensive’ doctrines increase the probability of an arms race, 
power rivalry, and strategic competition among world powers, as seen in the Cold War period 
between the US and the Soviet Union and more recently between the US and China in the 
South China Sea. On the contrary, defensive doctrines tend to promote more benign effects 
focused on “keeping the peace.”137 
Bernard Miller proposes a model that explains the changes in US grand strategy from the prism 
of its offensive and defensive liberal and realist interpretations. According to his model, two 
systemic factors account for variations or shifts in US grand strategy and act as the “selector 
of ideas about which approach to security is likely to emerge as the winner and dominate US 
security policy in a certain period.”138 One is the degree of threat in the external environment. 
This is premised on the perceptual dimension of threat that considers: (i) state willingness to 
use force, (ii) the unpredictability of rival’s intentions, and (iii) the actual use of force as reasons 
states may opt for offensive doctrines. Thus, in a high threat environment, states are more 
inclined to demonstrate aggressive behaviour and power-projection capabilities than in an 
international security environment laden with external security threats. In contrast, a benign 
environment, or a relative absence of threats, gives rise to defensive approaches that favors 
interstate cooperation and diplomatic engagement. This, however, can change in a situation of 
hegemonic affront by engendering the quest for dominant ideology promotion. In sum, in a 
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high threat environment, offensive realist and liberalist approaches are bound to thrive, and a 
benign environment favors both defensive realist and liberal approaches.139 
The second factor is the distribution of power in the international system. According to Miller, 
the distribution of capabilities in the international realm is a selector between realism and 
liberal approaches to US grand strategy.140 In a situation of unipolarity (single hegemon), the 
costs of pursuing defensive ideological security approaches that place a premium on domestic 
values and preferences are much lower than in situations of great power parity. This is because 
of the freedom the hegemon enjoys in the absence of great power rivalry. This implies that 
conditions of hegemony have a moderating influence on the adoption of a particular grand 
strategy. It also follows that, in a situation of great power competition, offensive realist 
approaches dominate and override liberal or defensive ones. This occurs as competition causes 
states to focus on balancing capabilities or projecting power to prevent any challenge to their 
hegemony. Under this situation, appeal for costly humanitarian interventions and aggressive 
expansionism is considered necessary for preserving state interests. 
There is, however, a caveat: while these two systemic factors are critical to influencing US 
grand strategic choices, there are two intervening variables that may influence these variations. 
One is the perception of decision-makers, and the second is the individual level of analysis. A 
third point can be made on the organisational, systemic factors – which explains how previous 
crises can condition future government decisions and introduce pathologies to its strategy.141 
Thus, the belief system of a particular US administration, including its foreign policy objectives 
and worldview, can alter the choice of grand strategy.142 Likewise, the individual level of 
analysis (for example, a specific US president and his worldview/preferences) of threats and 
opportunities in the external environment can determine the choices made between offensive 
and defensive strategies and how they should be adopted or pursued. In the subsequent 
chapters, these points are weighed upon and elaborated.  
2.2.5 Chapter Summary 
The chapter examined the key concepts and theories that inform the research agenda. A deep 
dive into the meaning of grand strategy and other conceptual underpinnings implicated in the 
term were explored, particularly the critical question of if the US had a grand strategy. In 
                                                             
139 Ibid. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Vanhoonacker, S., & Wangen, P. (2015). Graham T. Allison, The Essence of Decision: Explaining the 




spotlighting the different theories that can provide the analytical compass for the study,  it was 
assessed that liberalism and realism provide a critical and useful theoretical basis for 
understanding the role of drones in the US grand strategy. While there is no single 
encompassing theory in International Relations that best explains a research phenomenon, the 
analysis provided a useful lens for understanding why state actors may desire to acquire and 
develop drone technology and the likely security spiral that are more likely to arise. This served 
as the basis for the analysis of the defense and offense liberal and realist interpretations of the 
changes to US grand strategy in this chapter.  
The next chapter explores the typologies of US grand strategy and its intersection with drone 
use in successive administrations. It also assesses the literature on drone use and civilian deaths, 



















Typologies of US Grand Strategy and Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature on drones and their intersection with US grand strategy. It 
examined how the dominant typologies of US grand strategy offer an analytical frame for 
explaining US drone warfare, particularly from the lens of successive US administrations post 
9/11. The literature review in this chapter identifies the gaps in the analysis of US drone warfare 
and its impact on US grand strategy, particularly from the standpoint of civilian casualty, the 
security dilemma of drone proliferation, and the blowback effect arising from anti-
Americanism in targeted states. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first takes a deep 
dive into the typologies of US grand strategy and its intersection with the use of drones. The 
second part critically analyses literature on the aftermath of drone use in targeted states. 
3.2 Typologies of US Grand Strategy 
In this section, the typologies of US grand strategy are examined. First, the main elements of 
each grand strategy are identified. This is followed by an examination of their core objectives 
and goals and, lastly, how they intersect with drones. There are several typologies of US grand 
strategy, each providing underlying assumptions on how the US can maintain its unique power 
position in the post-Cold War. All these grand strategies offer an analytic lens for analysing 
US drone warfare and are central to this thesis in explaining their use in the successive grand 
strategies of US administrations post 9/11. 
3.2.1 Primacy and Drones  
Primacy strongly advocates the use of American military power in achieving its objectives. It 
is rooted in the unipolar perspective that emphasizes the preservation of America’s hegemony 
and power pre-eminence.143 Its proponents argue that sustaining “American military 
supremacy is the only way to ensure its security, promote its interests, and shape the 
international security environment without recourse to war.”144 As Robert Jervis notes, “this 
means being so powerful than any other state according to the crude measures of power, but 
also having the ability to establish or at least to strongly influence the rules of the game by 
which international politics is played.”145 
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Primacy is rooted in realist theory, more precisely, offensive realism – which explains 
aggressive behaviour and territorial expansion of states as enactments of self-help at the 
international level – to which the goal is to ensure greater national and international security. 
It also rests on hegemonic stability theory – which holds that the international realm is more 
likely to remain stable under a hegemonic unipolar world power.146 The legitimacy of the 
hegemon under this theory, to a large extent, depends on the degree of its willingness to 
forcefully guard the international order against illiberal threats.147  
There are several objectives linked to primacy. First, it is concerned with preventing the rise of 
a rival great power and places a premium on maintaining America’s preeminent power position 
around the globe. Second, it prioritizes democratic promotion in the international order to 
further consolidate its hegemonic status. Third, it advocates for the use of force via unilateral 
actions when national interests are at stake. Fourth, it supports preventive military action as a 
deterrent against illiberal threats. Lastly and relatedly, it champions the use of military power 
in achieving American security objectives, and it is arguably overconfident that its unilateral 
capabilities can achieve the ends it seeks. Both Robert Art148 and David Baldwin149 agree that 
the fungibility of American military power furthers its security objectives based on two central 
points: one, its versatility as an instrument of statecraft, and two, its importance for the 
successful conduct of American foreign policy.150  
In the post 9/11 security environment, primacy supports the assertive and determined use of 
American power for rolling back the threat of international Jihadist terrorism. This has been 
reflected in the George W. Bush preventative war framework and the regime change agenda of 
his grand strategy, which espoused power projection and hard power tactic for global liberal 
democratic promotion. As chapter six shows, vestiges of primacy are also evident in President 
Trump’s ‘America First’ strategy – which advocates a hard-line, zero-sum approach to global 
affairs predicated on unilateralism and neo-isolationism in preserving America’s power and 
interests.151 (this is further explored in-depth in chapter 6).  
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A major drawback of primacy lies in its projection of an ‘Americanized’ view of eliminating 
security threats by military means, which creates an overblown threat perception, creating what 
Cathy Downes refers to as ‘unintentional militarism’ – due to the overreliance on military 
methods and mindsets in the pursuit of US national security objectives.152 As Downes argues, 
this explains why America’s exceptionalism and military capabilities have not translated to 
outright victories in contemporary wars. The study by Amy Belasco on the cost of US 
counterterrorism spending illustrates this. Presently, the US is still conducting counterterrorism 
in 80 countries and active drone and bombing operations in seven. This includes US troops in 
14 countries and 40 military bases for prosecuting its WOT.153 All of which costs the US more 
than $6 trillion in military expenditures.154 
How do drones fit in within the grand strategy of primacy? From the prism of the foregoing 
discussion and based on empirical evidence of US drone use since 9/11, several points can be 
made on the nexus between drones and the grand strategy of primacy. First, drones express the 
“fungibility of American power”155 in targeted states in dismantling and disrupting terrorist 
organizations. It is also expressed in their use as an instrument for supporting US 
counterterrorism missions globally in providing air support, intelligence, and reconnaissance 
operations, supplementing US alliances, conducting surveillance, and projecting US military 
power, particularly in hard-to-reach areas of active hostilities. Second, they function as 
offensive war instruments of statecraft. As Hazelton notes, “in a world of primacy, drones are 
essential tools for furthering US unilateralism, hegemony, and assertiveness.”156 This is against 
the backdrop that the US has, for many years since 9/11, maintained an expansive and ever-
growing range of drone capabilities. Currently, the US has over 200 types of drones, and these 
include the Predator, Reaper, Global Hawk, Army’s Hunter, and Shadow, as well as several 
others (see table 4 below). 
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As Hazelton posits, this has allowed the US to use drones for accomplishing the ‘politicized 
functions on the use of force’157 in targeted states. These functions are identified as 
compellence, deterrence, defence, and swaggering. As a compellence tactic, drones are used as 
instruments of force to stop enemy targets from acting. Deterrence is the use of drones as a 
preventative tactic to prevent an enemy from attacking in the first place or as a tactic during a 
conflict to prevent retaliation in response to an attack. Swaggering is the use of drones for brute 
force projection intended to intimidate or coerce adversaries.  
Table 4: The United States’ Drone Capabilities. 
Name Capability Mission 
RQ-4A Global Hawk/BAMS-D 
Block 10 
Mainly for Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance (ISR), and Maritime protection 
RQ-4B Global Hawk Block 20/30 ISR 
RQ-4B Global Hawk Block 40 ISR/Combat Missions, Command and Control 
MQ- 9 Reaper ISR/Precision strike and swaggering. 
MQ-IA/B Predator ISR/Precision strike, swaggering. 
MQ-8B Fire Scout VTUAV ISR/ Precision strike/anti-submarine warfare 
MQ-5 Hunter ISR/ Precision strike/Combat missions 
RQ-7 Shadow ISR/ Precision strike /Combat missions 
STUAS ISR/Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
Precision strike /swaggering 
ScanEagle ISR/Target acquisition/swaggering 
RQ-11 Raven ISR/Target acquisition/swaggering 
Wasp ISR/ Precision strike 
SUAS AECV Puma ISR/ Precision strike 
gMAV/T-Hawk ISR/ Precision strike /Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
Source: Morris Zachary.158 
3.2.2 Restraint and Drones  
The grand strategy typology of restraint is framed as an incremental process to ensure power 
vacuums do not emerge as the US retrenches. It also advocates a sharp rollback of US power 
and scaling back on its commitment to global affairs.159 Restraint proponents claim it is futile 
for the US to commit enormous economic, political, and military resources towards 
maintaining its hegemonic status post-Cold War in the absence of a superpower threat – such 
as the Soviet Union. It, however, does not abandon the goal of defending US hegemonic might 
or its preeminent power position. Rather, it expresses the view that balance of power and 
nationalism are cornerstones for understanding the interaction of states in the international 
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realm.160 There are two versions of restraint. One is offshore balancing and the other, 
retrenchment. 
3.2.2.1 Offshore Balancing 
Offshore balancers share the view that the reduction of US global military commitments and 
an increase in burden-sharing with allies and partners will best preserve America’s global 
power.161 As Mearsheimer posits, 
“A strategy of offshore balancing would still try to ensure that no one major 
power dominates Europe, Northeast Asia, or the Persian Gulf. But it would 
make others assume the main burden and rely on local powers to balance one 
another while stationing US military forces over the horizon, either offshore or 
within the United States.”162 
Posen adds that “America has been living beyond its financial means, and its security strategy 
has become increasingly costly because it is overstretched under the pressure of existing 
security commitments worldwide.”163 The best way forward is for the US to shift the burden 
of military intervention to local forces, its allies, partners, and regional powers to prevent the 
dangerous effect of declinism in America’s preponderance which will give rise to another 
hegemonic power.164 This finds bearing with Paul Kennedy’s theory of imperial overstretch in 
explaining the rise and fall of great powers. The theory holds that “great powers inevitably 
work their way into decline and eventual demise by seeking to maximize their power; at some 
point, the costs of maintaining their power possessions outgrow their benefits. Consequently, 
the respective great powers become imperially overstretched.”165  
The effect of imperial overstretch potentially engenders hard balancing by other states – which 
occurs when other states increase their relative power against a powerful and hegemonic state 
through domestic military build-ups and external alignments.166 Or what Fareed Zakaria termed 
as “the fall of the West and the rise of the Rest” – which explains the rise of new and revisionist 
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great powers in the international system that challenges American power in order to maximize 
their own power and gains.167  
Offshore balancers oppose US international engagement in costly CT missions and the 
encumbrance of foreign wars and international humanitarian missions.168 Rather, they argue 
that the US narrows its focus to three core interests: First, shielding the American homeland 
from attacks. Second, defending and preserving its territorial integrity, and third, safeguarding 
American sovereignty.169 For countries where the US is actively at war, offshore balancing 
could involve the selling of drones to Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and other countries of active 
hostilities in order to minimize dangerous troop deployment – and diminish the cost and risk 
of warfare. The scaling back of US presence and global security commitments, however, has a 
dangerous unintended consequence for aggravating wars, fomenting regional instability, and 
incentivizing global terrorism. This is because, to American allies and partners, offshore 
balancing fosters the perception that the US is passively rescinding on its commitments to 
global democratic promotion. Thus, increasing their vulnerabilities and the need to devise 
means to safeguard and protect their national interests – even when the US provides them with 
the technology to ensure their security.170 
3.2.2.2 Retrenchment 
Proponents of retrenchment emphasize the cutting back of American international 
commitments and military costs.171 They call for reduced defence spending, scaling back on 
American foreign mission deployment, and a reduction in military expenditures and security 
commitment obligation.172 Retrenchment does not avoid strategic commitment; rather, it 
strongly advocates for lowered cost and reduced commitment more than offshore balancing. 
This was evident in President Obama’s grand strategy – that opposed heavy-footed 
counterinsurgency missions, rather opting for minimal soldier deployment for ground 
campaigns, a scaled-back force structure, and a restrained and minimalist security strategy.173 
For example, in 2010, US national security spending made up 20.1 percent of the fiscal budget. 
This dropped to 15.9 percent in 2015 because of phased troop withdrawal from Iraq and 
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Afghanistan and across-the-board cuts in both military and non-military spending within the 
same period.174 
3.2.3 The Utility of Drones in the Grand Strategy of Restraint 
The scaling back of US security and defence commitments overseas and the lower cost of 
warfare as advocated by restraint favours drone use. Drones are generally low-cost, remotely 
controlled, light approaches to warfare. The cost disparity between MQ-9 Reaper drones 
(mainly used for ISR and precision strikes) and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is huge and highlights 
this. While a single unit of the MQ-9 Reaper drone costs US$6.48 million with an estimated 
operational cost of US$3million, in contrast, the F-35 jet costs nearly US$91million per unit 
and an additional US$5million to operate.175 However, F-35s have very different capabilities 
and are conceptualized for very different purposes to drones. For instance, while F-35s are 
effective and necessary for forward troops deployed globally, in retrenchment, less of it will 
be required, thus shifting preference for drone systems. Another comparison between the cost 
of manned F-16s and combat Reaper drone (see table 5 below) also highlight the utility of 
drones as a replacement for manned aircraft under the restraint strategy. 


















1 $30  $50 -$20 $30 +$0 
2 $60 $75 -$15 $40 +$20 
3 $90 $100 -$10 $50 +$40 
4 $120 $125 -$5 $60 +$60 
5 $150 $150 0 $70 +$80 
6 $180 $175 +$5 $80 +$100 
 Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense UAV Roadmap (2000-2025).176 
Drones are also lower cost compared to soldier deployment. In 2012, each soldier deployed to 
Afghanistan cost the US government approximately US$2.1million.177 This amount does not 
include medical costs associated with life-threatening injuries, insurance, trauma, and 
disabilities associated with the risk of deployment. This means every five American soldiers 
deployed to Afghanistan equalled the procurement and operational cost of one MQ-9 Reaper 
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drone.178 It is therefore, unsurprising why the Obama administration increased drone 
procurement spending despite cuts in the Department of Defence (DoD) budget as part of his 
restraint grand strategy. 
Figure 1: United States Drones Procurement Budget 1989-2017 
 
Source: Morris, Z.179 
 
From figure 1 above indicating US drone procurement expenditure, the increase in drone 
spending in the first three years of the Obama administration (2009-2011) reflected the utility 
of drones in advancing US hard power capabilities while toning down on military expenditures 
and commitments. From $284 million in FY2000, drone spending under President Obama 
increased to $3.3 billion in FY2010. This further increased to $4.8 billion in FY2011 and $5.1 
billion in FY2012.180 From this lens, the use of drones in a world of restraint echoes what 
Hazelton termed as “a high-cost tool of violence, actual and threatened.”181 Precisely, it 
reiterates the position that while the US may be willing to cut down on its defence budget, it is 
not letting up on its international strategic commitments and security obligations to the 
American homeland or in responding threats at the international sphere. 
3.2.4 Deep Engagement, Selective Engagement, and Drones 
The US has pursued a grand strategy of deep engagement since the end of WWII. Deep 
engagement maintains that US retrenchment from its security commitments to its partners in 
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Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East would have a number of security and economic 
benefits.182  These include preserving the stability of Eurasia, facilitating America’s effort to 
maintain the stability of economic globalization and ensuring that its overall architecture is 
favourable to its core interests, and promoting institutionalized cooperation that benefits many 
states but is reflective of US preferences.183 Deep engagement shares a similar emphasis with 
primacy on the imperative of US power preponderance in maintaining a peaceful and 
prosperous world. The key elements of deep engagement are predicated on economic 
globalization, promotion of institutional order, protecting allies, and avoiding international 
conflicts that threaten the US-led international world order.184 Proponents of deep engagement 
posit it achieves three things for the US. First, the preventing the emergence of dangerous 
security dynamics in the world’s core regions. Second is facilitating across-the-board 
institutional cooperation that reflects American interests and greatly benefits its allies. Third, 
it ensures the global economic architecture is favourable to US interests.185   
Selective engagement espouses the same ideals as deep engagement but with important 
modifications. Robert Art identifies four of these modifications: First, it seeks the 
maximization of American interests by ensuring its military power is used most effectively in 
protecting these interests. Second, it is a hybrid strategy that incorporates the best elements of 
other grand strategies but avoids their inherent pitfalls. Third, it stands between isolationism 
and unilateralism on the one hand and interventionism and offensive liberalism on the other 
hand. Fourth, it strikes a balance between restrictive and overly expansive definitions of 
American interests in the international system by allocating political attention, military support, 
and material resources to core interests than desirable ones.186 Proponents argue that the 
increased security benefits from selective engagement prevent band-wagoning among states, 
as near-peer competitors of the US are less likely to challenge its hegemony. Two separate 
casual processes account for this in a realist sense. According to Reuben Steff and Nicholas 
Khoo, “in a defensive realist world, uncertainty over intentions activates security dilemma 
dynamics, leading to balancing. Hence, in an offensive realist world, conflict over real interests 
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leads to balancing.”187 This means less need for the US to drain resources on military spending 
and in fostering security commitments at the regional and international levels.188 
3.2.4.1 What Roles Do Drones Play in the World of Selective/Deep Engagement? 
In selective engagement, the role of drones is to shape the behaviour of other states, precisely, 
allies and partners of the US to preserve its hegemony and maintain regional stability. This 
underscores drones as leveraging tools for moderating state choices. On this, Hazelton notes, 
“the use and withholding of drone strike to leverage other states’ choice is possible if the US 
is willing to hold off on potential strikes when politically necessary, even if a strike is militarily 
possible and even desirable.”189 
This implies that the US can withhold drone strikes as a compellence tactic to force its partners 
to act – or it conduct unilateral drone strikes to project its military power and to reassure its 
partners. Drones can also support security coordination for dealing with international terrorist 
threats like al-Qaeda; under selective engagement, this would mean deploying drones to 
complement and support military actions of allies and partners and also requiring states to deal 
with their own security. 
3.2.5 Cooperative Security as a Grand Strategy and Drones 
Proponents of cooperative security share the view that liberal democratic promotion in the 
international order is the cornerstone of US grand strategy.190 This is premised on the notion 
that America’s economic and military hegemony can effectively maintain stability, ensure 
global security, and engender the creation of a favourable international order if it is based on 
three pillars: open societies, open governments, and an open international system.191 
Cooperative security shares a number of beliefs about the international order and the role of 
the US in it. First, it believes global humanitarian interventionism and liberal internationalism 
are pivotal in advancing human rights, democracy, and free markets.192 Second, it construes a 
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rules-based order founded on rules and institutions as salient for promoting collective security 
and cooperation among democracies – which overall is beneficial for US hegemony and 
interests.  
Third, it maintains that benevolent leadership, rather than coercion, best preserves the 
international order. That is, it supports the use of US power for advancing democratic 
institutions, promoting free markets, pulling down barriers to global trade, and greater 
institution-building while acting within the boundaries of the rules-based order. Fourth, it 
justifies increased US defence spending on troop deployments, security commitments, and the 
use of military power overseas if it advances the goals of democratic promotion and 
institutional building.193 It, however, emphasizes the incorporation of multilateralism in 
ensuring legitimacy in the use of force. Fifth, it views international terrorism, human rights 
violation, and the rise of illiberal powers as a threat to the global order and the American 
homeland and advocates for the use of force for dealing with threats. Lastly, it maintains that 
stability in the international order is best guaranteed when America is willing and able to use 
its preponderant power to overcome collective problems and provide international stability as 
a public good.194 
What then is the role of drones under this grand strategy? Considering that cooperative security 
construes US military dominance as underwriting the international liberal order, drones under 
this grand strategy serve as instruments for facilitating the international rules-based order and 
a hedge against potential illiberal challenges to America’s hegemony. From this lens, drone 
strikes facilitate liberal internationalism by exerting US power in counterterrorism, democracy 
promotion, and humanitarian intervention, and as a useful tool for deterring anti-liberal 
challengers and conflicts. However, drones can be perceived as overly aggressive (as their use 
after 9/11 suggests) and express the illiberal use of US power in targeted states, which 
potentially undermines the legitimacy of liberal internationalism as practiced and promoted by 
the US. This highlights one of the critical arguments of this thesis, that while drones are 
tactically useful, their impact in targeted states engender countervailing impacts that serve to 
undermine US grand strategy. 
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3.2.6 Drones and US Grand Strategy: The Nexus 
Having considered the different typologies of US grand strategy – including its core elements 
and the putative role of drones in it, how then can drones support or undermine it? This is 
answered in two ways in this thesis. First, to determine how drones support US grand strategy, 
their use as a political and strategic instrument of statecraft is assessed through the lens of the 
different typologies of US grand strategy (see table 6 below). This assessment is done based 
on how successive US administrations post 9/11 used drones and the respective grand strategic 
‘vision’ they have pursued and implemented. The table below provides a template that is used 
later in the thesis to answer the research questions. 
Table 6: Typologies of US grand strategy, its core objectives and view on the use of force 
 US Grand Strategy Typologies 











Main objective US power 
preponderance 
and prevent the 














rise of another 
hegemon 
 









Supports Minimal support Supports Supports 
Institution-building Wary Indifferent Supports Supports 
 Views on the use of force 
Force structure Expand Reduce Maintain Maintain 
Troop deployment Supports Minimal support Supports When necessary 
Use of force Unilateral When balancing 
fails 
Multilateral When core 
interests are 
threatened 
Source: Author’s re-adaptation from Avey et al.195 
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Second, assessing how drones undermine US grand strategy entails a critical assessment of the 
aftermath of drones in targeted states for CT operations. This means examining their use from 
the lens of different drone policies and strategies of successive US administrations after 9/11. 
For example, selective engagement has as its core objective the prevention of the rise of another 
hegemon. Thus, when drones proliferate globally, particularly among revanchist and resurgent 
powers, in a way that matches US drone capabilities, it creates uncertainties and vulnerabilities 
that potentially hampers US grand strategy. This implies investigating the inherent dilemma 
between the grand strategy espoused by a particular administration against the backdrop of how 
drone use in targeted states undermines its stated goals. 
3.2.7 Tactical vs. Operational vs. Strategic Use of Drones 
Drones have tactical, operational, and strategic significance. The instrumentation of drone 
technology highlights their tactical military uses – in providing defence, facilitating remote 
warfare, projecting US aerial superiority, and commanders' asymmetric advantages. Drone 
from a tactical standpoint, thus, refers to how its weaponry is used relative to its purpose in CT 
operations. Hazelton shares the view that drones are likely to remain tactically relevant in areas 
of active hostilities where the US has airpower predominance. However, as more state actors 
acquire air defense capabilities, this advantage is likely to be constrained and overshadowed.196  
Operational uses of drones represent the nexus between their tactical and strategic uses. It refers 
to the actual use of drones in targeted missions for their functionality and military significance 
– particularly as a countermeasure against illiberal threats. Since 9/11, this has been reflected 
in their role in thwarting terrorist safe-havens, preventing terrorist attacks by decapitating 
HVTs, and in disrupting terrorist organizations. This has been further expressed in their use as 
a force multiplier, particularly in the remote killing of terrorist targets by a simple push of the 
button. The Predator and Reaper drone systems have been the warhorse of US CT missions, 
and their operational uses for combat and ISR missions have reflected the duality of their 
functions – for “warcraft” and statecraft in targeted states. 
The strategic use of drones refers to the ends it accomplishes for the US for CT and its WOT. 
It underscores how the use of the technology advances national interests, preserves military 
power, and broader security goals beyond their operational and tactical use.  As Hazelton adds, 
drone strikes are “strategically useful primarily for their ability to reassure and provide leverage 
                                                             
196 Ibid (Hazelton, 2017). 
50 
 
over partner states. They are also useful, if anti-Americanism hinders the advancement of US 
interests, for their ability to cause less inflammation of popular opinion than other standoff 
weapons.”197 This thesis returns to these topics later in chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7. 
3.2.8 Doctrine vs. Strategy vs. Tactics 
For conceptual purposes, there is a need to establish the difference between the meaning of 
doctrine, strategy, and tactics as used in this thesis. Doctrines refer to the set of principles and/or 
statements that purport an explanation of the use of force. DoD defines them as “fundamental 
principles that guide the action of military forces in support of national objectives.”198 The 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) also views doctrine as “fundamental principles by 
which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives.”199 There is, however, a 
caveat, while doctrines by their nature are implicitly authoritative, there is a need to apply 
judgement in its implementation. This is because, as Harold Hoiback cautions, the efficacy of 
a doctrine as a tool for change, education, or command, depends on the military application of 
its devise200  – of which when wrongly applied can defeat the purpose it was crafted, thereby 
causing wars, inflaming tensions and conflicts. Furthermore, for a doctrine to be meaningful 
beyond the abstract conception, Hoiback argues it must be explicit and specific with useful 
empirical content to avoid the pitfalls of being construed as dogmatic and without value.201 
According to renowned American strategist Colin Gray, strategy is the “product of the dialogue 
between policy and national power in the context of the overall international security 
environment.”202 It also refers to the approach for achieving the goals that take into cognizance 
factors such as technology, resources, and geopolitical realities.203 The DoD defines the 
concept as the “art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychology, and 
military force as necessary during peace and war, to maximize support for policies and increase 
the probabilities of victory and lessen the chances of defeat.”204 Whereas, tactics, as defined by 
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DoD’s military terminologies, “refers to the specific ways military strategies are 
accomplished.”205  
What then is the difference between doctrine, strategy, and tactics? While doctrines are 
generally applied to tactics and strategy and clarify the links between their objectives and 
actions – simply put, it provides the basic principles on how the force operates. Strategy, on 
the other hand, describes how military objectives will be accomplished and to what ends. In 
contrast, tactics refer to the planned actions needed to implement a stated strategy. For instance, 
while Operations Desert Storm was a strategy of President Bush's administration in Iraq in 
2003, it was predicated on an offensive liberal doctrine that espoused the goals of forced 
democratization and unilateralism. The tactics for the strategy were evident in the actual 
military engagement with the Iraqis. 
3.3 Literature Review  
This section assesses academic literature on drones. The aim is to situate the core focus of this 
thesis – the impact of drone use on US grand strategy – in relation to the existing literature by 
highlighting the key issues and gaps. This is done using a thematic approach to help situate the 
dissertation within the context of analysis for in-depth analytical exploration. The first relates 
to the moral and ethical dilemma of drones. The second theme centers on the impact of drone 
strikes and civilian casualty. The third theme assesses the blowback effect of anti-
Americanism. Finally, the last theme relates to the security dilemma of drone proliferation for 
the US grand strategy. 
3.3.1 Moral and Ethical Dilemma of US Drone Use 
The unprecedented reconnaissance, surveillance, and lethal capabilities of drones since 9/11 
have increased its reliance and continued use as a CT instrument. Besides the asymmetric 
tactical advantage drones provide in dealing and responding to threats posed by terrorist groups 
and non-conventional targets, they provide strategic advantages to the US by facilitating remote 
warfare.206 This is essentially warfare that places a premium on minimal troop deployment and 
a preference for remotely controlled war. From an ethical lens, drones engender what former 
Secretary of Defence Robert Gates termed the “desensitization and dehumanization of warfare 
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that makes death painless and colourless.”207 This is because drones reduce the cost and risk of 
the use of force and engender a new form of warfare facilitated by the push of a button from a 
remote location far removed from the battlefield. Welsh explains this by asserting drones 
“…erase the pain given and taken, reduce the grunt and the struggle to the push of a button … 
and the game, the war, is no more than a fast-twitch exercise – a battle fought without personal 
cost. It is a cause without effect, a victory only for technology and opposable thumbs.”208 
This closely approximates what Andreas Krieg and Jean-Marc Rickli conceptualized as 
“surrogate warfare” to explain the transference of the burden of war from humans to 
technological surrogates.209 While this gives the US a wiggle room to avoid the human 
penalties resulting from its WOT in targeted states, it has not prevented the international 
backlash that has been ascribed to its continued drone programme and the perception that 
drones violate just war principles – which requires that the use of force must be justified under 
certain conditions (Jus ad Bellum) and be limited in certain ways (Jus in Bello).210 Paul Kahn 
terms this the “paradox of riskless warfare,” – which explains how the pursuit of asymmetry in 
war undermines reciprocity and the moral justification for killing the opponent’s combatants.211 
The paradox implied here is that the very feature of drones that makes it attractive to 
policymakers and military generals as a CT tool (for eliminating HVTs) also generates 
antipathy against their use due to blowback from civilian casualty and the visceral opposition 
it triggers in targeted states. 
However, the decision of whether drones are ethically permissible, as Jennifer Welsh notes, is 
dependent on “the precise differentiation between the use of force in wartime and the use of 
force outside the framework of armed conflict.”212 Ethical questions regarding the use of drones 
revolve around six key elements of the just war concept: last resort (which requires that all 
peaceful options must be explored towards achieving a just cause before resorting to the use of 
force), imminence (that use of force must be used in response to a looming attack), war must 
be sanctioned by lawful authority, proportionality (use of force must be proportional to the 
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stated goals of the war), protection of non-combatants, and the principle of necessity (that use 
of force must be predicated on the right intentions). As Kahn asserts, “drone warfare is not 
predicated on the notion of self-defence, since it removes the threat by opponents, and more 
so, the targeted side has no means to retaliate against lethal drone strikes.”213 Thus, making the 
asymmetric advantage conferred by drones in combat zones morally unjustifiable since it 
removes the ability of targeted individuals for self-defence. These ethical concerns are reflected 
in US drone operations in targeted states and fall short of most of these just war concepts (this 
is weighed upon in the latter part of the thesis). While these studies have explored the ethical 
dimensions of US drone warfare, particularly in violating the rights of non-combatants in 
targeted states, there has been limited analysis on the impact on US grand strategy – which is 
one of the areas this thesis explores. 
From a moral lens, drones make it easy for the US to conduct surgical strikes without the fallout 
of international laws or humanitarian laws. The moral dilemma stems from the civilian death 
following drone strikes and the collateral damage in targeted states, which currently have not 
been sanctioned as war crimes for unlawful killings of non-combatants. The moral problem is 
further compounded when the issue of culpability regarding who is to be punished for 
unintended killings of non-combatants. Is it the drone operator that pushes the trigger, or the 
decision-makers involved in targeted killing, or the drone itself that should be blamed for 
human rights violations and contravention of the Geneva Convention? The Convention 
requires that the use of force abide by four cardinal principles: distinction, proportionality, 
military necessity, and humanity. The overarching objectives of these principles are to ensure 
that weapon used in war serves the following purposes: (i) effectively discriminate between 
combatants and civilians, (ii) meet the requirements of military weapons, and (iii) do not cause 
needless suffering or are excessive relative to the context of its application.214 While answering 
these questions is outside the purview of this thesis, they reflect some of the underlying moral 
questions that drone use raise in US CT operations, and the impacts for US grand strategy have 
been underappreciated in literature. 
The US, however, takes a different position on the questions regarding the morals and ethics 
of its drone warfare. First, US policymakers argue that the moral justification for drones for 
CT apart from the AUMF has been the self-defence proviso of the United Nations Charter 





(Article 51), which provides the carte blanche for states to engage in acts of war when 
reasonably provoked to self-defence. The proviso states, “Nothing in the present Charter shall 
impair the right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security.”215 
In defence of drones, Harold Koh, former Legal Adviser of the Department of State under 
President Obama, stated, “It is considered the view of the Obama administration – and it has 
certainly been my experience during my time as Legal Adviser – that US targeting practices, 
including lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, comply with 
all the applicable law, including the laws of war.”216 
Successive US administration post 9/11, from Bush to Trump, has been vocal on the propriety 
of drone use and their justification in the WOT under the ambit of applicable international laws 
as reflected in several NSS documents, public speeches, and statements. Their position is based 
on the recognition that the US is engaged in preventative and preemptive warfare to disrupt 
transnational terrorist groups and their networks and protecting its homeland following the 9/11 
attacks. Hence the use of drones in targeting enemy combatants does not require the due process 
of international laws of war conventions.217  
This, however, does not supplant the manifold evidence establishing drone use in targeted 
states as contravening international laws of war and contributing to a precarious moral and 
ethical dilemma for US WOT. Buchanan and Koehane, for instance, assert that US CT is rightly 
an act of war and should not be misconstrued as self-defence or armed conflict, hence, 
amenable to applicable international laws moderating inter-state warfare.218 From this prism 
and based on studies that have assessed drone use from the moral and justice requirements of 
the 1899 Hague Convention, it is apparent that the full discretionary powers drone gives the 
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US in engaging in remote warfare wherever and whenever it deems fit, establishes a new form 
of warfare – that is outside the moral and ethical scope of the Geneva Convention.219  
Furthermore, the CIA drone strike operations have been predicated on a clandestine and highly 
classified targeted mission for eliminating HVTs and groups considered a threat to the US or 
linked to 9/11. However, the secretive nature of this war has been criticized as immoral and 
unethical.220 Apart from concerns about casualty figures, target lists, and the secretive target 
locations, drone strikes perpetuate a unilateralist manifestation of US CT, which abhors moral 
consideration in accomplishing military objectives. Several studies have highlighted this. 
Surprisingly, there is scarcely any study that explores the nexus between the moral and ethical 
implications of drone use for US grand strategy. This does not, however, refer to the legal 
aspects of drone use, as this has been overstretched and belaboured in academic literature. 
Rather, the moral and ethical aftermath of drone strikes as a CT tool and as an instrument of 
statecraft in the grand strategies of successive US administration, post 9/11. This thesis builds 
further on this in subsequent chapters. One of the arguments of this thesis is that the moral and 
ethical impact of drone use engenders negative consequences for US grand strategy in targeted 
states. Specifically in setting a negative precedent for US near-peer competitors, the impact on 
US soft power, and in compromising America’s US global reputation as the powerhouse of 
democracy and liberal institutions.  
3.3.2 Drones and Blowback 
The tactical utility of drones in CT operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan is well reported in 
academic literature. Though anecdotal evidence lends credence to this, a burgeoning concern 
of drone use in targeted states has been its blowback effect – especially for US CT, and more 
broadly, its grand strategy. Studies report that the aftermath of drone strikes serves as a catalyst 
for the growth, lethality, and influence of transnational terrorism. Scholars assert that drones 
engender new strategic risks for the US due to widespread anger, opposition to drones in 
targeted states, and the view that it inflames terrorist violence and spurs terrorist recruitment.221  
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Blowback effects of drones in targeted states have been conceptualized at three levels: the local, 
national, and transnational.222  Local blowback espouses the view that the unintended death of 
a family member killed in a target zone following drone strikes spurs the rise of anti-
Americanism and visceral opposition to drones.223 As Kilcullen and Exum put it, “each drone 
miss that kills civilians, or even each hit that kills militants anger locals near the blast zone and 
inflames national sentiments against the US in ways that aid militant recruitment and 
retaliation.”224 This is premised on the argument that in countries such as Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, the Pashtun’s code of familial revenge is the unspoken governing norm that 
inflames opposition to continued drone strikes. More applicably, the Pashtunwali code, which 
is an amalgam of two words, ‘Pashtun’ and ‘Badal,’ which means hospitality and revenge, 
respectively, serve as the basis for militant retaliation and terrorist violence in targeted states 
in opposition to drones.225 Other than the concern that it disconnects local populations from the 
hearts and minds of CT efforts, every unintended death of a relative, family or kin, arouses a 
desire for revenge against the US and also has a propaganda effect in terrorist mobilization and 
recruitment.226  
Blowback at the national level is anchored on the perception that drones erode sovereignty 
norms and violates territorial integrity. It is local opposition in targeted states to the 
proliferation of military bases, ‘unwarranted’ drone strikes, and the alliances with their 
domestic government that facilitate them. The aftermath results in anti-drone protests, and 
insurgencies which terrorist groups can leverage to mobilize and finance opposition to 
drones.227 This approximates Frank Sauer and Niklas Schornig's conceptualization of drones 
as “silver bullets of democratic warfare.” In their view, drones thwart democracies and provoke 
more wars in the long run.228 As Cronin adds, “drone blowback is a manifestation of the 
embitterment of the people and reflection of an aroused desire for revenge.”229 Peter Bregen 
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and Katherine Tiedemann construe reprisal insurgent attacks following targeted drone strikes 
as a reflection of a deep-seated resentment for many years of aerial drone strikes, indiscriminate 
civilian deaths, and collateral damages of their aftermath.230 At the transnational level, 
blowback is evident in the widespread resentment triggered by drones in targeted states, 
particularly among the rank and file of terrorist groups – as the spread of terrorist groups from 
South Asia to the Middle East and East Africa suggests.  
There are, however, contrary studies that refute the blowback hypothesis. These studies cite a 
lack of credible evidence to determine the validity of blowback and the possibility that internal 
factors such as state repression, weak governance mechanism, suppression of human rights, 
and the proselytization of extreme radical ideologies as the potential factors for blowback 
(these arguments are weighed and assessed in the latter part of the thesis).231 The blowback 
analysis of drones for the US grand strategy is a critical aspect of this study and is built upon 
in chapter 8 of this thesis. 
3.3.3 Civilian Casualty and Drones 
Drones are precision munitions, which suggest that compared to other weapons such as 
helicopter gunships, cruise missiles, F-35 fighter jets, they are more accurate and create less 
collateral damage. This is because drones can follow their intended target for days and weeks, 
gathering intelligence and conducting surveillance before killing their intended targets. 
Targeted killing here is defined as “the deliberate killing of an identified individual, specified 
in advance as the target, approved by an authorized part of a government bureaucracy without 
independent judicial process.”232 This implies that drones can avert unnecessary civilian 
casualty in battlefield settings, particularly considering the authorization process that precedes 
the order for drone strikes in combat zones.233, 234  
However, while drones are presumed effective in discriminating between civilian and military 
targets compared to other manned systems, drone use post 9/11 suggests the contrary, as shown 
by the glaring figures of civilian deaths left following drone attacks. This questions the 
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expected ‘precision’ of drones for discriminating against their targets in US CT missions. 
Evidence from US drone strikes in targeted states buttresses this. Reports from TBIJ, LWJ, and 
NAF estimate that from the Bush to the Trump administrations, more than 2,500 civilians have 
been killed in drone strikes in targeted states. Jeremy Scahill argues that “US preference for 
assassination rather than capture, and undue over-reliance on signals intelligence in its high-
value targeting campaign accounts for the incalculable civilian toll.”235  
Scholars share the view that the civilian death toll exacerbates rather than diminishes the threats 
the US seeks to confront in its ongoing WOT.236 Besides the blowback effect that arises from 
civilian deaths, concerns for human rights violations, and the view that it causes anti-American 
sentiments and opposition, their use further creates inimical consequences –  such as inflaming 
insurgent actions against the domestic government in targeted states – that portend long-term 
strategic considerations for the US CT operations.  
It is against this backdrop that US controversial drone operations have been criticized. The 
criticism stems from the view that drones perpetuate unethical warfare that ignores the 
proportionality and distinction criteria required for the use of weapons in targeted killings. 
These principles are based on the Geneva Convention, and proportionality requires that 
policymakers and military commanders ensure that the use of weapons in areas of active 
hostilities minimizes civilian deaths.237 As Rogers and McGoldrick note, the permissibility of 
targeted killings under laws of war requires a consideration that intended targets are 
legitimately classified as combatants and that targeted locations are designated battlefields. In 
addition, that targeting killing operations be conducted in ways that minimize unintended 
civilian casualties.238   
The rising civilian death toll under Trump’s drone warfare relative to the Obama era easily 
buttresses this point. According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
(UNAMA), in the first nine months of Trump’s administration, 150 civilian deaths were 
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reported from drone strikes.239 This figure has exceeded 1350 since then.240 Likewise, Amnesty 
International reports that drones have killed at least 14 civilians in Somalia since 2017, and as 
of January 2020, US drones used in fighting ISIS in Iraq and Syria have resulted in more than 
1,257 civilians deaths.241 These civilian casualty figures are higher compared to President 
Obama's drone warfare. For example, in the overall course of the first and second term of the 
Obama administration (2008-2016), only 5 percent non-combatant deaths were recorded in 
Somalia, 12.9 percent in Yemen, and 18.6 percent in Pakistan.242 Despite these numbers, 
President Obama facilitated a general decrease of non-combatant deaths in Yemen, Somalia, 
and Pakistan over his second term, decreasing non-combatant deaths from 12.54 percent at its 
highest in 2013 to 2.75 percent non-combatant deaths at its lowest in 2015.243 While President 
Trump saw a decrease of non-combatant deaths in Yemen and Pakistan, a larger percentage of 
civilians have died from drone strikes in Somalia in 2017 than the average figures during 
Obama’s second term (these issues are further examined in the latter part of the thesis). 
The classification of drone strikes into personality and signature strikes, as studies argue, also 
contribute to the increasing number of civilian deaths.244 Personality strikes refer to strikes that 
target individuals based on confirmation that the intended target identity and location match 
with intelligence.245 In contrast, signature strikes are based on a pattern of life and suspicious 
behaviour (the likelihood of engaging in terrorist activities) of the intended target. The 
authorization of these strikes usually does not require a confirmation of the identity of the target 
before the kill order is given. The CIA has conducted several covert signature targeted strikes 
in Pakistan and in North Africa, and strong arguments have been made that these contribute to 
the increasing number of civilian deaths.246  
                                                             
239 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) 24 February 2019 Civilian Deaths From 




240 Ibid (TBIJ, 2020). 
241 Ibid  
242 Malone, R. (2018). Trump’s first year: Analysing the Trump administration’s use of drone strikes as a 
counterterrorism strategy in 2017. Georgetown Security Studies Review, 6(2), 6-18. 
243 Ibid 
244 Ibid (Strawser, 2015; Boyle, 2016). 
245 Shaw, I. G. (2013). Predator empire: The geopolitics of US drone warfare. Geopolitics, 18(3), 536-559. 
246 Fair, C. C., Kaltenthaler, K., & Miller, W. J. (2014). Pakistani opposition to American drone strikes. Political 
Science Quarterly, 129(1), 1-33. 
60 
 
A related concept is ‘double tap’ strikes – which essentially is a second drone strike following 
an unintentional first miss. This second strike, however, does not often consider bystanders, 
first responders, or collateral damage until the intended target is completely immobilized.247 
The above was evident in the CIA drone strikes targeting Baitullah Mehsud in Makin city in 
2009 for his involvement in the assassination of former Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir 
Bhutto. The use of double strikes led to the death of 60-83 innocent civilians who were 
observing a funeral event.248  
These unintended deaths portend a negative antecedence for US CT operations with long-term 
implications for its grand strategy. While there have been several useful studies examining the 
impact of civilian deaths on US global image and its CT, there is a dearth of literature exploring 
how civilian deaths serve to undermine US grand strategy.  
3.3.4 Drone Proliferation 
Since the first successful drone strike against al-Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan, successive 
US administrations have continued to rely on and deploy drones for targeted killing missions 
and covert operations. This has inadvertently incentivized an unbridled arms race among 
revisionist and revanchist powers such as China and Russia to counter the technological edge 
the US has enjoyed over its monopoly of drones. As David Kilcullen notes, “…US technology 
deployment in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq has demonstrated to rival competitors how it 
fights modern wars.”249 Apart from near-peer competitors of the US such as Russia and China, 
drone proliferation at its current level increases the risk that non-state actors and enemy states 
can deploy drones in carrying out coordinated aerial attacks that are likely to cause dangerous 
ramifications for the US at the national and global security level. This is akin to what Michael 
Gross described as ‘the epochal transformation in international security due to the detachment 
of brutality from humanity in future warfare.’250 
At the global level, drones risk re-ordering the balance of power and strategic competition by 
introducing new dynamics in existing security arrangements. This raises the possibility that 
enemy or rogue states may develop armed drones for retaliatory or terrorist attacks and state or 
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non-state actors deploying armed drones outside declared theatres of war.  At the national 
security level, drone diffusion potentially alters strategic competition and the race to develop 
its technology among states. With advanced weaponization of artificial intelligence (AI) 
underway, the transformative potentials of drones as a critical component of national security 
also presages an emerging security dilemma likely to heighten uncertainties and introduce new 
changes to the accretion of military power.251 The implication of all this for the US grand 
strategy is scarcely mentioned in the literature; this is examined in-depth in chapter 9 of this 
thesis. 
3.3.5 Chapter Summary  
The preceding analysis on the typologies of US grand strategy and review of the literature on 
drones shows, there have been limited studies exploring the impact of drones within and outside 
targeted states for US grand strategy, which makes this thesis an important contribution to 
literature. A review of literature on the key themes relating to the intersection of drones for the 
US grand strategy has been undertaken, and the gaps for highlighted. The chapter established 
three key points. First, it determined the nexus between drones and the different typologies of 
US grand strategy post 9/11. It demonstrated that parsing drone from the gamut of successive 
US administrations provides a useful lens for assessing how it undermines or supports US 
grand strategy. Third, is that the literature on civilian deaths, proliferation, the blowback of 
drones, and its impact on US grand strategy is an underappreciated area that requires further 
investigation. 
The next chapter explores the historical development of drones and their role in the US grand 
strategy from WWI to the Clinton administration. The overarching goal is to determine whether 








                                                             




Drones and US Grand Strategy: A Historical Analysis 
“…Because war must always be thought of as an instrument of policy, military innovation 
must be guided by a coherent strategy or at least a sense of what is politically desirable and 
feasible.”252 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter assesses the historical role of drones in furthering US grand strategy by 
chronicling their evolutionary development and application by successive US administrations 
from World War I to the Kosovo War. The chapter argues that the lethal weaponization and 
the deployment of drones as a tactical and strategic tool of statecraft post 9/11 is inexorably 
rooted in the evolutionary antecedents of its weaponry – particularly in the Cold War era. 
During this period, there were important signposts as to how and why airpower and its 
proliferation could undermine US strategic objectives. As a tactical weapon, drones provided 
support for US ground troops while concurrently supplying valuable signals and image 
reconnaissance for guided missile release and influencing combat missions. As a strategic 
weapon, drones were key tools for force multiplication, precision targeting, and remote aerial 
bombardment operations. To critically assess this, the chapter is divided into five parts. The 
first part assesses the early development of drones during the World Wars and its intersection 
with US grand strategy during this period. In the second part, drone development during the 
Cold War and through the Korean and Vietnam Wars is explored within the gamut of 
successive US grand strategies during this period. The third part appraises the advancement of 
drone weaponry in the post-Cold War period, the rise of Network Centric Warfare, and their 
intersection with US grand strategy. The fourth part analyses the emergence and use of combat 
drones in the Persian Gulf War, Bosnian War, and Kosovo War and the impact on US grand 
strategy. The final part summarizes the key arguments discussed in the chapter. 
4.1 The Evolutionary Phases of Drone Development (1909-1917) 
The idea behind the drone technology dates to the mid-19th century when Austrian forces 
besieged Venice and floated nearly 200 paper hot air balloons carrying explosives set to 
detonate with 30-minute fuses.253 This innovation, though unsuccessful in destroying its targets 
in Venice, demonstrated the possibility of developing remotely controlled unmanned aerial 
systems with a guided precision munition. Elmer Sperry’s pioneering work with the gyroscope, 
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which began in 1909, proved significant for the early development of UAVs. His experimental 
works with radio control and inertia guidance resulted in the gyroscope – which was a key 
invention for achieving aerial stability in manned aircraft. This proved useful for further 
ground-breaking works in inertial navigation and missile guidance system. 
The inception of WWI proved significant for the application of drone instrumentation at its 
incipient stages. In 1915, Germany’s declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare that led to 
the sinking of several American merchant ships, including its ocean liner – the Housatonic, 
served as the casus belli for US involvement in WWI. After initially electing to be neutral, 
President Woodrow Wilson, with the unanimous backing of the US Congress, declared war on 
Germany. The entrance of America into the war was significant as it helped the Allied forces 
secure victory in the battlefields of Western Europe. During WWI, precisely in 1917, the 
gyroscope was applied to the Curtiss Flying Boat (also known as flying bombs), and this led 
to the development of the first guided missile flight known as the Curtiss-Sperry Aerial 
Torpedo. The aircraft was built to carry a payload of nearly 200 pounds and was remotely 
guided to release missile torpedoes that caused massive damage to enemy defences.254 Their 
deployment proved pivotal in breaking the stalemate of trench warfare and carrying out 
targeted attacks on German U-boats in the sea.  
Setbacks due to engine and catapult launch failure led to the demise of this progenitor UAV 
system. However, the measured success it achieved in WWI against the Germans caused the 
US Army to fund more research and experimental works on UAV development. This 
culminated in the design of the Kettering Bug.255 This innovation was an unmanned aircraft 
fitted with a pneumatic, electric dolly-and-track system for flight stability and guided-missile 
release.256  Though it was never deployed on the battlefield, it represented further progression 
in America’s effort in advancing UAV technology.  
Following the end of WWI, President Wilson’s administration announced its vision for 
achieving a stable, peaceful, and liberal world order in Europe and the rest of the world. This 
was articulated in this Fourteen Point speech which became the core pillar of America’s grand 
strategy throughout the 20th century or what would be dubbed the “American Century.”257 His 
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speech proposed open covenants of peace, reduction of armaments, support for the emergence 
of nation-states, a more favourable balance of power in the international system, and a rules-
based order that welcomed post-war Germany and post-revolutionary Russia.258 It also 
advocated for greater enforcement of global peace by the League of Nations and freedom of 
navigation in territorial waters.259  
Under President Wilson, UAV development was at its early stages, and the concept of airpower 
had not gained much traction in US military operations. As of 1912, US Congress approved 
only $125,000 for research and development of aircraft, half of which were split between 
airplanes (including UAVs) and balloons. Even when the US declared war in 1917, the US 
military aviation unit was still retained as part of the Army, and only around 200 Army trainer 
non-combat worthy aircraft were in its fleet.260 This caused the US to rely on France for the 
supply of 5,000 aircraft used during WWI.261 Thus, there were no connections between UAVs 
and Wilson’s grand strategy at this stage as their use was rudimentary, limited, and their 
military potential still undeveloped. However, changes that occurred in the Interwar period 
would greatly influence the trajectory of drone use. 
4.2 UAVs in the Interwar Period (1918-1938) 
The Interwar period describes the period after WWI and the beginning of the Second World 
War. Contrary to the notion, it was a time of relative world peace; it was also one characterized 
by rising tensions as states were guided by realist-style worst-case assumptions and 
prescriptions. This period also marked an era of German expansionism and revolution in its 
military affairs buoyed by a resurgent Prusso-German strategic culture under Adolf Hitler. Key 
among Hitler’s goals was to jettison the prohibitions of the Treaty of Versailles – which 
stripped Germany of its colonial powers and severely prohibited its military capabilities and 
possible rearmament.  
This period was also characterized by unprecedented development in the aviation industry and 
the ascendancy of airpower in military operations. The 1922 Washington Naval Treaty or the 
Five Power Treaty signed by world powers that won WWI was very silent on the development 
of aerial systems though it put stringent restrictions prohibiting naval construction. In the 
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absence of any constraints, airpower development further gained traction as a symbol of power 
and military advantage in war. Debates bordering on the tactical and strategic application of 
airpower in war also emerged in this period. Advocates of tactical use of airpower acceded to 
the saliency of the traditional use of “boots on the ground” in winning any war and share the 
view that airpower should be solely used for providing aerial support for troops in the form of 
reconnaissance, military supply, communications, and air support.262 Supporters of strategic 
use of airpower, however, argued that decisive war victories could be achieved with heavy 
aerial bombing operations without the need to commit troops.263  
These arguments would have a profound influence in shaping UAV development and use in 
the US in the coming years. However, bureaucratic opposition within the US War Department 
and Congress stymied the furtherance of air doctrine in the 1920s. Rather than invest in air 
development and the independence of the Air Force from the Army, President Calvin 
Coolidge’s administration in its first term reduced the military budget by $750 million.264 This 
affected any significant development of UAVs at this stage; however, some experimental 
works on television technology were pivotal in the Navy’s instrumentation of UAVs with 
aircraft trailing and evading capabilities. These were later tested on two US naval aircraft 
carriers – USS Ranger and USS Utah – with some success.265 The Navy was also able to 
develop radio-controlled pilotless target aircraft, which laid precedence for the emergence of 
assault drones with guided-missile capabilities that possessed radar guidance systems and 
alternative control platforms.  
Apart from the US, other countries were also carrying out research and developmental works 
in the application of UAVs to warfare. This not only demonstrated the burgeoning role of 
airpower but an acknowledged arms race – competitive adversarial acquisition of military 
capabilities among states – to acquire UAV capabilities among imperial world powers. 
Germany, for instance, developed the Ju-87 Stuka dive bomber and the unmanned V-1 aircraft 
– a cruise missile that flew less than 1,000 feet off the ground and flying at 400mph.266 This 
would prove very useful in the Blitzkrieg – the intense bombing campaign carried out by the 
German Nazi army against the United Kingdom in the early years of WWII. Likewise, Britain 
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also made advances with UAVs with the development of the Airspeed Queen Wasp, Queen 
Bee, Fairy IIIF Floatplane, and Miles Queen Martinet.267 These pilotless drones were used in 
several targeting operations in WWII though their many technical shortcomings, such as 
limited manoeuvrability and engine size, hampered its subsequent development and operations. 
The predominance of airpower in the military, the acknowledged race for UAV development, 
and the progress made in furthering its technology laid precedents for the increased role of 
drones as a weapon of war policy, as a force multiplier, and a show of military capabilities.  
4.3 UAVs, WWII, and US Grand Strategy (1939-1945) 
 
World War II marked an era for the decisive use of airpower, particularly for strategic bombing 
operations carried out by Germany, the US, Japan, Britain, and the Soviets. Germany’s air 
offensive operations using lightning air strikes to deal a decisive blow to British acquired 
targets demonstrated this. This not only conferred the Germans with positional advantage but 
with the ability to carry out coordinated maneuver and support their troops at their points of 
weaknesses during the war. For the Soviets, airpower played a key role in aerial bombardment 
operations of its Air Force (VVF) in the Eastern Front and in supporting ground operations of 
the Red Army infantry. Strategic bombing was also a dominant strategy used by Britain during 
the war in planning defence and in conducting aerial offensives, as the Battle of Berlin in 1943 
and the Battle of Okinawa in 1945 demonstrated. The US was not an exception, as strategic 
bombing played a pivotal role in supporting amphibious operations in the Pacific, particularly 
in protecting US naval ships from German U-boat attacks. It was also deployed in the bombing 
of contested battlefields of strategic interests across Europe and in countering German V-1 
flying bomb assault attacks. The ascendancy of airpower in WWII using manned aircraft was 
also strongly complemented with UAV deployment operations. 
UAVs played a notable role in WWII as the generation of drones in this period were equipped 
with photoreconnaissance capabilities, battlefield damage assessment (BDA), and the ability 
to intercept messages. There were two types of drones produced during this period. The first 
was proto drones – which were camera-guided autonomous missiles that can be fired at high 
velocity from a great distance. The second was unmanned assault drones which used television 
technology for intelligence gathering and surveillance operations.268 Allied and Axis powers 
incorporated UAVs as a tool for weapon delivery, gathering valuable intelligence, relaying 
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communication, and for anti-gunnery operations with onboard munitions. V-1 flying bomb 
unmanned aircraft were used by Germany in the aerial bombardment of Britain. The US 
deployed retrofitted UAVs carrying high explosives for destroying German bunkers.269 
The bombing of Pearl Harbor following a Japanese attack on 7 December 1941 served as the 
catalyst for America’s entrance into the war and the basis for the implementation of the three-
tier grand strategy of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration. The goals of his strategy 
included: establishing a greater alliance with Great Britain in cohering and implementing a 
common strategy, crushing Axis powers which it perceived posed the greatest threat to 
America’s security, interest, and values, and third, mobilizing US economic and technological 
resources to support Allied Forces during the war.270 A quintessential aspect of Roosevelt’s 
grand strategy was its unequivocal invocation of the Monroe Doctrine – which is a classic 
American expression of unilateralism developed when Britain sacked Washington in the war 
of 1812.271 The core aspects of the policy included: (i) US non-interventionism in the internal 
affairs of European countries, (ii) America’s recognition of existing colonies and dependencies 
in the Western hemisphere, (iii) preventing colonization in the Western hemisphere, (iv) foiling 
any attempt by European powers to acquire or control territories in the Western hemisphere.  
These policies not only asserted US dominance of the Western hemisphere but were reflective 
of the US declaration of the right to act as an international police force over it.272 The basis of 
the Monroe Doctrine is pre-emption that provides a rationale to take unilateral military actions 
when its interests or its citizens are threatened.273 Thus, the Pearl Harbor attack caused a 
redesign of the US grand strategy under Roosevelt’s administration as it more readily re-
introduced the doctrine of pre-emption in the US unilateral decision to use force against enemy 
states. In his first major budgetary response to the Pearl Harbour, which he described as a war 
budget. Roosevelt declared: “This is a war budget. The details of a war program are, of course, 
in constant flux. Its magnitude and composition depend on events at the battlefronts of the 
world, on naval engagements at sea, and on new developments in mechanized warfare. 
Moreover, war plans are military secrets.”274 
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According to data from the Congressional Research Service, “the national defense 
appropriation surged from $6.4 billion for Fiscal Year (FY) 1941 to $25.7 billion for FY1942. 
This increased to $66.7 billion for FY1943 and peaked at $83 billion for FY1945 before 
dropping in the postwar years.”275 The impact of this budget also had a significant impact on 
the research and development of drone instrumentation, particularly for the development of the 
radio-controlled RP-4, which was later redeveloped into the Radioplane OQ-2 – a total of 
nearly fifteen thousand of these drones were manufactured for the US Army during WWII.276   
The effectiveness of strategic bombing in WWII and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki further established the importance of air power in military campaigns. Relatedly, the 
utility of drones in aerial reconnaissance missions proved tremendous in aiding further works 
on drones in post-WWII. Though WWII generation of drones encountered logistical, 
operations problems in communication relays, David Blom argues, “the experience of WWII 
not only solidified the mind of the US Army on the effectiveness of tactical reconnaissance, 
but it also demonstrated the utility of organic aviation for intelligence gathering and 
surveillance operations.”277 It was therefore not surprising that the National Security Act of 
1947 made the Air Force an independent unit of service similar to the Army and Navy, but also 
an Air Material Command was formed for the purposes of developing new aircraft. Ultimately, 
the ‘redesign’ of US grand strategy under President Roosevelt’s administration, the burgeoning 
role of strategic bombing in WWII, and the rise of proto drones and assault-type drones would 
lay the groundwork for the further advancement of the technology in coming years, particularly 
during the Cold War.  
4.4 UAVs and US Grand Strategy in the Early Cold War (1947-1950) 
The end of WWII brought about changes in the structure of the global distribution of power – 
from multipolarity to bipolarity. The new bipolar order distributed world power between two 
ideological blocs – the United States and the Soviets.278 The US promoted liberal democratic 
ideas, whereas the Soviets pursued Communism as its political and economic ideology. The 
ensuing tension between these two dominant powers led to a worldwide struggle for ideological 
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supremacy, which culminated in the Cold War. The long telegram sent to the US Department 
of State by George Kennan, the American state diplomatic representative serving in Moscow, 
detailing his views on the Soviet Union, provided a pivotal underpinning for the development 
of America’s Cold War policy of Containment.279 As Kennan argued,  
“The Soviets were incapable of long-term cooperation with the West. Driven by 
traditional Russian insecurity, Marxist-Leninist ideology, and the need to 
legitimize ruthless repression at home, they viewed the outside world as 
implacably hostile and were determined to seek security only in the deadly  but 
patient struggle for the destruction of rival power.”280 
Containment policy focused on preventing a major war with the Soviets but suppressing their 
territorial expansion and preventing the spread of Communist ideas. This meant for the US, 
maintaining a strong nuclear weapon advantage and protecting its strategic interests in Europe 
and the rest of the world from Communist threat. As Joseph Nye puts it, “US sought to 
strategically uphold its sphere of influence and regional proxies based on pragmatic political 
and economic considerations to sought to strategically contain Soviet influence”281 The 
implementation of Containment, however, did not take place all at once; it was honed over time 
by series of events which affected its core goals and overarching priorities that would shape 
the grand strategy of Harry Truman’s presidency. 
4.5 US Grand Strategy under Harry Truman and the Militarization of Containment 
The grand strategy of Truman’s administration is heralded as the “golden age of American 
grand strategy” as it laid down key policies for containing Soviet expansionism and stabilizing 
international order beyond the purview of the Cold War.282 This required the US to maintain 
an auspicious geopolitical balance and devise a strategy for resurgence states destroyed by 
WWII, especially in Western Europe and Northeast Asia. Truman’s policies translated into the 
formulation of the Marshall Plan – often referred to as the economic and ideological side of 
Containment, the formation of NATO, increase in US military buildup, and the revival of Japan 
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and Western Germany.283 These policies placed the US as the world policeman of the liberal 
world order with powerful economic and military might. 
The Chinese revolution in 1949, the Soviet explosion of an atomic bomb in late 1949, and the 
start of the Korean War in 1950 served as the catalyst for the militarization of the Containment 
strategy. Hitherto, the Containment strategy was devoid of America’s intention to wage a direct 
war with the Soviets; these three historical events, however, changed this notion. The National 
Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68), a declassified top-secret 58-page report authored by 
Ambassador Paul Nitze of the US Department of Policy Planning Office, provided the clearest 
articulation of the Containment strategy. The wordings of his report explicitly stated that the 
US would “vigorously pursue a policy of containing Soviet expansion and embark on a rapid 
military expansion of conventional forces and the nuclear arsenal, including the development 
of the new hydrogen bomb.”284 The document perceived the hostile design of the Soviet Union 
as the most credible threat facing the US and therefore recommended a massive military build-
up. At the heart of the document, it called for “a rapid build-up of the political, economic and 
military strength of the free world than provided by current policies, with the purpose of 
reaching, if possible, a tolerable state of order among nations without war and of preparing to 
defend ourselves if the free world is attacked.”285 
The NSC-68 established the framework for US security policy throughout the Cold War and 
broader aspects of its recommendations included: 
i. Sustaining ongoing diplomatic efforts at negotiating with the Soviets and 
preparation to defend when attacked. 
ii. The defence and protection of US values and interests. This contributed to the Cold 
War arms race during this period. 
iii. Armament to deter Soviet aggression and enhance US technological superiority 
through accelerated exploration of its scientific potential. 
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iv. It considered the creation of political and economic conditions in the free world as 
a potent deterrence to the Soviets from pursuing a military solution.286 
The NSC-68 framers were, however, skeptical that US isolationism would lead to Soviet 
domination in Eurasia, making it challenging for the US to ward off the spread of Communism. 
Likewise, it was averse to carrying out preventative attacks on the Soviets for fear that such 
actions would embolden Soviet’s military aggression in Western Europe and further attacks on 
the US. Yet, the militarization of NSC-68 was instrumental in shaping Cold War strategic 
planning and in preventing the rise of Communist revolutionary antics that sought to overthrow 
US regional proxies. It also increased the fight against Communist decolonization movements 
in Indochina.  
4.6 Drone use during the Early Cold War 
 
Compared to previous wars, several factors contributed to the furtherance of drones during this 
period. The aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki increased the need to scale the effects of war 
and to prevent another atomic bomb event. Second, the Cold War led to an organic build-up in 
conventional rearmament and military capabilities between the US and the Soviets. The end 
game was to outdo the other power in military superiority and reach. Drone development in 
this era further reflected this ongoing competition.287  
At the beginning of the Cold War, airpower and guided missile systems still had predominance 
in military operations; however, the early Cold War led to greater use of drones for anti-
gunnery operations and ISR missions between the US and the Soviets. This also shaped the 
type and capabilities of drones that were developed during this period, mainly for tactical 
surveillance and intelligence gathering. As the Cold War progressed, the US raced to develop 
several types of UAVs in a bid to counter Soviet aerial technological advances. In the US, the 
Army experimented with small tactical drones while the Navy deployed DSN-3 drones for 
photographic reconnaissance and naval combat engagement.288 Another of these drones was 
the Quail – a jet-powered drone that was designed purposefully to confuse Soviet integrated 
air defense system by saturating its air defense as a decoy to improve the targeting accuracy of 
the US bomber aircraft. Over time, Quails were easily detected by Soviet radar and were 
defenseless against its surface-to-air missiles. The need to gather valuable intelligence about 
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the Soviets' military defence formation, nuclear programme, and atomic weapons development 
led to the development of the Firebee drone – a U-2 high altitude reconnaissance drone 
specifically developed for spying on Soviet nuclear weapons programmes.289 In response, the 
Soviets developed the SA-2 radar-guided surface-to-air (SAM) missiles to counter these 
drones. The interactive process between the two world powers underscored the inherent 
security dilemma of the drone development that transpired during the Cold War – whereby US 
efforts to increase its UAV defensive/offensive capabilities triggered reciprocal effects with 
the Soviets. Though the Firebee suffered operational, budgetary, and logistical shortcomings, 
it was pivotal in ISR operations. 
In effect, the Cold War set the tone for the deepening of the role of drones in US military 
operations and their tactical utility on the battlefield. Their role in furthering US grand strategy 
was, however, overshadowed by the predominance of nuclear weapons in the Cold War. 
Besides, the early Cold War period marked the launch of the DoD’s first offset strategy. The 
strategy sought to offset the potential advantages of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in 
conventional forces. The goal was to leverage America’s nuclear advantage against the Soviet’s 
expected advantage in conventional forces in Europe, thus strengthening deterrence.290 
However, the start of the Korean War in 1950 led to profound changes in the utility of drones 
as an instrument of war and statecraft. 
 
4.7 Drones, US Grand Strategy in the Vietnam War and Korean War of the 1950s 
 
The Korean and Vietnam Wars were consequential for drones and US grand strategy. The wars 
were largely fought as proxies in the larger Cold War between the US and the Soviets. In Korea, 
Communist North Korea invaded the South Korean peninsula in a bid to unite the country 
under the rule of Communism. North Korea was backed by the Soviets and the People’s 
Republic of China, while South Korea was supported by the US and the UN. Likewise, in 
Vietnam, the Communist North was supported by the Soviets, China, and other Communist 
allies, while the South was backed by the US and several Western (anti-Communist) allies. 
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4.7.1 Richard Nixon’s Vietnamization Policy  
When Richard Nixon came into power, Containment was still the predominant US grand 
strategy. However, the Vietnam War, the rise of Soviet and China’s influence in US regional 
proxies, and the post-WWII resurgence of Japan and Germany necessitated a new approach for 
US engagement in the Cold War. Together with his then-National Security Advisor, Henry 
Kissinger, Nixon sought to develop a new structure of peace for dealing with the challenges of 
the Vietnam war and implementing a foreign policy that promoted core American national 
interests rather than liberal ideology. In his words, “world leadership requires something that 
is in many ways alien to the American cast of minds. It requires placing limits on idealism, 
compromising with reality, at times, matching duplicity with duplicity and even brutality with 
brutality.”291  
 
This formed the cornerstone of his three-pronged grand strategy. The first component 
recognized that a tripolar configuration of power (tripolarity) between the US, Soviet Union, 
and the People’s Republic of China was manifest in the international sphere. The second aspect 
is the admission that the tripolar power structure plays a deterministic role in the development 
of the international system. Third, curtailing Soviet expansionism while avoiding direct 
military skirmishes. The grand design for achieving these strategic objectives was premised 
on:  
i. Accepting Soviet parity in nuclear weapons,  
ii. Devising a carrot-and-stick approach (relying on negotiation and diplomacy but 
showing a willingness to attack) when dealing with the Soviets,  
iii. Instituting rules-based order in issue areas 
iv. Maintaining American foreign policy commitments with or without congressional 
and public support. 
v. Implementing a ‘Vietnamization’ policy which involved shifting combat roles to 
South Vietnam troops and the phased withdrawal of US troops 
vi. Improving the defence capabilities of South Vietnam in the face of US imminent 
withdraw from the war.  
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4.7.2 The Efficacy and Utility of Drones in the Korean and Vietnam Wars 
The Korean War, which started in the 1950s, was pivotal for the furtherance of drone warfare 
as it led to the development of assault-ready reconnaissance UAVs. These drones were 
deployed by the US to spy on North Korea and for reconnaissance and surveillance missions. 
However, it was not until the Vietnam War that reconnaissance UAVs were first deployed in a 
combative role shortly after US involvement in the war in 1964. Prior to this, and within the 
same year, the Tonkin Gulf incident – which involved the destruction of US naval destroyers 
off the coast of Vietnam – served as the casus belli for America’s involvement in the Vietnam 
war and also demonstrated the need for the US to incorporate UAVs into its wartime service 
for combative and reconnaissance purposes. This prompted the development and launch of 
AQM-34 drones and DC-130 drones, which were photoreconnaissance drones with combat 
capabilities. 
Among other drones used during the Vietnam War, the Lightning Bug (Ryan 147B) drone – 
an ultra-fast UAV fitted with a jet-propelled engine, deployed for targeting operations and 
reconnaissance, stood out. These modified target reconnaissance drones flew at both high and 
low altitudes and used their photographic and radar capabilities in gathering electronic signals 
intelligence that spied on North Vietnamese enemy forces and provided battlefield data in real-
time. It was further used for bomb damage assessment, revealing North Vietnamese anti-
aircraft installations, and used by the CIA in devising electronic countermeasures.292 The 
photographic intelligence of the Lightning Bug was instrumental in disproving Communists' 
accusations of US complicity in the killing of civilians following the bombing of Hanoi and 
Hai Phong cities.293  
Outside Vietnam, these drones also conducted spy missions over Communist China and were 
used to provoke China’s Air Defenses.294 Though the Chinese People Liberation Army (CPLA) 
Air Force shot down eight of these drones, it did not deter the US from further use in gathering 
valuable signals intelligence (SIGINT) during the Cold War. The efficacy of the Lightning Bug 
led to the use in performing 3,300 reconnaissance operations during the Vietnam War.295 Apart 
from situational awareness and gathering useful SIGINT, these drones were used for 
reconnaissance missions and in plotting enemy vulnerabilities, for example, in tracking Soviet 
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surface-to-air missiles and in providing acquisition data on North Vietnamese troops. It was 
also used for the optimal tracking of the enemy position in airfields and shipping harbors and 
in mapping out the defensive orders of enemy troops. The Firebee was particularly useful in 
intercepting air-to-air missiles loaded on Mikoyan-i-Gurevich-21 (MiG-21) Soviet aircraft.296 
It was also equipped with an onboard electronic gear system that picked up radar signals and 
tapped into North Korean, Chinese, and Russian communication channels. 
A program that demonstrated the utility and survivability of drones during the Vietnam War 
was Operation Chicken.297 During this program, US drones were used for intercepting enemy 
aircraft, detecting missiles, and enabling manned aircraft maneuverability in the face of threats. 
The war also demonstrated the use of drones as a tool of psychological warfare – which is the 
use of planned tactical propaganda and other non-combative techniques during wars or periods 
of unrest to attempt to intimidate or influence the thinking of enemy targets. The utilization of 
UAVs for this purpose occurred with the dissemination of propaganda leaflets from the skies 
into territories containing Nixon’s messages urging Communist North Vietnam to change from 
their foolish ways.298 Despite many Lightning Bugs being gunned down by enemy missiles, 
their efficacy as combat and reconnaissance UAVs in battlefield settings encouraged the US 
Air Force to modify its engines to carry heavier payloads. 
 
The successful application of the Lightning Bug in the Vietnam War demonstrated the tactical 
utility of drones as an instrument of statecraft – as the workhorse of the war. This was evident 
in the marginal role it played in furthering the Vietnamization strategy of the Nixon 
administration – particularly in providing valuable electronic intelligence to boost the defence 
capabilities of South Vietnamese forces – though it lost the war (the reasons for this are outside 
the scope of this thesis). It also demonstrated the utility of drones as a force multiplier with 
more advanced ISR capabilities compared to manned aircraft. Against the backdrop of the 
‘Vietnam syndrome’ – or prolonged warfare or stalemate – the efficacy of drones during the 
Vietnam War informed arguments that the US military could reduce American casualties 
during warfare with drones replacing soldier deployments in hard-to-reach areas and war 
fronts.299 As such, it was not surprising that their success buoyed further US research and 
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development into the making of more combat-effective UAVs modified from the Lightning 
Bugs. This birthed the Ryan 154, also known as the Compass Arrow.300 It was the first UAV 
to be equipped with a prototype stealth technology as it was built to fly at an altitude of 78,000 
feet with minimal heat and radar detection signatures.  
The goal for the design of the Compass Arrow was to further the advancement of long-range 
UAVs with photo-reconnaissance capabilities – this meant drones that flew faster, farther, more 
precise, and less prone to enemy missiles while simultaneously providing real-time high-
resolution battlefield images and intelligence.301 However, unlike the Lightning Bug, which 
was a remarkable success, the Compass Arrow failed to live up to its bidding, as its launch was 
besieged with several political, technical, and financial setbacks.302 The main setback was the 
lack of operational utility of the Compass Arrow as the Vietnam War was coming to its end. 
Second, the Kissinger-Nixon Sino-American rapprochement initiative with China in 1971 also 
considered Compass Arrow not necessary in supplying intelligence about Soviet Forces. Its 
deployment was also considered too costly and excessive for the Six Days War between Arabs 
and Israel (Yom Kippur war). Besides this, the development of the Ryan 154 was budgeted at 
$35 million, but the final cost exceeded $200 million.303 As a result of the lack of mission to 
purpose these drones, the US military-industrial establishment considered it excessive and 
consequently ordered its decommissioning.  
It is worth noting Israel's efforts in UAV development, particularly during the 1973 Yom 
Kippur war. This is because the generation of drones developed by Israel following this war 
led to further advancement in drone technology in the post-Cold War years. Concerns of Soviet 
encroachment in the Suez Canal engendered the development of Teledyne-Ryan Aeronautical 
(TRA) – which was mainly a combat drone that functioned like the Lightning Bug but was 
used mainly for countering air-to-surface missiles.304 Israel also developed the BGM-34A for 
reconnaissance mission for Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) in detecting Egyptian missile sites in 
war and again in 1982 for detecting Syrian missile sites at the Bekaa Valley.305 The situational 
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awareness and battlefield success of these drones caused them to be widely accepted in the US 
defence community. This caused the US to procure the Israeli drone, called Pioneer – which 
was a combat-ready photoreconnaissance drone used for gathering image intelligence (IMINT) 
for tactical command operations on land and at sea.306 The Pioneer, like every other UAV, had 
its own share of shortcomings in battlefield settings and underwent redevelopment with a $50 
million research to repurpose their use to a level described as “minimum essential 
capability.”307 The combat utility of the Pioneer would come nearly a decade later during the 
Persian Gulf War (this is discussed in subsequent sections). 
4.8 Drones, Détente, and the Second Cold War 
 
Under President Nixon, the US gradually relaxed tensions with the Soviet Union. This period, 
which lasted between 1963-1975, is known as détente. The hallmark of this period was the 
signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the two major powers to limit 
ballistic missile launchers and the SALT II to reduce nuclear weapons stockpile. The détente 
and denouement of the Vietnam war limited further use of reconnaissance UAVs. Several 
factors in the mid-70s led to the slowing down of drone development. First, drastic military 
budget cuts limited drone research and development. Two, drones were not suitable to carry 
heavier payloads and were increasingly defenceless against Soviet aircraft missiles. Third, new 
developments in avionics, sensor technology, laser-based artillery projectile systems meant 
changes needed to be made to existing UAV models. Lastly, the efficacy of new high-speed 
missile systems and long-range bombers in military systems led to the prioritization of funding 
over drones.308 Hence, apart from the BGM models, which were introduced after the Vietnam 
war, further research and expenditures on UAVs were put on hold.309 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, however, changed the US disposition to the Soviet 
Union and effectively ended détente. President Jimmy Carter's administration considered this 
invasion “the most serious threat to peace since WWII”310 and, as a response, halted existing 
economic relations with the Soviets. Though drone development did not increase during this 
period, the events surrounding it would serve as the catalyst for the further advancement of its 
weaponry and utility in facilitating US grand strategic objectives.  
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The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 further intensified the rising tension between the 
Soviets and the US. This period has been referred to as the “Second Cold War”311 due to the 
increase in military stockpiles and renewed superpower hostilities that engendered fear of a 
nuclear showdown between the two world powers. This was also the period when the DoD's 
second offset strategy was framed with the goal of developing stealth technology, precision-
guided munitions, smart weapons, and laser-guided weapons to counter Warsaw’s Pact 
numerically conventional forces.312 
President Reagan denounced Soviet invasion and affirmed his determination to roll back 
Communism instead of tolerating it – with the goal causing its eventual end. In a speech 
delivered at the British parliament, Reagan vowed to leave Communism “on the ash-heap of 
history, as it has left other tyrannies, which stifle the freedom and muzzle the self-expression 
of the people.”313 His vigorous stance effectively revived a Cold War arms race and increase in 
US military defense spending – which soared from $326 billion in 1980 to $456 billion in 
1985.314 The ensuing rivalry led to the development of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) – 
an anti-ballistic missile programme initiated under Reagan to shield the US from nuclear 
missiles using space technology.315 The development of the SDI alone cost $100 billion.316 
However, despite significant military spending and missile technology being critical assets in 
US strategic intelligence systems under Reagan, drones did not take priority in his 
administration spending as the US focused on defending against Soviet nuclear weapons rather 
than deploying airpower or UAVs for combat missions. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991, however, opened a new opportunity in the research and development of post-Cold War 
drones and their military application.  
4.8.1 Drones, George H.W. Bush Administration, and the Persian Gulf War 
The end of the Cold War signaled the end of bipolarity and the rise of a unipolar power, with 
the US emerging as an unrivaled global power with immense discretion to do what it wanted 
and pursue ideological objectives. As Ikenberry and his colleagues put it, “as a unipolar power, 
US overall share of capabilities placed it unambiguously in a class by itself compared to other 
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states…. thus, offering powerful structural incentives for the US to be revisionist in the absence 
of a countervailing power….”317 
Under the George H.W. Bush administration, the US embraced a new grand strategy. In a 
speech at the Aspen Institute in Colorado on 2 August 1990, Bush announced a new national 
strategy for the planning and organization of US military power. As he famously declared, “the 
rule of law and not the rule of the jungle shall govern the affairs of nations”318 This strategy 
was called the ‘New World Order’ or the ‘Aspen Strategy.’ Its’ overarching goal was to 
transcend the superpower competition that characterized the Cold War in favour of promoting 
global democratic enlargement in the post-Cold War – by preventing the rise of Third World 
powers with nuclear capabilities and ensuring a favourable international balance of power.319 
The Persian Gulf War – triggered by Iraq’s occupation and invasion of neighbouring Kuwait 
in 1990 – served as the basis for the application of the NWO. As President G.H.W. Bush asserts, 
“the Gulf War was more than one small country; it is a big idea; a new world order with new 
ways of working with other nations…peaceful settlement of disputes, solidarity against 
aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals and the just treatment of all peoples.”320 
According to Miller and Yetiv, the NWO was essentially a rethink of the way the US fights its 
wars – that is, one that reduced soldier casualty, prevented congressional and domestic 
opposition to war and multiplied US power.321 In theory, it appeared practicable and 
purportedly advanced the US role in the post-Cold War era; however, in principle, it was 
criticized as being “vague, inchoate, unworkable and nascent.”322 However, with the inception 
of the Gulf War, which served to operationalize the NWO, this view changed. The war created 
an opportunity for the US to take a strong position in world politics in asserting its power and 
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influence and to prove to the rest of the world that even in changed circumstances, the US 
remained a force.323  
4.9 Drones, Network Centric Warfare, and the Persian Gulf War 
The Persian Gulf War was important for drone use. This is because it was during this time that 
the concept of “pilotless aircraft” or “remote piloted aircrafts” gained prominence in the US 
military establishment and marked a shift in the way the US military viewed and utilized drone 
technology. The late 1980s was characterized by several technological advancements that 
influenced the generation of drones that were produced in the Gulf War. This included 
development in an electronic system, micro-computing, global positioning system, and further 
improvements in guided missile systems. This was also a time when the US military underwent 
a revolution in military affairs and consequently led to the emergence of Network Centric 
Warfare (NCW) – the application of computer-based technologies in changing military 
operations. This was strongly reflected in DoD’s goal of “altering the way US forces conduct 
its military operations by introducing advanced weapon systems with greater precision and 
with innovative operational concepts.”324 
 
The idea behind NCW, as Christopher Bellamy notes, is to “develop a system that would enable 
US Armed Forces to carry out decentralized, surgical and irregular warfare using satellite 
communications systems and devices for building interoperability.”325 The evolutionary impact 
of the NCW led to the restructuring of the US Command and Control system into the C4 ISR, 
which stands for Command, Control, Computer, Communication, Information, Surveillance, 
and Reconnaissance.326 The main objective was to facilitate the remotely operated missions 
with surgical precision. These changes significantly affected the functions and capabilities of 
successor drones in the post-Cold War era. Apart from having force enhancement capabilities, 
these drones had enhanced command, control, and communications (CCC) units, image 
processors, advanced high-resolution sensor imaging, in-built remote systems, reduced size, 
and weight and computerized platforms compared to predecessor drones.327 The long-range 
capabilities, naval gunfire support, battlefield management platform, interoperability, precision 
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targeting system, and remote missile guidance further increased their tactical usefulness in 
high-threat space. These technological modifications made drones produced in the 1990s 
quickly proliferate in the US military.328  
By 1990, the US armed forces had heavily invested in the Pioneer drone, and when the Gulf 
crisis broke out, it emerged as one of the most useful military assets. The Pioneer drone played 
a pivotal tactical role in supplying valuable image reconnaissance, intelligence and real-time 
situational data, and BDA that helped targeting operations of manned US air offensives. High-
level commanders were able to effectively utilize the new satellite imagery and precise 
engagement capabilities of this drone to deal a decisive blow on Iraq's defense. A notable 
incident was when the USS Missouri deployed the Pioneer to Faylaka island off the coast of 
Kuwait to destroy the enemy defense.329 Their use in attacking the Kuwait airport with missiles 
when it was occupied by Iraqi forces was notable. In another instance, it was used to deactivate 
enemy artillery, thwarting Iraqi troop advancement in the north end of the Kuwait airfield and 
to destroy Iraqi forces' base of operation in Kuwait and in monitoring the coastline for enemy 
activity. Further, it helped in detecting Iraqi patrol boats, anti-ship missiles, and anti-aircraft 
artillery. The Pioneer flew more than 300 combat reconnaissance missions during Persian Gulf 
operations, and its operational success in Operation Desert Storm – a US-led massive air 
offensive against Iraq – helped to consolidate their wide acceptance.330 This led to its further 
development, which contributed immensely to successor drones such as the Global Hawk, 
Predator, and the Dark Star.331 Due to the efficacy of the Pioneer during the Persian Gulf War, 
drones began to be assigned combat roles conventionally executed by manned aircraft. This 
was key in facilitating aspects of the NWO grand strategy, which interalia aimed at reducing 
US soldier death and altering the way the US fought its war. The war ended with only 291 US 
soldier casualties of the 750,000 US and allied troops stationed deployed for the operation. 332 
Advanced firepower and US technological advances were attributed to the success of the war 
operation.333 
                                                             
328 Ibid (Kindervater, 2016) 
329 Cook, K. L. (2007, March). The silent force multiplier: The history and role of UAVs in warfare. In 2007 
IEEE Aerospace Conference (pp. 1-7). IEEE. 
330 Ibid. 
331 Clark, R. M. (1999). Uninhabited combat aerial vehicles: airpower by the people, for the people, but not 
with the people. Air Univ Maxwell AFB AL School of Advanced Airpower Studies. 





4.10 Drones, Clinton’s Grand Strategy, and the Bosnian War 
The crisis in Somalia, the Balkanization of the former Yugoslav Republics, the rise of new 
economic and political entities such as the European Union, World Trade Organization (WTO), 
and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) were some of the changes in the 
post-Cold international system that informed the grand strategy of the Bill Clinton’s 
administration. This advertently presented a credible opportunity for President Clinton to 
pursue a NSS that focused on promoting American ideas in the liberal capitalist world order. 
This was the cornerstone of his grand strategy, which focused on national security, neoliberal 
globalization, and democratic promotion. This was expressed in his 1995 National Security 
Strategy, which championed the goals of free trade, open and equal access to foreign markets, 
and enhancement of US national security—in effect consolidating, deepening, and globalizing 
the neoliberal project of Reagan’s era. 
Initially, President Clinton did not prioritise the use of American military power to address 
foreign policy issues. As Andrew Bacevich notes, Clinton was “keen on avoiding any 
American casualties; military power was not to be unleashed but doled out in precisely 
measured increments.”334 However, while his administration was committed to promoting 
economic liberalization, the Bosnian war and subsequent attacks on American buildings by al-
Qaeda caused a U-turn in Clinton’s use of America power and, in effect, prompted the offensive 
proclivities of his grand strategy – a task he would eventually delegate to the CIA.  
The outbreak of the Bosnian war of 1992, between Orthodox Serbs and Bosnia’s Muslim 
(Bosniaks) and Croats in the former Yugoslav Republic, saw the use of the Predator drone.   
These drones fitted with payload sensors with electro-optical infrared technology were 
equipped with line-of-sight capabilities and built-in ultra-high-frequency satellite 
communication system and guided missile system. They were the first military drone to be 
used in complex, joint tactical operations in an active combat theatre as part of the US Air 
Force Combat Command’s 11th Reconnaissance in the Bosnian war.335 This was predominantly 
due to their combat readiness and ISR capabilities for supporting ground troops and their 
friendly forces.336 
                                                             






The emergence of the Predator is, however, not surprising as several factors accounted for their 
development. 
i. The aftermath of the Vietnam War sapped domestic support for prolonged wars and 
American soldier casualties. This led to US Joint Chiefs of Staff asking the then 
Director of Intelligence, Michael Cramer, to develop ISR capabilities that protected 
the lives of non-combatants in combat zones.337 
ii. New post-Cold War security threats that did not conform to traditional military 
weapons  
iii. The need to leverage the success of the Pioneer drone in the Persian Gulf War. 
iv. The Predator’s ISR capabilities and its integrated arms platform was a key 
component for facilitating the working of the C4 ISR system. 
The Predator was pivotal in surveillance and intelligence gathering, and supporting ground 
troops during the war. Its live video and re-tasking capabilities increased battlefield awareness 
for commanders. It flew over 20,000 hours and made several combat deployments, including 
providing targeting and real-time intelligence.338 The ISR capabilities of the Predator provided 
valuable intelligence to NATO and US military commanders that facilitated active bombing 
operations and contributed to the denouement of the war with the signing of the Dayton Peace 
Accord in 1995.339 
The successful deployment of the Predator inspired further development and redesign of drones 
by the CIA and US Air Force that incorporated the C4 ISR system. These modifications 
included an expanded data-dissemination structure and air-traffic control systems.340 During 
Operation Allied Force – NATO’s military operation against the former Yugoslav Republic 
during the Kosovo War – further use of drones for military-type engagement demonstrated the 
ascendancy of their weaponry in US military affairs, particularly with the introduction of the 
Pioneer, Predator, and the Hunter. While the first two systems had been deployed in previous 
wars, the IAI RQ-5 Hunter drone with C-band line-of-sight link and sensors made them provide 
IMINT in real-time.341 After the Kosovo conflict, drones became more tactical than strategic 
for US military missions, as manifested in further deployment for surveillance missions 
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globally. This increase of drones in military operations under Clinton’s administration further 
consolidated their role as instruments of war and statecraft in a post-Cold War era. This fitted 
with the DoD’s third offset strategy – which aimed to revitalize US conventional deterrence 
capabilities and to outmanoeuvre near-peer competitors closing the gap on American military-
technological advantage post-Cold War.  
4.11 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, the historical development of drones and US grand strategy from its early 
development in WWI to the Kosovo war in the 1990s was outlined and critically assessed. 
During WWI though the technology behind drones was still in its incipient stages, its success 
in the war influenced their further development in the Inter-War period and their use in WWII. 
The utility of drones as assault weapons and in reconnaissance missions in WWII laid the 
precedent for the evolution of the modern-day use of drones in warfare. The analysis showed 
that drones had limited utility in facilitating the US grand strategy before the Cold War. This, 
however, changed in the heat of the Cold War, especially in the Korean and Vietnam Wars and 
in the post-Cold War period when the application and tactical relevance of its weaponry 
became useful for military operations and for facilitating the offensive aspects of US grand 
strategy. Despite the predominance of nuclear weapons and air power in the grand scheme of 
strategic considerations in the Cold War period, this examination highlighted the 
instrumentality of drones as part of the quiver of tools in US weaponry. This was demonstrated 
in their efficacy for dealing with threats and in protecting American values and interests in the 
face of hegemonic threats, and in dealing with rogue states. The impact of their role during and 
after the Cold War laid the precedents for the deepening of their use and lethal weaponization 
after 9/11 as a tactical and strategic instrument for warfare and statecraft.  In the next chapter, 
the role of drones in the Bush administration is examined in order to ascertain if their 














The Cold War provided various lessons for the use of drones, and there was evidence that 
during the early post-Cold War period, they were becoming more instrumental strategically. 
However, things were to change as the Bush administration, particularly following the terrorist 
attacks of 2001, which not only changed his perception of threat of the international 
environment and the grand strategy of his administration but also led to the lethal 
weaponization of drones for CT missions in targeted states. 
Did the use of drones during the Bush administration support or undermined US grand 
strategy? In answering this question, it is necessary to consider the foreign policy outlook of 
the Bush administration, the ways in which drones were used during this period, and the way 
they intersected with the US grand strategy. The key argument in this chapter is that drone use 
during the Bush administration was closely related to a shift in US grand strategy from the 
defensive realist stance of successive US presidents in the post–Cold War period to a national 
security realist posture in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The chapter further argues that 
preventive and pre-emptive drone strikes served to undermine Bush’s grand strategy, 
particularly in targeted states such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Yemen by causing unintended 
civilian deaths, a broader escalation of anti-American sentiment, a rise in retaliatory strikes by 
radical insurgents, and through their propaganda value as a recruitment tool for extremists. 
Furthermore, though the global proliferation of drones was not significant during his 
administration, as the US maintained a monopoly over the use of lethal drones, the deployment 
of armed drones under Bush laid the precedent for its proliferation as it demonstrated their 
military utility for US counterterrorism missions.342 
In building these arguments, the chapter is divided into four sections. In the first part, the 
foreign policy of the Bush administration prior to and after the 9/11 terrorist attacks is analysed. 
The second part examines the emergence of a post-9/11 grand strategy, including the role of 
neo-conservatism in that process. In the third part, the evolution of Bush drone warfare from 
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2000 to 2008 is assessed. The fourth section examines the role of and rationale for drone use 
during the Bush administration. In the last section, we examine whether the use of drones 
undermined the US grand strategy during this period. 
 
5.1 George W. Bush’s Foreign Policy Before and After 9/11 
 
Since the US emerged as the sole superpower following the end of the Cold War, successive 
US presidents have sought to formulate and pursue different grand strategies in the absence of 
a peer competitor.343 This applies to George H.W. Bush’s ‘New World Order,’ Bill Clinton’s 
‘Engagement and Enlargement’ strategy, George W. Bush’s ‘Primacy,’ and more recently to 
Barack Obama’s pursuit of ‘Restraint’ and Donald Trump’s ‘America First.’   
 
Prior to 9/11, the foreign policy of the George W. Bush administration pursued a defensive 
realist strategy. As part of this, it showed little appetite for global democratic interventions. 
Many analysts344 have argued that the foreign policy of Bush during this period was devoid of 
elements of offensive liberalism or, more precisely, of plans to forcefully project military into 
rogue states or those providing safe havens for terrorists. This was expressed by Bush’s 
ambivalence before 9/11 to effecting regime change or to order offensive military action 
against the Baathist government in Iraq. Likewise, his initial foreign policy orientation, or what 
has been described by Robert Jervis345 as the ‘First Bush Doctrine’ – was predicated on 
strengthening US military power and managing great power competition with Russia and 
China. This stance was corroborated by Bush’s objection to the deployment of US military 
power in open-ended democratic intervention missions, as stated during his 1999 presidential 
campaign.346 In sum, prior to 9/11, the foreign policy of Bush can be summarised as one overly 
focused on changing the Clinton-era ‘enlargement and engagement’ strategy to a more 
defensive realist approach predicated on limited democratic interventions and little inclination 
for offensive liberal proclivities.347 
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The September 9/11 attack ushered in a new direction for US grand strategy by challenging the 
Bush administration’s seeming complacency to threats in the international environment. The 
terrorist attack engendered new security concerns and a heightened fear that radical terrorist 
groups would acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) to carry out coordinated attacks 
on US soil and interests.348 This is mainly because the 9/11 attacks heightened the perception 
of a possible alliance between rogue states and radical militant groups in perpetuating further 
terror attacks against the US.349 
 
As a consequence, the 9/11 attacks led to a shift in priorities and a new foreign policy direction 
for the Bush administration as encapsulated in the ‘Second Bush Doctrine.’350 The new doctrine 
was articulated in the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) and outlined four aspects of US 
strategy in the post-9/11 security environment. First, at the heart of the Bush doctrine was the 
idea of anticipatory self-defense – the requirement for the US to act unilaterally, with 
immediacy, and offensively in dealing with global terrorist threats.351 This included preventive 
and preemptive wars against imminent threats from rogue states and terrorist groups seeking 
to develop WMDs.352 Second, the strategy strongly advocated for sustaining US military 
primacy, arguing that a preponderance of US power could ensure peace and that the most 
serious threat to US primacy would be an “across-the-board” political, economic, and military 
challenger.353 The fundamental objective of the US was premised on a will to forcefully guard 
the international order against illiberal threats and the rise of a foreign power.354 Fourth, it 
declared its goal for forcible democracy promotion, particularly in the Muslim world (Miller, 
2010). The new approach encapsulated in the second Bush doctrine thus formed the main 
foreign policy focus of the administration and shifted the administration towards an offensive 
liberal approach to grand strategy. 
 
5.2 Grand Strategy after 9/11 and the Role of Neo-conservatism  
 
Following 9/11, the Bush administration believed that its existing foreign policy strategy was 
not suitable for addressing the threat of transnational terrorism and that a new direction was 
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needed. More precisely, the 9/11 terrorist attacks demonstrated the flaws in defensive and 
offensive realist approaches that seemed ill-suited for dealing with non-state threats like suicide 
bombings, rogue states, or transnational terrorism.355 In his assessment of the different versions 
of US grand strategies, Bernard Miller argues that they were “incapable of offering any 
effective response for dealing with non-state threats.”356 Implicit in defensive realism is the 
advocacy for the use of deterrence as a tactic to achieve its goals. While this may be useful 
against traditional state actors and against nuclear-armed states, deterrence was seen as an 
ineffective strategy to combat “irrational” terrorist or rogue states that were, or could be, 
willing to support transnational terrorist networks, use suicide bombs or WMD with little 
regard for their own lives.357  
Furthermore, while preventive attacks could be allowed through an offensive realist strategy 
and could potentially deal with the threats posed by rogue states and terrorist groups, it does 
not preclude the possibility of hostile regimes rebuilding infrastructure and conducting 
clandestine activities in hard-to-reach areas.358 In the same vein, defensive liberalism, based on 
advocacy for multilateral diplomacy to advance non-proliferation, seemed to be a weak 
approach to adopt in dealing with regimes that were likely to hide their WMD programs or 
rogue states that could clandestinely support and finance transnational terrorism.359 
 
It was not possible to forge a grand strategy for dealing with the threat of al-Qaeda and rogue 
states via a rational, linear process. However, in the aftermath of 9/11, there appeared to be a 
symmetry between neo-conservative thinking and the immediate needs of the administration. 
Thus, the crucial issue for the Bush administration after 9/11 was formulating the most 
appropriate approach to deal with the rising threat of Islamic terrorism, and this served as the 
catalyst for the center play of neo-conservative ideas for US foreign policy in the Bush 
administration.  
 
Neo-conservatism had been a prominent part of the US domestic debate on foreign policy since 
the end of the Cold War and had a broader intellectual history stretching back at least to the 
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1960s. With the demise of the Soviet Union, neo-conservatives advocated that enforced 
democracy promotion based on an offensive liberal strategy should be the cornerstone of a new 
ideological American foreign policy.360  
 
Neoconservatives had been influential players at the inception of Bush’s unilateralist 
administration and gained more influence after 9/11. Neo-conservatives such as Paul 
Wolfowitz appeared to be the only ones ready with a detailed program that offered a credible 
response for dealing with the post-9/11 threats based on their long-standing offensive liberal 
agenda with regard to Iraq and the Middle East. Analyses by Robert Jervis361 and Robert 
Kaufman362 have shown the program included an explanation of the sources of terrorism (that 
states in the Middle East were aiding and abetting terrorism by inflaming American resentment 
and incentivizing the spread of radical Islamic ideologies), a program for forcible regime 
change in Iraq, and an action plan for dismantling terrorist operations and the rogue regimes 
that allegedly harboured them. Finally, Wolfowitz, an ardent neoconservative under Bush, 
proposed replacing rogue regimes with liberal democracies, arguing that “the more democratic 
the world becomes, the more likely it is to be both peaceful and friendly to America.”363 
 
As a consequence, due to the availability and the seeming plausibility of the neo-conservative 
approach, together with the political and strategic shock of 9/11, key officials in the Bush 
administration, such as Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, who hitherto had not been seen as 
neo-conservatives, also adopted this approach. Offensive liberalism thus became a key aspect 
of the Bush administration’s post 9/11 foreign policy and informed the President’s usage of the 
term, ‘Axis of Evil,’ during the January 2002 State of the Union address and the articulation of 
Second Bush Doctrine of September 2002. As Miller puts it, “the offensive liberal strategy 
advocated by neo-conservatives, focused not only on changing the capabilities of rogue 
regimes, namely destroying their WMD and preventing them from acquiring more but also on 
changing their ideological character by transforming the nature of their political system – 
namely, enforced democratization.”364 
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The offensive liberal strategy was perceived not only as necessary for US security but also as 
feasible since it was expected that “the oppressed Middle Eastern peoples would welcome 
democracy if they could be helped to get rid of their oppressors.”365 The expectation of the neo-
conservatives was that a successful regime change in Iraq would have ripple effects across 
other states in the region and thus trigger democratization in the whole of the Middle East. 
Ultimately, while US power preponderance made this strategy possible, the high level of 
perceived threat post-9/11 provided the catalyst for its adoption, with neo-conservative 
ideology providing its intellectual underpinnings. The next section explores the phases of drone 
warfare under the Bush administration. 
5.3 The Evolution of Lethal Drone Warfare 2001-2008 
Since the first lethal drone strike in Kandahar, Afghanistan, in October 2001, the Bush 
administration’s use of drone warfare evolved and expanded in terms of the range of operations 
and targets. This evolution is divided into three phases (see table 7 below) and the casualty 
figures (see table 8 below). The first phase (2002-2004) served as the testing period for the use 
of drones for the elimination of HVTs in targeted states. The second phase (2005-2007) was 
characterised by slight increases in strikes on HVTs. The third phase (2007-2008) consisted of 
the escalation of drone strikes in targeted states. 
Table 6: Phases of Bush Drone Warfare 
Drone Strikes by Phase Number of strikes HVTs Killed Total Deaths 
(2002-2004) 2 2 11 
(2005-2007) 6 2 53 
(2007-2008) 48 5 333 
 Source: Adapted from Hudson, Owens, and Flames.366 
 
Table 7: Drone strikes and Casualty Figures in the Bush-era  
Drone strikes and Casualty Figures in the Bush-era  
 Figures 
Total drone strikes 51 
Total reported killed: 410-595 
Civilians reported killed: 167-332 
Children reported killed: 102-129 
Total reported injured: 175-277 
Source: TBIJ.367 
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The first phase of Bush’s drone warfare began in mid-November 2001 when a drone strike 
killed Mohammed Atef, an al-Qaeda military commander. This was followed by another CIA 
drone strike in the Maarib province of north-eastern Yemen. The strike killed six al-Qaeda 
militants, including Salim Sanin al-Harethi, and it was the first drone strike to kill an American 
citizen, Kamal Derwish.368 The next attack started in 2004 and killed Nek Mohammed, an 
influential member of the Taliban and a former Mujahedeen. The total number of HVTs killed 
in this period based on published data from TBIJ is estimated to be five or six.369 
The second phase occurred mainly in Pakistan. Drones strike increased slightly during this 
period and targeted al-Qaeda and Taliban HVTs in the remote FATA region of Pakistan. 
Though there are conflicting reports that most of the targets killed during this phase were 
mainly low-value targets (LVTs) and not top members of the al-Qaeda core370, the elimination 
of Hamza Rabia, the number three in the chain of command in al-Qaeda, did occur during this 
phase. In the third phase, the use of drones for leadership decapitation became a key component 
of strategy, as more HVTs were eliminated following the intensification of lethal drone strikes 
in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Somalia (see table 9 below). 
Table 9: Drone strikes against HVTs in the third phase of the Bush administration’s drone 
warfare. 
Drone HVT Terrorist Role/Affiliation Date of Death 
Qaed Salim Sinan al-
Harethi 
Al-Qaeda leader in Yemen November 3, 2002 
Nek Mohammed Wazir Senior Taliban Leader in Pakistan circa 2004 
Abu Laith al Libi Senior militant/Al-Qaeda in 
Afghanistan 
January 31, 2008 
Abu Khabab al-Masri Al-Qaeda Weapons Chief 28 July 2008 
Khalid Habib Al-Qaeda Leader in Northwest 
Pakistan 
October 16, 2008 
Usama al Kini Senior militant/Al-Qaeda in 
Pakistan 
January 2, 2009 
Author’s adaptation from TBIJ and NAF. 
 
The rationale for the use of drones for leadership targeting is expressed in the 2003 National 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT). The document highlighted the intersection 
between leadership decapitation and the collapse of terrorist organizations. 
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“The terrorist leadership provides the overall direction and strategy that links 
all these factors and thereby breathes life into a terror campaign. The leadership 
becomes the catalyst for terrorist action. The loss of leadership can cause many 
organizations to collapse. Some groups, however, are more resilient and can 
promote new leadership should the original fall or fail. Still, others have adopted 
a more decentralized organization with largely autonomous cells, making our 
challenge even greater.”371 
Thus, the focus of drone strikes for the Bush administration was the elimination of leaders 
affiliated with global al-Qaeda and its affiliates. As a counterterrorism tool, it demonstrated 
that the US could leverage the precision and lethal weapon capabilities of drone technology for 
leadership decapitation when targets were identified and intelligence matched the kill order.372 
The success of drones in eliminating HVTs like Salim Sinan al-Harethi – who was targeted for 
his involvement in the October 2000 USS Cole bombing and the October 2002 Limburg attack 
– and Nek Mohammed, a senior Taliban leader in Pakistan, gave the Bush administration the 
impression that if limited drone strikes were successful at leadership decapitation and terrorist 
disruption, more strikes would be even better. The logic behind this argument is that drone 
strikes create a climate of fear among terrorist targets by fracturing their organization and 
eventually leading to their collapse.373 In writings discovered after his death, Osama bin Laden 
lamented the impact of drone strikes and recommended that Al-Qaeda leaders flee Waziristan 
to safer terrain to avoid them.374 
The US process behind making the decision to launch a decapitation strike through targeted 
killings is worth noting here. According to Gallarotti,375 this involves (i) deciding if the target 
is a significant threat to US interests, (ii) cognizance of state sovereignty issues, (iii) high 
confidence in the target’s identity, and (iv) that innocent civilians will not be harmed and, 
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5.4 Explaining Drone use During the Bush Administration 
 
The domestic rationale for lethal drones was predicated on the AUMF. The AUMF not only 
expanded the executive powers of US presidents to use force for matters of national security 
but also served as the basis for the rationalization of lethal drone strikes for Bush’s preemptive 
and preventive attacks in targeted states. The Bush administration further maintained that 
Article 51 of the UN Charter gave the US the authority to act in self-defense against high-level 
targets who were planning attacks, both in and out of declared theatres of war.376 
Since their first lethal use, the precision, accuracy, and disruptive effects of drones on terrorist 
groups have helped to avoid the costs of conventional war – civilian and soldier deaths and 
collateral damage.377 This is premised on the idea that drones are more capable than human 
beings in gathering and processing information precisely, rapidly, and flexibly.378 Similar 
arguments assert that drones provide the US with greater incentive and capacity to defend itself 
from external aggression through the projection of force.379 
At an operational level, one of the many US responses in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks was 
the increase in the build-up of military and intelligence capabilities and the establishment of 
new military bases in Asia, including a new military command in Africa.380 This occasioned a 
rise in defence expenditures and emphasised the imperative of counterinsurgency initiatives 
for dealing with the new security threats in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Under Bush, 
drones initially served ISR functions, with limited lethality in the battlefield, but by the end of 
the administration and as a result of the change in his administration’s grand strategy, they had 
become weaponized tools for CT and COIN operations that more directly and forcefully served 
the offensive aspects of the Bush doctrine. 
Relatedly, As Aqil Shah recounts, America’s experience in Afghanistan and Iraq showed that 
a quick and decisive victory over the Taliban and Iraqi forces did not result in the complete 
destruction of the militant groups.381 In Iraq, armed groups mounted sustained attacks on US 
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forces resulting in high military casualties.382 In Afghanistan, US troops weakened but did not 
completely dismantle or eliminate the Taliban. The Afghan War caused al-Qaeda’s senior 
leadership to take safe haven in Pakistan’s FATA following the fall of the Taliban.383 This made 
it difficult for the US to bring to bear the extraordinary advantage in conventional military 
power it had in Afghanistan and Iraq384 and compounded the pressure (discussed in the next 
paragraph) on the US to make quick and decisive progress in Afghanistan, which required 
dismantling al-Qaeda’s safe haven in Pakistan.385 
The expectation that American military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq would be 
withdrawn as soon as stable and effective government institutions were created proved 
erroneous – meaning the US faced a choice between supporting a long term presence in both 
countries or decreasing its military footprint and risking a protracted war and the overthrow of 
its local allies.386 Also, al-Qaeda’s clandestine transnational network became increasingly 
complex for the US to track, disrupt and dismantle, especially as it established links with other 
armed groups and terrorist affiliations as far away as Southeast Asia, Northern and Eastern 
Africa, and the Middle East.387 
The onset of intense violence, the rising cost of war, mounting American soldier deaths, 
increasing uncertainty over the US democracy promotion mission in Iraq, and the perception 
that the administration lacked an exit strategy and a defined path to victory served to undermine 
President Bush’s foreign policy and public support for it.388 Initially, the wars in Iraq and in 
Afghanistan received the support of a majority of Republicans and Democrats in Congress and 
from the majority of the American public. Pew Research conducted when the Iraq War began 
in March 2003 showed more than seven in ten Americans (73%) supported the use of force, 
including 93% of Republicans, 66% of Independents, and 59% of Democrats.389 Towards the 
end of the George W. Bush administration, support for military action in Iraq had plummeted, 
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with only 17% of Democrats and 73% of Republicans supporting the war.390 Thus, the use of 
drones under Bush, particularly in the latter stages of the administration, offered a way to 
continue the conflicts in the Middle East without sapping public support.   
 
The Bush administration’s experience in Iraq following the invasion of 2003 thus made the use 
of drone strikes a more attractive strategy.391 As their use in the latter part of the administration 
showed, drones became a manifestation of primacy and hard power empowerment for an 
offensive liberal grand strategy. Used in this way, drones fulfilled an important objective of 
aggressively countering terrorism as “an assertive and determined strategy to rollback threats 
that challenge US national security.”392  In sum, the use of drones after 9/11 under Bush 
reflected not only America’s technological and military power but also reiterated the 
commitment of the US to act alone in defeating al-Qaeda and its affiliates. This pivotal role 
was expressed in its utility as a tool for the propagation of a form of ‘American First’ multi-
unilateralism – which advocates the use of brute force when US interest is threatened without 
compromising the benefit and necessity of multilateral cooperation.393 
 
5.5 The Dilemma of Drone Warfare for the Bush administration’s Grand Strategy 
 
Since the 9/11 attacks, drones have played an important yet controversial role in US 
counterterrorism strategy. Despite the acknowledged utility of drones for targeted killings, 
reducing troop deployment, and casualty figures, the intensification of their use in targeted 
states had several negative effects. Ultimately, they worked at cross-purposes with the more 
liberal elements of the Bush administration’s grand strategy and undermined efforts to promote 
democracy in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen. This was due to the countervailing 
democratic reactions engendered in the aftermath of drone strikes in these targeted states, such 
as local protests against their use, unintended civilian death, anti-American sentiments, and 
militant recruitment and violence. From this lens, rather than consolidating democratic 
promotion, drone use triggered the conditions that undermined it. 
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A number of scholars have taken up this line of reasoning. The use of drones against HVTs 
from 2002-2007, as Kilcullen and Exum,394 avers caused indignation to their use in targeted 
states. They argue that drones engendered three effects that undermined their use (these 
assertions are supported by data outlined in the next paragraph). First, they created a siege 
mentality in targeted states, triggering a blowback effect for unintended civilian deaths and 
collateral damage caused. Second, drone strikes sparked opposition from the population in 
target areas and increased anti-American sentiments due to the moral and territorial issues 
associated with their use. Third, drones externalize the burden of war. This approximates with 
Krieg and Rickli’s395 explanation that drones are an instrument of ‘surrogate warfare’ – which 
places the burden of war on human and technological surrogates, particularly in instances 
where the US judges no vital American interest to be at stake. This is analogous to what Shaw 
and Akhter396 call the “dronification of state violence,” which highlights the shifting pattern of 
US state violence towards the inclusion of weaponized drones. 
More specifically, attempts to expand the offensive liberal strategy of the Bush doctrine beyond 
Iraq to Pakistan and Afghanistan appeared self-defeating and disempowering for the US. The 
reliance on drones as a tactic for targeted killing operations of terrorists increased the cause of 
anti-Western militancy and engendered political opposition in targeted states that supported 
drone operations.397 Richard Boyle398 contends that the way the US used its power in the WOT 
increased American vulnerability by energizing terrorism and galvanizing support for anti-
Western movements within the countries in which drone strikes occurred. Hazelton adds, 
“drone strikes appeared to inflame existing enmities the US had prior to 9/11 by creating a web 
of fear and vulnerability in targeted states.”399 The next paragraph supports the case that drone 
strikes inflame anti-American sentiments in targeted states. A recent study by David Jaegar 
and Zahra Siddique400 outlines the negative feedback in targeted states and the perception of 
the US as a military threat following drone strikes during the Bush era. The study reported the 
vengeance effects of drone strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan based on an analysis of terrorist 
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data attacks on the Taliban from January 2005-September 2011. The study showed that drone 
strikes induced further violence through vengeance by the Taliban.401 
A 2010 poll based on a sample of 1,000 residents in all seven FATA agencies showed that 76% 
of respondents opposed drone strikes; only 16 percent thought that such strikes accurately 
target insurgents, and 48 percent believed that the strikes largely kill civilians.402 Moreover, 60 
percent believed that suicide attacks against the US were “sometimes” or “always” justified. 
Bergen and Tiedemann, who conducted the survey, had used these figures to claim that suicide 
attackers are popular across FATA and that the main motivation for anti-American militancy 
“stems from anger at CIA-directed drone strikes at militants living in the area.”403 
Kilcullen implies that the aftermath of drones in targeted states elevates the level of anti-
American sentiment, which is counterproductive for US objectives to win the hearts and minds 
of the population in targeted states.404 This is against the backdrop of the siege mentality drone 
fosters in targeted states akin to what transpired in Somalia in 2005 and 2006, where targeted 
attacks against Union of Islamic Courts forces caused the Islamist's popularity to soar and 
consequently emboldened the use of extremist tactics. This eventually resulted in the military 
intervention in Ethiopia, a surge in the regional insurgency, and a rise in offshore pirate 
activities.405 Thus, while insurgency is usually unpopular, domestic outrage emanating from 
faceless drone attacks that kill innocent civilians makes the former less ominous. From this 
lens, instead of drones to advance the strategic objectives of the US, it creates negative 
outcomes that serve to undermine it. 
As Ashan Iqbal of the Muslim League Party (MLP) notes, the Islamist parties have used the 
pretext of the aftermath of drone strikes to mobilise thousands of followers throughout Pakistan 
in large protests in Punjab, North West Frontier Province, and Sindh.406 To this end, the 
excessive reliance on hard power (and drones) in dealing with terrorism under the Bush-era 
rather than improve the US image as a promoter of democracy, or address terrorism through 
legal mechanisms, served to undermine it. 
 
                                                             
401 Ibid 
402 Bergen, P., & Tiedemann, K. (2011). Washington's Phantom War: The Effects of the US Drone Programs in 
Pakistan. Foreign Aff., 90, 12. 
403 Ibid 
404 Ibid 
405 Kilcullen, D., & Exum, A. M. (2009). Death from above, outrage down below. New York Times, 16, 529-35. 
406 Iqbal Ashan cited in Williams, BG (2010) ‘The CIA’s covert predator drone war in Pakistan, 2004–2010: the 
history of an assassination campaign’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33(10), pp. 871–892. 
98 
 
Drone strikes have been argued to spur militant recruitment and retaliation in targeted states.407 
It is, however, hard to prove direct causation between drone strikes and militant retaliation – 
that the increase in suicide bombings was related to the emergence of insurgencies in targeted 
states that would probably have occurred even had drone strikes not been happening. For 
instance, insurgent action against the Pakistani government has been ongoing prior to drone 
strikes, particularly in FATA and NWFR. This was established conducted by Luqman and 
colleagues, based on a comparative analysis of the mean deviation of suicide attacks following 
drone strikes interval between the Bush and Obama. The report determined that at least one 
suicide attack occurred 3-days after each drone attack – compared to one in 20 days under 
Obama.408 They attributed their findings to drone attacks killing more children and women 
under Bush, which caused more reprisal actions compared to Obama, who had “cleaner” or 
surgical strikes. 
However, drones clearly fuelled the conditions under which these insurgencies grew. Boyle409 
, for example, argues that there is a substantive relationship between the increasing number of 
drone strikes and the mounting number of retaliation attacks. As data published by the TBIJ 
shows, for every high-profile, purposeful attack by the US, many more low-profile attacks take 
place.410 This position is supported by a report published by the CIA (2009) on HVTs: 
“The potential negative effect of high-level target operations includes 
increasing the level of insurgent support, strengthening an armed group's bonds 
with the population, radicalizing an insurgent group's remaining leaders, 
creating a vacuum into which more radical groups can enter, and escalating or 
de-escalating a conflict in ways that favour the insurgents.”411 
Drone attacks generate what Kilcullen describes as the “accidental-guerrilla” phenomenon – 
which explains that drones incentivize the militarization of the locals and increases the 
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propensity of reprisal attacks.412 Acknowledging the accidental guerrilla phenomenon, Shah 
writes, “the new combatants unable to retaliate against the US within FATA, crossed over the 
border into Afghanistan, where US troops, NATO forces, and Afghan security forces are 
concentrated and present easily identifiable targets by joining the ranks of groups like the 
Pakistani Taliban, whose attacks within Pakistan destabilize the US-Pakistani alliance.”413 
These “new combatants” contribute to the growth of terrorist cells, which hinder US 
counterinsurgency operations. This implies that the use of drones as a decapitation strategy 
served as a propaganda tool for the creation of accidental guerrillas in targeted states – a 
consequence of which engendered a paradox of Bush CT operations. Articulating this, Jessica 
Wolfendale stated that “counterterrorism policies that are intended to enhance security often 
have a counterproductive and paradoxical effect.”414 This corresponds to a modified version of 
security dilemma analysis which explains situations where the actions were taken by a state to 
increase its own security cause reactions from other states, leading to a decrease rather than an 
increase in the state’s security.415 
Data published by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) supports this (see figure 2 below). As 
the trend in the graph below shows, retaliatory attacks in Pakistan increased with the 
intensification of US counterterrorism operations. The graph below (see 2002-2008) 
corresponds with evidence from research on terrorist radicalization and recruitment between 
2004 and 2008, which reported a steady rise in attacks by suicide bombers in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan – the two main centers for the Bush-era drone strikes.416 Though a recent study by 
Shah based on interviews and surveys of “well-informed” respondents in FATA, Pakistan, 
discredits the credibility of militant recruitment following drone strikes, his study still confirms 
drone strikes as contributing to the precarious security situation in Pakistan. 
The use of drones as a CT instrument of statecraft under Bush came at a high price for US soft 
power. Drones emphasised US hard power, which complicated its strategic mission in 
Afghanistan, as well as affected its fragile relationship with Pakistan.417 The negative feedback 
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of the new drone policy, particularly in targeted states, undermined the domestic and 
international soft power of the administration’s foreign policy.418 According to Byman,419 
drones caused “enormous pressure for governing structures in these countries while at the same 
time worsening social volatility in the target area with an unpredictable outcome.” This was 
the case in Pakistan, where the intensification of drone strikes culminated in a series of protests 
against the Pakistani government for aiding the US in killing its citizens.420  
Figure 2: Trends in terrorist retaliatory attacks in Pakistan following US counterinsurgency 
operations.  
 
Source: GTD, University of Maryland, 2019.421 
 
Likewise, the US COIN mission in Afghanistan also became a victim of two forms of 
blowback. The first blowback arose from the feeling of asymmetric vulnerability from non-
combatants on the ground in the target area. The feeling resulted in the desire to fight back and 
inflamed national sentiment against the use of drones. The second blowback is that drones 
potentially engender stiff resistance to local authorities in targeted states which are shown to 
be powerless (or even complicit) to stop drone strikes over their territories.422 The point here is 
that the Bush administration’s drone attacks served to further destabilise an already fragile 
nation by deepening divides between the citizenry that abhors the attacks and the government 
institutions that tolerate or facilitate them.423 
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5.6 Chapter Summary 
 
In this chapter, the role of drones in the grand strategy of the Bush administration has been 
critically assessed. One of the key arguments is that drones served as a tool for facilitating US 
offensive liberal strategies under Bush. The utility of drones for targeted killings, leadership 
decapitation, and as an instrument of statecraft in targeted states were also highlighted. The 
overarching argument in this chapter is that drone strikes in targeted states undermined rather 
than supported US grand strategy, especially towards the end of the Bush administration. 
Furthermore, the use of drones by Bush for CT set a precedent that made them attractive to 
other states and non-state actors, and while substantial armed drone proliferation did not take 
place until the Obama administration, their use under Bush established a legacy for the 
advancement and development of armed drones. As such, the US would lose its US monopoly 
on drone technology (this is further investigated later in the thesis). 
In the next chapter, the Obama administration’s use of drone warfare and its impact on US 
grand strategy is examined. Is there a continuation of the US offensive liberal agenda under 
Obama? Did his foreign policy show continuity with Bush doctrine? How and to what extent 
were drones used to facilitate US strategy? Were they successful? What undermined it? These 
questions are a core interest in the next chapter. The chapter also provides an assessment of 















Obama’s Drone Wars and US Grand Strategy 
“Obama’s drone programme, in fact, amounts to the largest unmanned aerial offensive ever 
conducted in military history: never have so few killed so many by remote control.”424 
6.0 Introduction 
In this chapter, the role of drones in the Obama administration’s grand strategy is critically 
assessed. The overarching argument is that the tactical reliance and intensification of drone use 
for targeted killings during Obama’s era served as a double-edged strategy for facilitating the 
administration’s hybrid grand strategy that sought, on the one hand, to promote America’s 
exceptionalism, multilateral engagement, and restraint in world affairs, and on the other, its 
military assertiveness. Despite the political and strategic utility of drones under Obama as a 
counterterrorism tool, this chapter argues that the aftermath of signature drone strikes in 
targeted states undermined Obama’s grand strategy by engendering a dronification and security 
paradox. The basis of the security paradox is that while drones had some beneficial security 
outcomes for the US – in saving the cost and risk of warfare – they also created negative 
outcomes in targeted states. This is evident in the increase of anti-American antipathy, 
retaliatory attacks, anti-drone protests due to civilian deaths and territorial violations, and 
suicide attacks following drone strikes. The dronification paradox argues that while drones 
have been effective CT instruments, the over-reliance of their use under Obama set a negative 
precedent for US CT to rival and regional powers. This manifested in the proliferation of drones 
among non-state actors, including revanchist and resurgent powers, and the continuation of 
terrorism despite leadership decapitation using drones. 
In building these arguments, this chapter is divided into five parts. The first part deciphers and 
unpacks the making of the Obama doctrine. The second part assesses the grand strategy of the 
Obama administration. The third part unbundles the elements, character, and phases of 
Obama’s drone warfare campaign. In the fourth part, the utility of drones in supporting 
Obama’s grand strategy is explored. The final part critically examines how drones have served 
to undermine Obama’s grand strategy. 
 
 
                                                             




6.1 The Making of the Obama Doctrine 
The precarious state of America’s global leadership following the end of the Bush 
administration served as the catalyst for the emergence of Obama’s foreign policy that sought 
to re-establish America’s exemplarism (leading by example) in global affairs. This is against 
the backdrop of the number of strategic challenges that greeted Obama’s presidency from its 
onset – a resurgent China, a domestic financial crisis, an assertive Russia in Europe, mounting 
war costs, an inherited global WOT, and the dent of America’s global image due to his 2003 
Iraq failed invasion. In reference to Bush, Obama in his 2008 presidential debate with Republic 
nominee, John McCain faulted his predecessor’s strategy in Iraq for not considering “how 
much the war was going to cost, whether US intelligence was sound, what the exit strategy 
might be, how it would affect US relationships around the world, but also failed to finish the 
job in Afghanistan and put al-Qaeda to rest”425 
The aftermath of the Iraq invasion, as Brands notes, “weakened US power rather than 
strengthen it, as it put America in a position of strategic and military overstretch and increased 
its military spending.”426 On this basis, Obama’s presidency at its initial stages set its sight on 
reversing what they saw as the flawed foreign policy of the Bush-era, re-establishing a new 
course for America’s leadership in world affairs, and re-orienting Washington’s priorities. 
More precisely, he sought to reformulate the US offensive liberal strategy that relied on the use 
of force by including non-military aspects of America’s power – that placed a premium on 
multilateral engagement and cooperation, peaceful democracy promotion, and strategic 
partnerships for economic prosperity.427 Due to Obama’s preoccupation in undoing his 
predecessor’s errors and adjusting the relative settings of Washington’s consensus on the use 
of America’s global power, the early years of his presidency have drawn divergent analyses 
regarding the overarching goals it espoused for America’s engagement in world affairs. 
6.1.1 Did Obama have a Doctrine? 
There are different speculations in the literature on what constituted the pillars of Obama 
doctrine in the early years of his administration. Michael Clarks and Anthony Ricketts, in their 
article, argue that the early years of Obama’s foreign policy were “largely incoherent, 
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ideologically pragmatic” as it veered from America’s post-Cold War traditional foreign policy 
goal of democracy promotion.428 Likewise, Michael Hirsh, in his article, in The Atlantic, boldly 
declared, “Obama had no doctrine” due to his little interest in foreign policy, minimal 
appreciation of America’s powers, and excessive confidence in international norms.429 In a 
similar assessment, Timothy Lynch characterized Obama’s policies at their incipient stages as 
“a set of reactions, adapting itself to reality rather than reshaping it, as it provided no clear road 
map for America to navigate the murky waters of international affairs.”430 Adam Quinn, an 
expert in America’s foreign policy and politics, describes this period as a story; 
“…Characterized as the unfolding of two plots, intertwined yet distinct. One 
focuses on the presidency and consists of efforts to locate his approach within 
the intellectual historical context of US policymaking and evaluate its wisdom. 
The other concerns the status of the US within the international order and 
consists of debate over the sustainability of US primacy.”431 
The lack of renowned foreign policy advisers like Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski 
at the beginning of Obama’s tenure may partly account for the “chaotic and scattered”432 
characterization of his foreign policy. As David Unger argues, this is because Obama 
“imagined he could transform the content of American foreign policy without transforming its 
operating structures.”433 
6.2 Deciphering Obama’s First Doctrine 
Contra to the view that the clearest articulation of Obama’s foreign policy was lacking at the 
incipient stages of his presidency, four strategic priorities are identifiable from his presidential 
campaigns that formed the cornerstone of his foreign policy – which were indicative that 
Obama had a grand strategy. They include: (i) facilitating America’s disengagement from Iraq, 
(ii) refocusing the attention of US counterterrorism spotlight on Afghanistan and Pakistan (Af-
Pak) with the broader escalation of drone operations, (iii) re-orientating Washington’s 
leadership away from vindicationism – that placed a premium on power projection and 
expression of American power, to exemplarism – that emphasizes exemplary leadership away 
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from the hubris of America’s power preponderance434 (iv) promoting multilateral engagement 
and (v) Pivot to Asia. These priorities become the pillars of the first Obama doctrine and 
subsequently informed his 2010 National Security Strategy. 
6.2.1 Disengaging America from Iraq 
On moving beyond Iraq, Obama published an article in Foreign Affairs435 where he explained 
the logic behind Iraq was flawed and argued that contemporary security issues are not amenable 
to purely military solutions; rather, they require a whole range of instruments of US political, 
economic and military power to address them.436 He argued that America could no longer 
afford to pursue an ambitious grand strategy of offensive liberalism that emphasizes overseas 
troop deployment, forced regime change, and military activism, as it not only creates more 
problems than it solves but also increases the burden of US security commitments and military 
spending.437 Rather, Obama proposed a more calibrated, cautious, and austere strategy akin to 
what two renowned American political scientists, Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer, termed 
as “retrenchment or restraint.”438  
Retrenchment advocates for the scaling back of security commitment and military spending 
cuts to training and involving local forces to respond to security threats.439 Retrenchment 
proponents argue it prevents America’s declinism and will preserve its powers in global 
affairs.440 Besides, the call for cautious and internationalist strategy at the beginning of 
Obama’s presidency was amplified by fears of America's decline. This was vis-à-vis the rise 
of resurgent rivals, particularly China in Eurasia and Russia in former Soviet territories, and by 
the presence of a host of strategic challenges such as ongoing nuclear weapons proliferation 
and humanitarian crises around the world – that the Bush administration had failed to dispel. 
Obama’s calibrated strategy resulted in the phased withdrawal of American troops in Iraq and 
Afghanistan (from 183,000 in 2009 to 15,062 in 2016)441 and the training of local security 
forces in preserving domestic security. However, burgeoning new strategic challenges such as 
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China’s newfound assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific, the rise of the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS) 
threat, and the Arab Spring tested the limits of Obama’s commitment to retrenchment. As this 
chapter argues during the latter part of the Obama administration’s term, this caused a paradigm 
shift in Obama’s inclination towards international affairs and his disposition to use America’s 
military power.  
6.2.2 Broader Escalation of Counterterrorism 
Obama prioritized refocusing America’s CT operations from Iraq to Afghanistan and Pakistan 
(Af-Pak). The main goals included: (i) cracking down on the Taliban command and leadership 
hierarchy, (ii) decapitating and the leadership of al-Qaeda HVTs and its affiliates, (iii) 
dismantling the terrorist links and safe havens, (iv) disrupting terrorist organization within 
America’s homeland. These goals not only formed the hallmark of Obama’s CT strategy, but 
they became the main reference point of his administration’s drone programme in targeted 
states. Furthermore, Obama initially expressed continuity for the Bush-era WOT, however with 
a new CT nomenclature that declared war on “far-reaching network of violence and terror”442 
that attacks the US, its allies, and partners. This was buttressed further in his 2010 NSS 
document, which affirmed his declaration to wage a global campaign, “…against al-Qaeda and 
its terrorist affiliates to protect the America homeland, secure the world’s most dangerous 
weapons and material, deny al-Qaeda safe haven, and build positive partnerships with Muslim 
communities around the world.”443 The CT efforts of Obama at the incipient stages of his 
presidency subsequently informed the 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism (NSCT) 
which had as its primary objective the goal of dismantling terrorist networks that posed direct 
and significant threats to the US.444 
6.2.3 Promoting Washington’s Exemplarism 
Obama advocated a foreign policy that espoused America’s exemplarism that insulates the 
world from the hubris of America’s power in the unipolar world. Contra to his predecessors, 
he categorically opposed the “emblematic muscular internationalism”445 stance of former US 
presidents, rather championed the merits of America’s global leadership that avoids the ideals 
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of moral absolutism, exceptionalism, and misguided faith in brute power for dealing with world 
problems. Obama, speaking at the G-20 meeting in Strasbourg on 4 April 2009, called for 
greater strategic collaboration among world powers in global affairs and dismissed the notion 
of an America endowed with exceptional responsibilities in world affairs.446 Similarly, while 
addressing the UN on 23 September 2009, he promoted the allure of US soft power that 
showcased its diplomatic strength, persuasion, and values rather than the coercive instruments 
of its economic and military might.447 Daniel Drezner described this as counterpunching – to 
underscore Obama’s willingness to leverage America’s soft power to project its influence and 
ideals across the globe, particularly when challenged by other countries.448 This, however, did 
not mean Obama was dismissive of using America’s power in unilateral humanitarian missions 
or when its national interest was threatened.  
6.2.4 Pivot to Asia 
Obama’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ strategy was an economic, diplomatic, and security approach 
developed for the Asia-Pacific that places Washington in the cockpit of global security 
competition in the region. Some scholars argue that Pivot to Asia (later relabelled the 
rebalancing) was a long-term change of US strategy to Asia initiated under the Obama 
presidency but has been carried on by successive administrations – particularly, Trump.449 For 
instance, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) – a free trade agreement between the US and 
twelve Pacific-rim countries intended to liberalise trade and foreign investment (now renamed 
without the US, as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (CPTPP)), was an economic component of the Pivot to Asia strategy that took years 
to negotiate but created what Rubrick Beigon termed a “crisis of common sense.”450   This is 
because it inadvertently fostered a trade governance crisis, and its approach was devoid of clear 
answers to the broader strategic goals of the administration in Asia.451  
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Extending his analysis, John Ford argues, the strategy was based on a number of flawed 
assumptions, which led to its demise and can be regarded as one of Obama’s biggest foreign 
policy failures. The assumptions were: (i) that hitherto US foreign policy had neglected the 
Asia-Pacific, (ii) that assigning more military, economic, and diplomatic resources to the region 
was the best response to its growing global economic influence, (iii) that it would afford the 
US the opportunity to pull back its security commitments from the Middle East.452 Militarily, 
the strategy created a need for the US to reorient its force structure away from Europe and the 
Middle East to Asia. Drones, in part, created a way for the US to do this by freeing up key 
military assets that would have been deployed in the region – this was also evident in US drone 
sales. For instance, the US under Obama sold MQ-9 Reaper drones to Taiwan, which the DoD 
argues was intended to “improve the security of Taiwan and assist in maintaining its political 
stability, military balance, economic progress in the region.”453 This, however, infuriated 
Beijing and caused it to increase its military drills in the South China Sea (SCS) in response to 
US intervention in the region.  
Thus, rather than improve Washington’s influence in the region, the Pivot to Asia approach 
inflamed tensions in the Asia-Pacific and caused the Middle East and Europe to fall into deeper 
chaos due to neglect. According to Ford,  
“America’s neglect of Europe was followed by Russian adventurism in Ukraine, 
an increased threat to the Baltic states, and the erosion of democracy in Poland 
and Hungary. After America pulled back from the Middle East, the Syrian Civil 
War displaced 11 million people and caused a refugee crisis, the Islamic State 
moved into Iraq, and America’s relationships with its Gulf allies frayed as 
Iranian influence expanded throughout the region.”454  
Furthermore, it provoked an aggressive military response from Beijing in an effort to contain 
America’s growing influence.455 China’s defense response was also evident in its deployment 
of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) in an effort to keep US fighter jets and naval ships from the 
shores of China. This also included improving its drone technology and sophisticated radar 
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capabilities, prominent among them being the CH-4 drones.456 (the broader impact of these for 
US grand strategy is analysed later in chapter 9). 
6.2.5 Multilateral Engagement 
Obama sought to build bridges that fostered global partnerships, conciliated actual and 
potential rivals rather than his predecessor’s “coalition of the willing.” This was evident in his 
speech delivered at Cairo University in Egypt on 4 June 2009, which announced “a new 
beginning for the Muslim world” and a willingness to broker a nuclear deal with Iran and 
establish free trade agreements with Eurasia.457 It also called for international support in 
fighting transnational terrorism.458 The default basis of Obama’s multilateralism based on his 
commencement address at West Point on May 28, 2014, is premised on four principal 
objectives: (i) non-proliferation and disarmament, (ii) promotion of global peace and security, 
(iii) global environmental protection, (iv) globalization of the world economy.  
These four strategic priorities highlighted above were re-echoed in the 2010 NSS, which had 
as its core goals: multilateralism and global engagement, the doctrine of strategic patience – 
that advocates the pursuit of national security at low cost and minimal losses, retrenchment, 
American exemplarism, use of force as a last resort, and intensifying counterterrorism 
efforts.459 
Robert Kaufman, a renowned professor of politics, summarizes Obama’s foreign policy in his 
first term as containing seven tenets: retreat from vindicationism, an embrace of 
multilateralism, strategic irrelevance of regime type, reluctance to use decisive military power, 
preference of soft power, and diplomacy, strategic retrenchment, and acceptance of 
multipolarity and collaborative engagement with potential rivals.460 The sum of Obama’s first 
term can be described as one deeply enmeshed in undoing a number of Bush’s decision that it 
ended up providing no clear road map for America’s foreign policy in the post 9/11 security 
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environment. This will, however, change during Obama’s re-election in his second term as US 
president. 
The next section discusses Obama’s second term, the changes to his foreign policy outlook, 
and the role of neo-realism in this process. 
6.3 Obama’s Second Term and the Rise of ‘Neo-Realism’ 
6.3.1 An Era of Pragmatism 
Obama’s second term has been described as “pragmatic” due to his readiness to prioritize 
America’s national security interests and assert its hard power readily. Juneau Saunders 
describes this type of pragmatism in a National Interest article as one that enunciated realism 
and rooted in “an awareness of international anarchy, infused with a deep understanding of 
American power in service of a strategy based on American interests.”461 As Goldberg puts it, 
in Obama’s second term, “America’s foreign policy became a middle ground caught between 
internationalism and realism on one hand and engaged multilateralism and military restraint on 
another.”462  
Obama’s pragmatism was demonstrated in his willingness to use America’s military power 
more assertively in preserving the rules-based order and in projecting Washington’s pre-
eminence in world affairs. This was evident in the deployment of the US naval fleet to the Asia-
Pacific to challenge China’s military posturing and its territorial claims in the SCS. Also, in 
the deployment of troops to Iraq, Afghanistan, North Africa, Syria, and expanding drone 
strikes, and conducting limited military operations in Yemen and Libya. In addition to running 
a military budget of about $600 billion per year.463 Saunders argues that the White House had 
aggressively portrayed Obama as “steely-eyed pragmatists judiciously making tough calls on 
both international and domestic policy.”464 Though Obama denounced this characterization in 
the May 2014 Commencement speech at the US Military Academy in West Point, saying, 
“according to self-described realists, conflicts in Syria or Ukraine or the Central African 
Republic are not ours to solve.”465 
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The 2015 NSS, or the ‘Second Obama Doctrine,’ further expressed some of the core principles 
that defined his second term. These included: (i) leading with all instruments of American 
powers, and prioritizing its long term security interests, though it expressed its willingness to 
work with partners and set an example through American leadership (ii) strengthening national 
defence, protecting the homeland, and combating terrorism, (iii) elevating the principle of 
strategic patience in the pursuit of US security objectives and (iv) preserving the rules-based 
order.466 While some of these principles were captured in the previous NSS document, the new 
NSS expressed a coherent pathway for maintaining American leadership and a response to the 
contemporary strategic challenges faced by the US.  
6.3.2 Rise of Neo-Realism 
The inadequacies of offensive liberalist and realist strategy in addressing the challenges of the 
US in the post 9/11 security environment spurred the rise of neo-realist ideas within the Obama 
administration. Revisiting Millers’ assessment of the offensive and defensive interpretations of 
US  grand strategy (in chapters 2 and 3), following the end of the Bush administration, offensive 
liberalism and realism were no longer a suitable strategy for dealing with transnational terrorist 
groups due to the absence of imminent threats.467 Furthermore, offensive liberalism’s excessive 
reliance on hard power also proved incapable of providing an adequate response for dealing 
with the failure of Bush’s forcible regime change and vindicationism in Iraq. Likewise, implicit 
in offensive realism is the idea that state behaviour is a response to the anarchic nature of the 
international system.468 However, as Miller argues, it is a deficient strategy for dealing with 
the rise of an external threat (due to its inefficacy in dealing with imminent threats) or the 
antipathy generated by Bush’s preemptive and preventive wars.469 On the other hand, defensive 
realism assumes that the US is still growing in power and advocates for a multilateral approach 
that moves beyond the narrow focus on military power to elevate the role of US soft power.   
According to Kaufman, In Obama’s second term, “neorealist ideas crossed from an academic 
debate to a popular and practical discussion that challenged elite opinion and conventional 
wisdom on the Washington consensus on US power.”470 The inadequacies of neoliberalist and 
realist strategies in addressing the strategic challenges faced by the US spurred the rise of neo-
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realist ideas in the Obama administration. Neo-realists such as Chuck Hagel oppose the view 
of democratic primacists such as Leon Panetta on how Washington must exercise its power 
and preserve its global liberal agenda. They maintain that retrenchment would lower the cost 
and risks of Washington’s global posture, reduce its military footprint and security 
commitments while preserving US unipolarity.471 Neo-realists share the view that offensive 
liberalism is ineffective for dealing with post 9/11 security threats and oppose the 
neoconservative squander of America’s resources in costly wars due to its dangerous effect of 
overstretching America’s hegemonic power.472 These ideas are reflected in the grand strategy 
of the Obama administration.  
6.3.3 Obama’s Hybrid Defensive grand strategy 
There are several interpretations of Obama’s grand strategy. Brands, for instance, narrowed 
this down to three core elements: (i) preservation of the post-Cold War order of Washington’s 
leadership and primacy in world affairs, (ii) avoiding costly wars and military overstretch, and 
lastly,, (iii) increasing US influence in the Asia-Pacific.473 Other analyses conceptualize it as a 
hybrid strategy that espouses multiple yet contradictory approaches. For example, Jack Holland 
portrays it as “an alloy of defensive neo-realism, multilateralism and anti-moralistic variants 
of classical realism and pragmatism.”474 Thus, implying it is a strategy that exalts restraint and 
multilateralism and advocates for the use of Washington’s soft power in global affairs. This 
symbolized a change in US grand strategy from one that emphasized unipolarity and 
unilateralism to one that encouraged burden sharing, greater cooperation, and incorporated 
multilateral engagement and projection of soft power.  
Similarly, Colin Dueck, a renowned scholar on US grand strategy, also offered a hybrid 
analysis of Obama’s grand strategy as one containing five basic alternatives: containment, 
regime change, integration, bargaining, and non-intervention.475 In explaining these elements, 
Dueck delimits them as one that espoused limited democratic intervention, dismisses 
vindicationism, and commits to exemplary leadership. Georg Lofflman expatiates this further, 
“under Obama’s hybrid discourse, the US remained the world’s dominant power tasked with 
exercising global leadership but had subverted the unilateralism of Bush and the 
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neoconservative vision of primacy with a more conciliatory approach of multilateral 
cooperation and consultation.”476  
In sum, five core elements are identifiable from the preceding hybrid analysis of Obama’s 
grand strategy, namely: deep engagement, offshore balancing and restraint, strategic patience, 
economic globalization, and lastly, promoting an international rules-based order and 
preventing any affront to America’s hegemony.  
Though Obama is credited as being a “careful planner who gave a good account of his 
policies,”477 his grand strategy is criticized as “lacking in substance” and ineffective in its goal 
of preserving America’s leadership in global affairs. As Mikael Blomdahl puts it, “Obama’s 
greatest policy ambitions were domestic than international, and this reflected in his grand 
strategy which prioritized damage control and the need for diplomatic outreach towards US 
rivals such as Iran and China.”478 Drezner argues that the tone of his grand strategy was “neither 
of American triumphalism, exceptionalism or decline’479 due to its inconsistent articulation and 
implementation. However, no grand strategy is flawless, and its success is mostly dependent 
on the goals of the political leader who also has domestic considerations in mind amidst 
prevailing issues in global affairs. 
Having examined the elements of the grand strategy of the Obama administration, 
understanding the key aspects of Obama’s drone warfare is important for understanding their 
role in Obama’s grand strategy. 
6.4 The Elements, Character, and Phases of Obama’s Drone Warfare 
6.4.1 Obama’s Drone Warfare 
During the Obama administration, drones became the cornerstone of US CT strategy in the 
Middle East. This was exemplified in the expansion of drone weaponry for targeted killing 
operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Libya. Brennan argues that “drone 
strikes are so exceptionally surgical and precise that they pluck off terror suspects while not 
                                                             
476 Ibid (Lofflman, 2017) 
477 Ibid (Brands, 2014) 
478 Blomdahl, M. (2016). Bureaucratic roles and positions: Explaining the United States Libya 
decision. Diplomacy & statecraft, 27(1), 142-161. 




putting innocent men, woman, and children in danger.”480 The reliance on drones for CT under 
Obama is, however, not surprising, as Bush drone warfare set a precedent for their use, 
particularly due to its cost-benefit calculus and their efficacy in the WOT in targeted states.  
Obama conducted his drone programme under the umbrella of two agencies – the Joint Special 
Operations Command (JSOC) and the CIA – each with a different mode of operations for 
accomplishing its CT goals. The JSOC drone operations were publicly acknowledged, 
amenable to Congressional oversight, based on established rules of engagement, and limited to 
declared battle zones. Whereas CIA drone operations were clandestine, classified, and 
conducted outside declared battlefields such as Yemen, Libya, and Iraq – with minimal 
government oversight.481 This meant information regarding targeting location, HVTs killed, or 
cases of miss or unintended civilian deaths were not accessible to the public or the Congress – 
only the CIA and the president. While this strategy was effective in decimating al-Qaeda and 
its affiliates, it has been critiqued as giving drones “the role of judge, jury, and executioner of 
the US demonstrated by its inordinate attachment to the rules and norms in an environment of 
international anarchy where there is no supreme enforcement authority.”482  
6.4.2 Elements of Obama’s Drone Warfare 
Four key elements characterized Obama’s drone warfare, namely: signature strikes, 
systematization of the drone kill list, legitimization of targeted killings, and the expansion of 
targeted killings to include Americans.  
6.4.2.1 Signature Strikes 
Signature strikes are defined as the targeting killing of an individual based on a suspicious 
pattern of life without confirmation of their identity to determine if they have links with terrorist 
activity or affiliation.483 This practice was the hallmark of CIA drone operations in Pakistan 
and subsequently in Yemen and Somalia under the Obama administration.484 It considered all 
military-age males in the drone strike zone as combatants unless there is explicit intelligence 
posthumously proving them innocent.485 This controversial drone strike differed from the 
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Bush-era personality strikes, which conducted targeted killing operations based on precise 
information of the intended target or pre-identified signature of suspicious behaviour.486 As an 
unnamed US official confirmed in 2011, “indeed, signature strikes have killed twice as many 
‘wanted terrorists’ than in personality strikes.”487  
Furthermore, while these strikes were effective in eliminating HVTs in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, it was highly classified. The Obama administration did not publicly acknowledge this 
secret drone operation until when CIA drones targeting an al-Qaeda compound in Afghanistan 
mistakenly killed an American contractor and an Italian citizen in 2015.488 Also, earlier in 2012 
in Yemen, a failed CIA signature strikes killed 55 civilians, mostly children, instead of terrorist 
targets.489 The 2015 incident, however, put unprecedented pressure on the Obama 
administration to review its policy guidance on targeting and procedures on the authorization 
of drone use outside declared battlefields.490 This was acknowledged by Obama in a speech 
given at the National Defense University, Fort McNair, in 2003, where he stated,  “I authorized 
the declassification of this action, and the deaths of three other Americans in drone strikes, 
to facilitate transparency and debate on this issue and to dismiss some of the more outlandish 
claims that have been made.”491 
6.4.2.2 Systematization of Targeted Killing and Kill lists 
Targeted killing is defined as the “intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force 
by states or their agents under the colour of law against a specific individual who is not in the 
physical custody of the perpetrator.”492 Obama, compared to his predecessor, introduced a “kill 
over capture” policy using drones for the targeted killing of terrorists and their affiliates. This 
policy reversed the capture, torture, and detain policy of the Bush era and consequently led to 
the institutionalization of targeted killing. Frankel Pratt explains this to be a result of the 
“convention reorientation and redefinition of US targeted killing programme, which used the 
instrumentality of drones to bypass normative and strategic concerns over precision, which 
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resultantly removed the bureaucratic structures concerning the use of force for CT operations 
and the greater use of its weaponry by the CIA under Obama.”493 
Kimberly Dozier further argues that the institutionalization of targeted killings under Obama 
“transformed ad-hoc elements into a CT infrastructure capable of sustaining a seemingly 
permanent war.”494 The aftermath of which facilitated the systematization of the ‘drone kill 
list’ or ‘kill list’– which is a list comprising of those to be selected and prioritized terrorist 
members for targeted drone strikes. In describing the kill list process, Greg Miller, a New York 
Times reporter in 2012 following interviews with 60 Obama advisers, depicted the kill list 
process as a “…weekly Pentagon-run videoconference in which over 100 national security 
officials review the names and biographies of the suspected terrorist member before 
recommendation decisions are put forward to the President.”495  
The end product resulted in what Michael Leiter of the National Counterterrorism Center called 
the “disposition matrix,” which essentially is a catalogue of the biographies, locations, network, 
and organizational ties of targeted persons.496 Typically, these lists usually contained a list of 
twenty-four persons meant to be eliminated by drone strikes in a 30-day period.497  
The normalization of the kill list under Obama underscores a precedent in the ‘dronification’ 
of state-sanctioned death that engendered what Shaw describes as “the decentralization of 
targeted killings and the simultaneous centralization of state power in the executive branch.”498 
This is not radically different from what Prankel defined as “norm transformation of targeted 
killings” to explain how international and domestic prohibitions to targeted killings have not 
disappeared but merely changed in response to “practitioner-led changes in the conventions, 




                                                             
493 Pratt, S. F. (2019). Norm transformation and the institutionalization of targeted killing in the US. European 
Journal of International Relations, 25(3), 723-747. 
494 Kimberly Dozier, (2012) “Who will drones target? Who in the US will decide?” Associated Press, May 21 
495 Greg Miller, “C.I.A. Seeks New Authority to Expand Yemen Drone Campaign,” The Washington Post, April 
18, 2012. 
496 Shaw, I. G. (2013). Predator empire: The geopolitics of US drone warfare. Geopolitics, 18(3), 536-559. 
497 Ibid 
498 Ibid (Shaw, 2013, pg. 2) 
499 Pratt, S. F. (2019). Norm transformation and the institutionalization of targeted killing in the US. European 
Journal of International Relations, 25(3), 723-747. 
117 
 
6.4.2.3 Expansion of the AUMF 
Obama’s drone warfare stretched the interpretation of the 2001 AUMF and the latitude of 
America’s CT operations. Essentially, it expanded the scope of his predecessor’s pre-emptive 
and preventive warfare to a more proactive strategy that did not consider issues relating to 
imminent threats or confined to fixed battlefields by directly taking the WOT to al-Qaeda and 
its affiliates. This was evident in the broader escalation of drone strikes into declared and non-
declared battlefields outside the scope of the current AUMF. Though in theory, Congressional 
approval was needed to ratify any expansion, in principle, CIA covert strikes bypassed this 
bureaucracy. Bachman and Holland interpreted this to mean Obama’s “sanguine, bureaucratic 
language to veil the act of killing”500 – that permitted him to exert his resolve to combat 
terrorism while avoiding Congressional oversight or the limitations of international laws of 
war. Obama took the position that targeted killing does not require “a separate self-defence 
analysis of what constitutes an imminent threat before targeted killings are authorized.”501  
Furthermore, senior officials in the Obama administration such as Brennan have characterized 
drones as “precise,” “indispensable,” and “effective,” and most of all, “lawful.”502 However, 
characterizing drones as lawful is abstract, considering there is no current US law passed by 
Congress or any existing federal regulations or adjudication by the court normalizing drone 
strikes. Thus, the effort to legitimise drone strikes as lawful is more of an unwritten law by the 
executive that is withheld from Congress and public scrutiny which inadvertently gives 
unrestrained powers to the presidency on how it conducts drone strikes.503  
6.4.2.4 Legitimization of Targeted Killings 
International law requires certain criteria to be met before targeted killings can be considered 
legitimate. They include: (i) that government needs to make multiple interpretative judgements 
or ‘best case scenarios’ before ordering strikes, (ii) that drone strikes are vetted, and 
engagement rules are clearly defined, (iii) and that it complies with international law 
benchmarks.504 While targeted killings during the Obama administration were characterized by 
                                                             
500Bachman, J. S., & Holland, J. (2019). Lethal sterility: innovative dehumanisation in legal justifications of 
Obama’s drone policy. The International Journal of Human Rights, 23(6), 1028-1047. 
501 Obama cited in McCrisken, T. (2013). Obama's drone war. Survival, 55(2), 97-122. 
502 Brennan cited in Boyle, (2016). 
503 Jaffer, J. (2016). How the US justifies drone strikes: targeted killing, secrecy and the law. The Guardian, 15, 
2017. 
504 Davis, L. E., McNerney, M., & Greenberg, M. D. (2016). Clarifying the Rules for Targeted Killing: An 
Analytical Framework for Policies Involving Long-Range Armed Drones (No. RR1610). RAND Corp Santa 
Monica CA Santa Monica United States. 
118 
 
mounting civilian casualties (as later parts of this chapter reveal, the number of civilian 
casualties increased exponentially compared to his predecessor) and ambiguities in the 
interpretation of international law, the endorsement by former US Department Legal Adviser, 
Harold Koh, constituted the legitimization of targeted killings during his administration. 
According to him,  “…what I can say is that it is the considered view of the Administration – 
and it has certainly been my experience during my time as a legal advisor – that US targeting 
practices, including lethal operations conducted with the use of drones, comply with all 
applicable law, including the laws of war.”505 
This statement has been used to attest to the legality of drone warfare and justifies its 
compliance with extant international laws of war. Likewise, in a speech given at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Society of International Law in 2010, Harold Koh asserts: 
“This (Obama) administration has carefully reviewed the rules governing 
targeting operations to ensure that these operations are conducted consistently 
with the law of war principles, including Second, the principle of 
proportionality, which prohibits attacks that may be expected to cause incidental 
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated.”506 
Consensus on the proportionality of drone strikes in targeted states remains a contested issue 
in international law due to the lack of a clear specificity and generality in the scope of its 
application.507 However, the systematization of targeted killing under Obama set a dangerous 
precedent for US drone warfare and CT operations as President Trump’s administration has 
further broadened the latitude and secrecy of US drone operations in declared and outside 
declared areas of active hostilities (examined in the next chapter). 
6.4.2.5 Targeting American Citizens 
Another element of Obama’s drone warfare was the use of drones for killing Americans abroad 
suspected of facilitating or supporting terrorism. Though this policy was viewed by many as a 
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violation of the rights of American citizens to due process, as enshrined in the US constitution, 
it was justified based on the premise that “when an American has made the decision to affiliate 
with al-Qaeda and target fellow Americans, there is a legal justification for to try and stop them 
from carrying out their plots.”508 
Former US Attorney-General, Eric Holder, in defence of this practice, opined that “the internal 
processes of the Obama administration for determining if a US citizen can be killed in a drone 
strike are sufficient enough to count constitutes due process.”509 This principle was invoked in 
the killing of Anwar Al-Awlaki in 2011, a Yemeni-American Imam and chief external operator 
for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), who was killed by drone attack for his 
involvement in plotting the failed Christmas Day underwear bombing on 25 December 2009. 
Though President Obama, in a speech delivered at the Fort McNair in 2013, asserted it was 
unconstitutional for the government to kill US citizens with drones or other weapons without 
due process, he justified the killing of Awlaki as necessary and inevitable. He opined that his 
involvement as an American citizen does not exculpate him from lethal action (paraphrased).510 
Furthermore, the optimum protocols of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) – a multilateral treaty adopted by the UN to protect the civil rights and political 
liberties of persons – of which America is a signatory, applies only when the targeted person 
is within the US and not outside.511  
The next sub-section discusses the phases of Obama’s drone warfare. 
6.4.3 Phases of Obama’s drone war 
Obama’s drone programme can be divided into four main phases reflecting the utility of its 
weaponry in the CT strategy of his administration. These phases are described as (i) the peak, 
(ii) expansion, (iii) staggered, and (iv) denouement phases are outlined below.  
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6.4.3.1 The Peak Phase 
The first two years of Obama’s administration (Jan. 2009 – Dec. 2010) can be regarded as the 
‘peak of his drone warfare’ as this period marked the intensification of drone strikes for 
systematized killing operations in targeted states, mainly conducted by the CIA. Three days 
into the Obama presidency, he ordered the first drone strike in South Waziristan, and 12 months 
later, he had carried out 54 drone strikes in Pakistan alone.512 This figure surpassed the total 
drone strikes (53) conducted in the two terms of the Bush administration. Available data 
published by TBIJ and NAF estimate the total drone strikes conducted in this period as 300, 
with 186 of these strikes occurring in Pakistan (see figure 3 below).513 In September 2010, 
Obama ordered the single highest (22) monthly drone strike in Pakistan’s FATA region out of 
the 87 drone operations that took place in the entire year.  
Figure 3: CIA drone strike in Pakistan (Jan 2009- Jan 2011) 
 
Source: TBIJ.514 
6.4.3.2 Expansion Phase 
The main feature in the second phase (January 2011- December 2011) of Obama’s drone war 
was the expansion of drone operations outside traditional battlefields. This led to the broader 
escalation of targeted killing operations in Yemen, Somalia, and Libya. In Somalia on 23 June 
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2011, Obama authorized the first drone strike that led to the death of two al-Qaeda operatives. 
In Yemen, a targeted strike assassinated Anwar al-Awlaki and the two low-level AQAP 
terrorists in 2011.515 During the Arab Spring in Libya in 2011, the US Air Force 324th 
Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron also conducted drone operations from the American 
Naval Station in Sigonella, Italy. The first drone attack in June 2011 was carried out in Misrata, 
a Gaddafi regime fortress. It is estimated that more than 500 drone operations have been 
conducted to date in Libya since the first drone strike in 2011.516 During this phase, drone 
operations still continued in Pakistan. Though according to data published by the TBIJ and 
NAF, the total number of strikes (64) dropped by 45 percent from the previous year (117) (see 
figures 4 and 5 below).517 
Figure 4: Total Drone Strikes in Pakistan in Obama’s Phase Two 
 
Source: TBIJ 
In the Af-Pak region, drone strikes plummeted in this phase (see 2010 - 2011 figures), from 
about 330 strikes from the first phase to 125 total strikes. A number of factors account for this, 
but one major event was the Salala incident when US-led NATO forces engaged and killed 24 
Pakistani security forces along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border on 26 November 2011.518 This 
caused the Obama administration to temporarily stop drone operations in the region until 10 
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January 2012. In this phase, however, an estimate of 10-21 drone strikes occurred in Somalia 
and about 15-62 strikes in Yemen in this phase.519  
Figure 5: Drone strikes in Pakistan from 2004-2018 
 
Source: Federation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD) Long War Journal.520 
6.4.3.3 Staggered Phase 
The third phase of Obama’s drone warfare (January 2012 - December 2014) was marked by a 
further intensification of drone strikes outside non-declared battlefields, particularly in Libya 
where civil strife following the Arab Spring caused the US to order more than 100 strikes 
within this phase and a total of 263 strikes at the end of Obama’s presidency.521 In principle, 
the bulk of drone strikes shifted from Pakistan to Libya. Available data published by TBIJ and 
FDD confirms this (see Tables 7 and 8 above). Drone strikes in Pakistan also continued to 
reduce – from 48 strikes in 2012 to 26 and 24 strikes in the following successive years (see 
table 9 below). TBIJ data estimates put the total strikes in this period at 77, which is 12.5 
percent lower than the figure provided by FDD.522 
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Data from TBIJ, NAF, and Air Wars estimate the civilian casualty figures at the end of this 
phase as 1450-1650 as a result of drone strikes conducted in six targeted states – Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, Libya, and Iraq.523 This figure was 500 percent higher than the total 
of the two terms of the Bush administration (330).524  
To address this mounting civilian casualty figure, the Obama administration on 23 May 2013 
articulated the PPG on Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets 
Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities525, which required explicit presidential 
approval and a near certainty that drone strikes cause zero civilian death before deployment in 
targeted states.526 The PPG did not apply to Iraq, Afghanistan, Iraq, and some parts of Libya – 
as President Obama considered them as “areas of active hostilities” outside the ambit of the 
policy guidance and procedural mechanism for targeted drone operations.527 The PPG, 
however, led to a considerable policy re-examination of concerns regarding the lethality, 
transparency, efficacy, transfer, export, and the general operations of the US drone programme 
in the remaining part of the Obama administration. 
6.4.3.4 Denouement Phase 
The final phase of Obama’s drone war (2014-2016) saw a further drop in the number of drone 
strikes in Pakistan (see figure 8 above). As a result, it led to fewer civilian casualty figures.  
TBIJ estimate 350 deaths occurred during which is lower compared to previous phases.528 This 
period was also marked by a number of new drone policies such as the Export Policy for 
Military Unmanned Aerial Systems – a framework that governed the international sales, 
transfer, and use of drones based on the 2014 US Conventional Arms Transfer Policy (in 
response to global drone exports and proliferation). In this period, Obama also signed on 1 July 
2016 the United States Policy on Pre-and-Post-Strike Measures to Address Civilian Casualties 
in US Operations Involving the Use of Force, which required acknowledgment and 
                                                             
523 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, (2016) Obama’s covert drone wars in numbers: ten times more than 
Bush. https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2017-01-17/obamas-covert-drone-war-in-numbers-ten-
times-more-strikes-than-bush . See also Bergen, P., & Tiedemann, K. (2010). The year of the drone. New America 
Foundation, 24 
524 Ibid 
525 Siemion, R. (2017). Presidential Policy Guidance: Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist 
Targets Located Outside The United States and Areas of Active Hostilities. International Legal Materials, 56(6), 
1209-1225. 
526 Siemion, R. (2017). Presidential Policy Guidance: Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist 
Targets Located Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities. International Legal Materials, 56(6), 
1209-1225. doi:10.1017/ilm.2017.4 
527 Ibid 
528 Ibid (TBIJ, 2016) 
124 
 
investigative reports for civilian drone casualties. It also stipulated drone strikes in targeted 
states be published on an annual basis.529 
Next, the role of drones in supporting Obama’s grand strategy is examined.  
6.5 The Utility of Drones in Obama’s Grand Strategy 
One of the arguments of this chapter is that the broader escalation of drone strikes in targeted 
states under Obama played a double-edged role as a tactical tool for CT and statecraft. To 
examine the utility of drones in facilitating the hybrid grand strategy of the Obama 
administration, the following roles are identified and analysed: (i) instrument of statecraft, (ii) 
casualty aversion, (iii) leveraging tools, (iv) facilitating local and regional cooperation (v) 
broader counterterrorism goals. 
6.5.1 Instrument of Statecraft 
Drones played an obtrusive role as a primary and comparatively low-cost tool of Obama’s CT 
strategy and for the instrumentation of his surrogate warfare.530 From this lens, drones not only 
expressed the power projection capabilities of Obama’s administration but also became a 
component of retrenchment as espoused in his grand strategy. As McDonald and Parent assert, 
this contributed to “…decreasing the overall costs of foreign policy by redistributing resources 
away from peripheral commitments and toward core commitments (great power competition, 
counterterrorism, and promotion of a rules-based order).”531   
The reliance and broad escalation of drone strikes in seven targeted states – Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Somalia, Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen – during Obama's two terms underscore the 
centrality of drones as a tactical CT tool. Thus, the shift to the greater use of drones under 
Obama cut down the cost of prosecuting the WOT (see table 10 below), which he had 
previously argued, overextended America’s resources. The cost-benefit of drones is evident in 
the annual budget released from the US Office of Management and Budget. A comparison of 
the WOT spending between Bush and Obama highlights this. While Bush spent $192.5 billion 
and $235.6 billion FY2007 and FY 2008 for its total WOT, Obama spent $192.5 billion for 
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FY2009 and $181.0 billion for FY 2010.532 This figure further dropped to $49.6 billion by FY 
2013 (see table 10 below). While a number of factors, such as drawing drown American troops 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, contributed to this, the role of drones in cutting down deployment 
costs in the total WOT spending cannot be overstated. 
Table 10: National Defence Budget of Bush and Obama administration  
FY War on Terror Overseas 





Total War on Terror 
($billion) 
2001 22.9 6.5 31 
2002 16.9 40.8 59.1 
2003 72.5 36.7 111.9 
2004 90.8 11.6 105.0 
2005 75.6 23.6 102.3 
2006 115.8 10.5 127.0 
2007 166.3 20.9 192.5 
2008 186.9 47.5 235.6 
2009 153.1 34.2 197.1 
2010 162.4 14.7 181.0 
2011 158.8 0.3 162.4 
2012 115.1 2.2 119.6 
2013 82 -34.9 49.6 
2014 85.2 0.8 88.0 
2015 62.9 1.0 65.7 
2016 58.9 24.3 89.7 
Source: Congressional Research Service533  
Though Obama’s combined defence spending across the years exceeded that of his 
predecessor, the bulk of his overall budget spent on CT operations in Iraq was lower compared 
to his predecessor.  This supports the argument that the extensive use of drones in CT 
operations in Pakistan allowed the US, under Obama, to reassign America’s military assets to 
areas of active hostilities such as Libya while delegating more CT operations to surrogate 
weapons (drones).  
Furthermore, as figure 6 shows below, the total US military budget in relation to US GDP 
plummeted steadily under Obama (as part of the controversial ‘sequester’ or cap on military 
spending). While it may be an overstatement to expressly affirm that drones played a significant 
part in reducing overseas contingency operations (OCO) costs in the defence budget, the 
increased reliance on drones and the scaling back of CT military cost during his administration 
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occurred at the same time, suggesting a causal relationship. This is well articulated in the 2012 
Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) that emphasized restraint as the watchword for US defence 
policy under Obama. 
Figure 6: US Military spending under Obama in relation to GDP 
 
Source: Macrotrends.534 
6.5.2 Casualty Aversion Tool 
The preceding argument fits with the casualty aversion theory in explaining the utility of drones 
under Obama. Casualty aversion recognizes the salience of public opinion, media coverage, 
and civilian casualty in assuaging or inflaming support for a war.535 It holds that the public 
tends to show approval or disapproval based on the balance of whether media coverage 
highlights its negative impact on the public or if their use does not elicit significant attention.536 
The institutionalization of covert drone strikes is arguably a casualty aversion strategy under 
Obama – to prevent public or Congressional scrutiny on the impact of its drone operations – 
especially due to the civilian casualty figures. Obama’s speech delivered at National Defence 
University at Fort McNair in 2013 sums up the inherent casualty aversion tactic inherent in his 
administration’s preference for drones “…the very precision of drone strikes, and the necessary 
secrecy often involved in such actions can end up shielding our government from the public 
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scrutiny that a troop deployment invites.  It can also lead a President and his team to view drone 
strikes as a cure-all for terrorism.”537 
In the same speech, he further remarked that, 
“Conventional airpower or missiles are far less precise than drones and are 
likely to cause more civilian casualties and more local outrage. The results 
would be more US deaths, more Black Hawks down, more confrontations with 
local populations, and an inevitable mission creep in support of such raids that 
could easily escalate into new wars.”538 
Though public approval or support is not always a key determining factor for the conduct of 
wars – as the Vietnam War,539 there are several instances in history where it has. The American 
Civil War, for instance, caused significant civilian casualties, affected government approval 
ratings, and inevitably triggered a legitimacy crisis on the incumbent.540 The 2003 failed Iraq 
invasion is another classic case, as it caused a significant dip in President Bush’s approval 
ratings among the American public. A Pew Research survey conducted in 2008, sampling the 
perceptions of 1489 Americans on the Bush administration, indicated that a majority (64%) of 
the total respondents stated that the Bush administration was a failure, while 34 percent also 
gave poor approval ratings.541 This was despite his CT efforts in his final year.  
Drones under Obama serve as a casualty aversion strategy that recognizes the sensitivity of the 
US public and Congress to the blowback effect of US power projection in its CT operations. 
On this, Shane writes: 
“…For a presidential candidate whose main ambitions lay in the domestic arena, 
drones seemed a godsend. It could lower the American profile in the Muslim 
world, depriving al-Qaeda of the foil that had allowed it to recruit an Iraqi 
branch of the terror network and reinvigorate anti-American passions. It offered 
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Obama the opportunity to take decisive action without the agony of American 
casualties.”542  
A 2013 Pew Research surveying American citizens and Congressional support for drone strikes 
during the Obama administration draw close connections with the casualty aversion hypothesis 
(the implications for US grand strategy are explored deeper later in the thesis). The result 
showed that 56 percent of Americans supported the drone programme while 26 percent 
disapproved of it. In Congress, 68 percent of Republicans approved continued drone strikes, as 
did 58 percent of Democrats. Independents had a 31-50 percent margin for their drone approval 
support.543 Likewise, a Gallup survey in 2013 also reported that 65 percent supported the use 
of drones against terrorists.544 A Pew Research poll on Obama’s approval ratings in 2016 
reported that 46 percent of Americans approved of Obama’s presidency (this figure is 12 
percent higher than Bush and comparable to the 49 percent approval ratings given to Ronald 
Reagan in 1987).545 It is useful to note that these polling results were obtained when civilian 
casualty figures from drone strikes reported by investigative agencies in targeted states were at 
an all-time high (TBIJ put the figure at 1500 deaths) – these deaths are, however, not 
acknowledged by the CIA due to the nature of its covert operations. 
6.5.3 Broadening the Latitude of Counterterrorism Cooperation 
Drones were useful in facilitating local and regional CT cooperation with the government of 
targeted states, particularly in Yemen and Pakistan under Obama (the implication for US grand 
strategy is subsequently analysed). According to a 2018 Stimson Research report, drones 
“enabled direct action by foreign partners and allies by providing real-time intelligence to 
entities to enable them to undertake lethal action against terrorist suspects in their own 
territories.”546   
The tactical utility of drones in providing ISR, containing local insurgencies, and eliminating 
HVTs helped in broadening the latitude of CT goals, especially with the domestic government. 
In Pakistan, for instance, drone strikes conducted in the FATA region with the support of the 
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Pakistani government achieved a two-fold result. One, it helped America in dismantling the 
Taliban formation, and two, it prevented the spread of al-Qaeda safe havens across the 
Pakistani border. For the Pakistani government, it enabled the deployment of its military into 
the “ungoverned spaces” of the FATA region and also prevented the scourge of local 
militants.547  
Likewise, in Yemen, drones were valuable tools for rooting out AQAP HVTs and served as a 
policing mechanism for disrupting and tracking terrorist operations of local Islamist factions – 
which the Yemeni government proved incapable of containing due to the seizure of its capital, 
Sana’a.548 Further use of drones in Yemen proved instrumental in supporting the Yemeni 
military in expelling al-Qaeda forces who had claimed most part of the country in the wake of 
the Arab Spring. In Libya and Syria, drones supported local CT partners by providing aerial 
support for Syrian opposition groups. Though drone strikes spur public backlash and local 
discontent due to territorial violations and powerlessness against its strikes in targeted states, 
most drone strikes are done in conjunction with domestic governments and are usually based 
on reciprocal understanding. In Pakistan, for instance, the US provides civilian assistance 
programme and foreign aids, and in return, the Pakistani government allows drone strikes in 
designated strike zones in Pakistan. This leads to the next point. 
6.5.4 Leverage tools 
The word ‘leverage’ as used here refers to the political decision to use or hold off on potential 
drone strikes as a potential threat and a means of reassuring CT partners and in projecting 
America’s power position where necessary. The utility of drones as a tool for moderating the 
behaviour of CT partner states based on their “leveraging power” was evident under Obama. 
As Hazelton notes, “the lethality and precision of unmanned drone strikes create fear not only 
among terrorist groups but also by serving as a valuable tool for restraining US allies and 
partners in targeted states from acting provocatively, and for deterring US enemies from taking 
destabilizing actions.”549 
In Afghanistan, for instance, following the phased withdrawal of American troops under 
Obama (from 183,300 in 2009 to 15,062 in 2016)550 , the Afghan government, in partnership 
                                                             
547 Minhas, Z., & Qadir, A. The Us War on Terror and the Drone Attacks In FATA, Pakistan. 
548 Hudson, L., Owens, C. S., & Callen, D. J. (2012). Drone Warfare in Yemen: Fostering Emirates through 
Counterterrorism? Middle East Policy, 19(3), 142. 
549 Hazelton, J. L. (2017). Drone strikes and grand strategy: Toward a political understanding of the uses of 
unmanned aerial vehicle attacks in US security policy. Journal of Strategic Studies, 40(1-2), 68-91. 
550 Department of Defence Contractor and Troop Levels in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2007-2017.  
130 
 
with the US, leveraged on drone strikes in preventing the Taliban from assuming power and in 
forestalling al-Qaeda threats and local insurgencies.551 In Pakistan also, the decision to 
temporarily halt further drone strikes in the country following the targeted assassination of 
Osama Bin Laden in 2011 was negotiated between the US Ambassador to Pakistan and the US 
Secretary of State. The diplomatic decision and the resulting political approval reached with 
the Pakistani government demonstrated that drones were used to foster alliances that influenced 
targeting operations under Obama. 
Having now considered the way drones support the US grand strategy under Obama, the next 
section discusses the way it has undermined it. 
6.6 Dilemma of Obama’s Drone Warfare for US grand strategy 
Despite the political and tactical utility of drone strikes, as the preceding section has shown, 
the over-reliance and aftermath of drone strikes in targeted states engendered countervailing 
outcomes for Obama’s grand strategy. This is evident in the rise of anti-American antipathy, 
mounting civilian deaths, and the blowback effect arising from the broader escalation of drone 
strikes in targeted states. These are further analysed. 
6.6.1 Violation of Territorial Sovereignty and Anti-Americanism 
A Pew Research conducted in 2013 surveying the impact of drone strikes and sovereignty 
violation in Pakistan showed that a majority of the respondents, mostly civilians (87%), 
believed that drones violate territorial sovereignty and cause visceral opposition among the 
local population.552 (see figure 7 below). 
Relatedly, a study investigating the impact of drone strikes in FATA, Pakistan, notes that “the 
intensification of drone strikes not only exposed the fault lines between the Pakistani Army 
and the democratically elected parliament, but culminated in the April 2012 political protest 
demanding for the immediate cessation of drone attacks inside Pakistan’s territorial 
borders.”553 A statement issued by the UN special rapporteur for Human Rights and 
Counterterrorism, Ben Emmerson, following a three-day visit to Pakistan in 2013 affirmed that 
“as a matter of international law, the US drone campaign in Pakistan is being conducted without 
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the consent of the elected representatives of the people, or the legitimate government of the 
state.”554 
Figure 7: FATA residents support for drone strikes 
 
Source: Brookings Institution555 
 
This statement contradicted the position made by Harold Koh and John Brennan, affirming the 
legality, constitutionality, and legitimacy of drone operations in targeted states. Apart from 
Pakistan, the expansion of drone strikes outside non-designated battlefields such as Libya, 
Syria, and Iraq, under the Obama administration not only violated the territorial sovereignty of 
these countries but inflamed anti-American sentiments by “upsetting local groups due to 
powerlessness over drone strikes, and cause fuelling political upheavals due to the perceived 
complicity of government in permitting these strikes.”556  
The growing anti-American sentiment and visceral opposition due to the intensification of 
drone strikes in South Waziristan, Pakistan, during the Obama administration, culminated in a 
protest march in October 2012 in Mianwali, North Pakistan, led by Imran Khan, a former 
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cricketer turned populist politician.557 The impact of the protest pushed anti-American drone 
politics to the forefront of Pakistani politics, the aftermath of which caused the former Pakistani 
President Ali Asif Zardari to distance himself from American drones for fear of complicity and 
civil action.558 Likewise, former Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani was vocal in his 
opposition to drone strikes asserting that it is “disastrous and prove counterproductive in efforts 
to isolate extremists and militants from the tribal population.”559 Furthermore, he shared the 
view that “the strikes create outrage and uproar among the people and drive a wedge between 
the government and the tribal population.”560  
For Obama’s grand strategy that espoused American exemplarism and a “new beginning for 
the Muslim world,” the broader escalation of drone strikes was contrary to this ‘vision.’ This 
is because drones not only violate the territorial sovereignty of targeted states but generate a 
legitimacy crisis over their use within the local population by projecting the powerlessness of 
domestic government to dispel the negative impacts of drones within its borders. The blowback 
for the US grand strategy engenders hamstring effects for further use of drones for CT operation 
in targeted states. For example, Pew Research in June 2012 revealed that 74 percent of 
Pakistanis consider the US as an enemy, and only 17 percent supported drone strikes if they 
are conducted with the support of their government.561 Also, data published by the Brooking 
Institution (see figure 8 below) show that majority of the residents in FATA oppose the US 
military presence (84%) compared to fighters of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Arabs. 
Thus, while drone strikes may have achieved Obama’s CT goals in the short term, evidence of 
anti-Americanism and visceral opposition creates a long-term problem for future CT missions 
in Pakistan. One that incites anger, opposition, and political crisis over the use of drones. In a 
speech, Hina Rabbani Khar, former Pakistani Foreign Minister, is quoted as saying: 
“This has to be our war. We are the ones who have to fight against them 
(terrorist insurgents). As a drone flies over the territory of Pakistan, it becomes 
an American war again. And this whole logic of being our fight, in our own 
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interest, is immediately put aside, and again it is a war which is imposed upon 
us.”562 
Figure 8: FATA Resident support for US military compared to other entities  
 
Source: Brookings563 
In Yemen, CIA signature strikes that failed to distinguish fighters of a local secessionist 
movement and AQAP members angered the local population and inflamed anti-American 
perceptions of drone strikes in their country. Also, the 2 September 2012 drone strike incident 
in Ramaa, Yemen, that killed 12 people, as documented in the Alkarama report submitted to 
Human Rights Committee, was reported to have caused “anger within the local population.” 
The report also established that in the Radaa region, US extensive surveillance had caused the 
local resident to feel antipathy towards US drone use.564 Thus fuelling public demands to the 
Yemeni parliament to stop further drone use in the country.565 
In sum, as Mark Moyar argues, the violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
targeted states, in Obama’s drone campaign, “exposed the limits of implementing an existing 
hegemonic identity discourse in a reformulated vision in a new paradigm”566 This approximates 
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to Nylen Alexandria’s argument that Obama’s drone warfare in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, 
engendered the creation of lawless spaces in the WOT in targeted states. These ‘lawless 
spaces,’ according to his assessment, “creates a conducive environment for powerful 
international governments to designate frontier territories as “lawless” by rhetorically 
constructing them as exceptional legal spaces that do not deserve the same protections as areas 
ordered by sovereign ideals.”567 
6.6.2 Terrorist Recruitment and Retaliation 
As figure 9 below shows, one of the impacts of sustained drone strikes in targeted states under 
Obama is its propaganda influence on terrorist retaliation. The figure shows that proportional 
increases in drone strike corresponded with the rise in terrorist attacks in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. The blowback effect is predicated on the notion that the “killing of suspected militants 
or civilians leads to marked radicalization of local populations to join or sympathize with al-
Qaeda and its affiliate organizations.”568 However, conditions for terrorist mobilization may 
vary widely within targeted states due to the difficulty in pinpointing the actual reasons 
individuals join local terrorist or militant groups.  In the case of Pakistan and Yemen, evidence 
based on empirical studies in these states shows there is a strong correlation between increased 
targeted killing operations, heightened anger, and terrorist recruitment.569  
In an interview with the Guardian, an anonymous Yemeni fighter stated, “if young men lose 
hope in the cause, they will be looking for an alternative.”570 Furthermore, David Kilcullen, in 
a congressional hearing, affirmed the need to call off drone strikes not because they were 
ineffective as CT weapons for leadership decapitation and disrupting the command structure 
of terrorist organizations, but due to its potential recruitment effect on terrorist groups.571 While 
the efficacy of drones as CT tools under Obama has weakened al-Qaeda’s ability to re-group572, 
the aftermath, as much literature suggests, emboldens terrorist willingness to retaliate and 
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hinder any potential negotiations and settlements (this is further examined in subsequent 
chapters). 
Figure 9: Drones strikes and terrorist retaliation in Pakistan and Afghanistan 
 
Source: Brookings Institution573 
 
In Pakistan, as figure 10 below shows (note the spike in 2008 – 2009), the intensification of 
drone strikes increased the incidence of terrorist suicide attacks in different provinces in 
Pakistan.  
Figure 10: Annual suicide attacks in Pakistan by province 
  
Source: Brookings574 
                                                             




Based on data published by Brookings Institution, the highest incidence of suicide attacks 
occurred in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) – a stronghold of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) 
terrorist group. The increase in suicide attacks corresponded with the surge in drone strikes 
during the Bush administration in 2008. However, under Obama, the level of suicide attacks 
increased to 52 in 2009. Though the drop in suicide attacks in Punjab and KP can be attributed 
to the efficacy of drones in disrupting terrorist attacks, the annual incidence of suicide attacks 
in retaliation to drones increased in other provinces – FATA, Balochistan, and Sindh. These 
provinces serve as bases for other terrorist formations in Pakistan, such as the Haqqani Network 
and al-Qaeda in Pakistan. In northern Pakistan, studies have reported civilians been tortured, 
bludgeoned, or killed by local militant groups such as the Khorasan Mujahedin in Waziristan 
as a retaliatory attack for supplying local intelligence that is used in coordinating US drone 
attacks.575 
Likewise, in Somalia, the October 2011 bombing of the Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG) compound in Mogadishu by al-Shabaab was conducted as a retaliation to the mounting 
levels of drone strikes against their members.576 Also, in Yemen, a US drone strike that killed 
Jabir al-Shabwani, a popular Sheik and Deputy Governor of the Maarib province, stirred 
retaliatory actions by AQAP that led to the bombing of critical oil installations. Yemen was 
estimated to lose nearly $1 billion as 70 percent of its country’s budget depended on oil.577 
A study by Luqman Saeed and colleagues establish the connections between drone strikes and 
suicide attacks in Pakistan under Obama. Their study, based on a comparative assessment of 
data available in the different databases of TBIJ, NAF, and LWJ, reviewed 430 drone strikes 
incidents in Pakistan against the rate of suicide attacks published by the Chicago Project on 
Security and Terrorism (CPOST).578 Their investigation concluded that drone strikes in 
Pakistan elevated rates of suicide attacks with an average of 20 deaths in a one-month period 
compared to 5 deaths in a month, in the absence of drone strikes. Though their study 
acknowledges the incapacitating effect of Obama drone warfare in reducing the incidence of 
suicide attacks in Pakistan (28 suicide attacks in 2013, 19 in 2014, 14 in 2015, and 10 in 
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2016)579, the perpetuation of retaliatory attacks underlined the nexus between drone strikes and 
suicide bombings. The study also determined that between January 2011 and January 2019, 
182 confirmed drone strikes in Pakistan resulted in 182 suicide attacks. Whereas in 
Afghanistan, 206 suicide bombings occurred after 5833 drone strikes, and in Yemen, 89 suicide 
attacks occurred after 323 drone strikes within the period.580 This underlines the paradox of the 
security argument made earlier in this chapter. 
Furthermore, though Obama espoused a strategic vision of America’s exemplarism in world 
affairs, the continued reliance of drones in targeted states engendered countervailing impacts 
that served to undermine the legitimatization of his policy – by de-emphasizing the utility of 
non-military aspects of US power in dealing with terrorist threats. 
6.6.3 Mounting Civilian Casualty  
As the preceding analysis shows, the civilian casualty figure from drone strikes in targeted 
states surged under Obama. After two terms and over 540 drone strikes, available data 
published by TBIJ, LWJ, and NAF estimate that, on average, 2250 civilian deaths (in all seven 
targeted states) had occurred.581 This was confirmed by the 18-month inquiry report by the UN 
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, affirming that the “use of drones for CT operations has caused disproportionate 
levels of civilian casualties.”582 Thus, while drone weaponry may be precise in itself, the human 
operator may not. There are a number of useful literature583 on the impact of post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) and its effect on drone operators (but this is beyond the scope of this 
thesis).  
The CIA, during Obama’s administration, reported low civilian figures. For example, the 
agency published that between May 2010 and August 2011, there were zero civilian drone 
casualties and 600 militant deaths.584 In the same period, data from NAF and TBIJ estimated 
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85 civilian deaths from drone strikes.585 The reason for the disparity is not surprising; one, the 
CIA, before PPG rules, ran a covert and unacknowledged signature drone operation that did 
not require public disclosure of strike data. Two, reporting a higher death count may elicit a 
negative reaction from the American public and the international community. However, 
evidence from a number of organizations investigating the incidents of civilian deaths 
following drone strikes in the Obama era provides the closest empirical data sets on death 
counts. While there may be diverse estimates, these data set consistently point to and report 
higher civilian deaths than those published by the CIA or any other American agency. 
The adverse effect of civilian deaths for the US grand strategy under Obama lies in its violations 
of international laws of war requiring adherence to the principles of proportionality and 
distinction.586 Hence, discrediting the allure of America’s exemplarism in targeted states by 
laying a negative precedent in the way it projects and uses its hard power. Though two separate 
arguments can be made that: Obama’s PPG changed the nature of drone operations in his 
second term and that civilian casualties are inevitable in warfare. The challenge of civilian 
casualty due to drone strikes is the countervailing impact it engenders – such as retaliatory 
attacks and antipathy within the Muslim world – which America may be unable to dispel in the 
long term. Thus, while drones may be effective in the short term, their aftermath in targeted 
states is likely to outweigh their tactical and strategic relevance as a CT tool due to the inherent 
paradox linked with their use. 
6.6.4 Counterterrorism Paradox 
Counterterrorism policies expected to improve security often have counterproductive and 
paradoxical effects.587 This means actions taken by governments to prevent terrorist threats can 
undermine anticipated gains.588 For instance, we could imagine the security of the US 
homeland being strengthened through drone strikes while the security of US allies in the region 
potentially being reduced when terrorist retaliation and recruitment levels rise.  
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Cohen and his colleagues589 identify six main principles that underscore the paradoxes of 
COIN: (i) the more you protect your force, the less secure you are, (ii) the more force you use, 
the less secure you are, (iii) the best weapons for counterinsurgency do not fire bullets, (iv) 
them (people in the targeted states) doing something poorly is better than us doing it well, (v) 
if a tactic is not always a guarantee it would always work, and lastly, (vi) tactical success 
guarantees nothing.  
Obama’s drone warfare has reflected a CT paradox – which construes the use of drones in 
targeted states, as engendering contradictory outcomes for stated CT US policy – by creating 
more problems than they solve. This is closely approximate to all of Cohen’s six COIN 
principles noted above. As George Mason, Professor Audrey Kurth Cronin avers, “terrorist 
groups such as al-Qaeda in Pakistan should be dealt as a COIN problem and not a CT issue.” 
590 Her argument is premised on the view that while drones may be effective in leadership 
decapitation and disrupting terrorist formations, it places less emphasis on countering 
individual recruitment and, by extension, the retaliatory attacks that serve to further inflame 
terrorism. However, while replacing drones with US troops for CT is a devil’s alternative, the 
continued reliance on drones under Obama potentially ignored other longer-term strategies that 
can foil the conditions that perpetuate terrorism and further disregards America’s soft power.   
Furthermore, while the technical and precision capabilities of drones diminish the practicalities 
of the aforementioned COIN paradoxes, as it removes the soldier from the equation and 
introduces remote warfare, it remains a deeply problematic approach for CT operations. The 
paradoxes of Obama’s drone warfare are manifested in the following ways: 
(i) It eradicates the possibility of acquiring useful human intelligence from killed 
terrorist targets. As Daniel Byman acknowledges, “even though they work, killings 
are a poor second choice to arrests. Dead men tell no tales and thus are no help in 
anticipating the next attack or informing about broader terrorist activities.”591 He 
submits that cooperative CT engagement with the government facilitating the arrest 
of a terrorist is a better alternative than outrightly killing them.592 
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(ii) Drones as CT tools rarely lead to the complete demise of terrorist groups. This is 
evident in the further proliferation of terrorist groups since 9/11 despite the ramping 
up of CT operations. In targeted states, drones have not caused the demise of al-
Qaeda, TTP, or its affiliates. 
(iii) Decentralized groups like AQAP make it difficult to ascertain the command and 
hierarchy of their organization and in selecting targets for signature strikes. As a 
consequence, drone strikes have killed more LVTs than HVTs due to the terrorist 
command and hierarchy structure that makes personality strikes difficult. Data 
published by NAF estimate that, of the 1260 militants that have been killed by drone 
strikes, only 36 have been leaders of al-Qaeda, Taliban, or its affiliates.593 Benedict 
Wilkinson, explaining the flawed logic of drone strikes in Yemen, argues that 
“when drones kill an AQAP leader, it increases local support for the group rather 
than diminish it.”594 
(iv) Terrorist groups are adjusting to drone strikes and devising mechanisms to evade 
strikes or stay undetected from their missiles. This goes to show that while drones 
may be effective, in the long-term terrorist groups may be capable of developing 
evasion strategies that make the precise target more difficult.  
The point is, while drones from a strategic and tactical perspective are useful CT tools, the 
aftermath of drone strikes emboldens and empowers terrorists in two ways. First, the muscular 
American CT response gives credibility to terrorist organizations by conferring a legitimacy 
that it poses a significant threat to the US and warrants drone strikes.595 This credibility can 
have propaganda value for terrorist mobilization and reinforces the notion that US drone strikes 
represent a validation of their threat and cause. Second, the blowback effect associated with 
drones works at cross-purposes for the US government in targeted states when terrorist 
resentment, public backlash, international criticism, and antipathy grows. The countervailing 
effect of Obama’s activist drone policy is the negative precedent it sets for future American 
presidents and the risk that long-term strategic deployment of drones without established rules 
of engagement ratified under the law may harm the integrity of US CT operations. 
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6.6.5 Drone Proliferation among Non-state Actors 
Under Obama, drones proliferated significantly, particularly among non-state actors (see table 
11 below). As Ash Rossiter notes, “several non-state actors incorporated drones into their 
operations by acquiring over-the-counter UAVs and in some cases militarizing them by 
imitating US drone operations.”596 In Syria, ISIS established its own drone formation named 
the – Unmanned Aircraft of the Mujahedeen – to coordinate drone assaults (again, the issue of 
proliferation of drones will be returned to in chapter 9). Though these drones are not full 
military-grade types, it is weaponized with explosives were used to run ISR operations in 
Eastern Syria and Northern Iraq.597 In 2016, ISIS used these drones to kill two Kurdish 
fighters.598 In Libya, a group of anti-Gaddafi rebels in Misrata employed small scout drones in 
organizing a rapid raid in the capital, Tripoli, in 2011. In Yemen, Houthi Rebels have employed 
unmanned maritime drones in attacking Saudi Navy sailors.599 Hezbollah has also deployed 
drones severally into Israeli air space between 2004 and 2006. Also, in 2016, the group 
launched an attack in rebel positions in Syria using quadcopter drones.  
One common feature of all these examples of drone use among non-state actors is that it 
occurred under Obama. The over-reliance of drones for Obama’s CT operations inadvertently 
demonstrated to non-state actors the capabilities of their weaponry. Considering the impact of 
globalization in the present world order, it has allowed the unchecked diffusion and 
weaponization of commercial off-the-shelf drones by the very targets of drone strikes. Apart 
from non-state actors, regional actors such as Iran also have drone capabilities. This was 
demonstrated in 2014 when Hamas (a militant group) in Palestine used Iran-made drones 
(known as Ababil) for ISR and armed operations along neighbouring Israeli borders.  
Resurgent powers such as China have developed drone capabilities, and this grew 
predominantly under the Obama era. For example, though China’s first drone – the Pterosaur 
1, part of the Wing Loong series – were first operational in 2005, most of its new generation 
drones such as the Pterodactyl 1, Sky Saker, Wu-Zhuang Wu-Ren (WJ-1), and Gong-Ji-Wu-
Ren-Ji (GJ-1) which are mainly attack drones, were made, and exported from 2014 onwards.600 
The drone arms race under Obama embodies Tang’s security dilemma theory – by causing a 
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security spiral among state and non-state actors. Thus, Obama’s drone warfare, as Kilcullen 
argues, “has demonstrated to rival competitors America’s technological advantages.”601 
Table 11: Non-state actors drone capabilities 
Non-State 
Group 
Country Year of 
Acquisition 





Non-military grade quadcopters and small 








Armed unmanned maritime craft, 
AeroVironment RQ-11 Raven, Semi-military 
grade drones (Qasif 1, which resembled 
Iran’s Ababil 2). 
Hezbollah Lebanese 
militant group 
2004 Misrad 1 military-grade surveillance drones, 
small quadcopters armed with explosives 
Hamas Palestinian 
Rebel group 




Libya 2011 circa Aeryon scout drones 
Source: NAF602 
 
6.6.6 The Restraint Paradox 
Restraint supporters advocate for the reduction of existing US defense commitments by 
minimizing forward-deployment of troops, the frequency of using force, and the cost of 
warfare.603 It is an embedded logic that by lowering the US military footprint in overseas 
territories, the unnecessary wars of the Bush-era would be drawn down during the Obama 
administration. However, rather than reduce the cost of CT operations for the US, the over-
reliance on drones under Obama increased it. As our analysis shows, Obama’s military 
spending more than quadrupled that of Clinton though 7.2 percent less than President Bush's 
war expenditure (on Iraq and Afghanistan wars).604 According to a report published by NAF, 
between 2009 and October 2012, the US engaged in 1,160 weapons releases from drones which 
more than doubled the amount released during Bush’s entire presidency in the Af-Pak 
region.605 
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Furthermore, during his candidacy, Obama criticized the heavy cost America pays for 
conducting warfare and humanitarian missions during his presidential campaigns, yet, after his 
election, more money was spent on war than during Bush's presidency ($866 billion and $811 
billion respectively). The cost of war in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Syria amounts to $4.79 
trillion and counting, the Watson Institute reports. This number is thrice the figure spent by 
Bush (between 8-11% of the defense budget).606  
Robert Lieber puts it more lightly, 
“Obama’s doctrine marked with inconsistency symbolized by the gap between 
identity and policy evident in his use of force. Thus, in ‘leading from behind in 
Libya, surging and, at the same time, announcing to withdraw in Afghanistan 
and to set up, but failing to militarily enforce ‘red lines’ in Syria, and his 
questionable policies seemed to question rather than confirm America’s 
singular exceptionalism and the country’s unique role as liberal hegemon.”607 
Hence, Obama’s grand strategy, contrary to facilitating restraint, emphasized the same hard 
power muscularism championed by his predecessor – and demonstrated in his administration’s 
increased defence spending for US CT and broader military operations.  
However, while drones have been effective in reducing the size of conventional forces in the 
Middle East, and effectively transferring battlefield operations to advanced technological 
warfare systems, the Pivot to Asia strategy under Obama made it “take its eyes off the ball” in 
the region, with early with troop withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan. This inadvertently 
caused the rise of ISIS, which filled the void left by al-Qaeda. Hence, while restraint reduced 
the cost of war by ensuring minimal soldier deployment, in the Middle East, it created under 
Obama new CT threats with the further spread of the ISIS caliphate into Syria and Afghanistan 
(Khorasan province). 
6.7 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, the foreign policy of the Obama administration has been critically assessed, and 
the evolution of his doctrine analysed. This chapter examined two key arguments on the role 
of drones for US grand strategy under Obama. First, it served as a double-edged instrument for 
facilitating the restraint side of the US grand strategy on the one hand and the offensive aspects 
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on the other. Second, despite the political and strategic utility of drones under Obama, it 
engendered two paradoxes (restraint and security) that undermined rather than furthered its 
overall grand strategy. This is based on the negative precedent of his drone programme, which 
contributed to incentivizing drone proliferation, spawning blowback from anti-Americanism, 
increasing terrorist retaliation, and undermining the ‘exceptionalism’ espoused by Obama. 
These arguments were evaluated from the prism of Obama’s drone warfare and the aftermath 
of drone strikes in targeted states based on the available data set. In the final assessment, the 
overall impact of Obama’s grand strategy worsened America's exceptionalism due to the 
dilemma generated by drone strikes and the weakness implicit in the articulation of his grand 
strategy. In the next chapter, the role of drones in the grand strategy of the Trump 




















The Trump Administration, Drones and US Grand Strategy 
“From this day forward, a new vision will govern our land. From this day forward, it is going 
to be only America First.”608 
7.0 Introduction 
This chapter examines the role of drones in the grand strategy of Donald Trump’s 
administration. It is the argument of this chapter that the outsourcing, deregulation, and 
expansion in the use of drones in targeted states under Trump served strategic purposes for his 
counterterrorism statecraft. The strategic ends, as this chapter examines, are consistent with the 
doctrine of his administration which espoused a “nativist, protectionist, and nationalist-
isolationist vision for the US under the populist slogan ‘American First,’ that challenges the 
post-Cold War Washington’s consensus on liberal hegemony.”609 However, like successive US 
administrations post 9/11, while drone strikes were effective in exterminating terrorist threats, 
the aftermath of their intensified use in targeted states engendered inimical outcomes for 
Trump’s grand strategy. This was manifest in the mounting civilian deaths, growing antipathy, 
and terrorist retaliation in targeted states.  
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, it deciphers the doctrine of the Trump administration. 
The second part analyses the elements of Trump’s grand strategy and its intersection with drone 
warfare. The third part unpacks the continuities and discontinuities of Trump’s drone warfare. 
The final part assesses how drones use under Trump undermined his grand strategy. 
 
7.1 Deciphering Trump’s Doctrine 
The doctrine of the Donald Trump administration has been described as a hodgepodge of 
different American foreign policy traditions offering varying suggestions for Washington’s 
role in the world.610 Many of these analyses emerge from Trump’s rhetorical and unorthodox 
approach to statecraft – that combined a Jacksonian strategic culture that espoused populist 
views and military strength with recrudescent isolationism – that is diametric to primacy but 
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consistent with Washington’s post-Cold War tradition on liberal hegemony.611 (this is 
elaborated upon later in this chapter). 
Five identifiable traditions are consistent with the foreign policy of the Trump administration 
that has been identified in the recent academic literature as the disavowal of liberal 
internationalism, principled realism, neo-isolationism, Jacksonianism, populist sovereignty, 
and conservative American nationalism.612  Ville Sinkonnen’s characterization of Trump’s 
doctrine captures some of these elements.  
“The “Trump doctrine” has been built in contradistinction to liberal 
internationalism, containing civilizational tropes drawn from neoconservatism, 
and is underpinned by a zero-sum materialist worldview borrowed from 
realism. Trump’s approach to the international is also transactional, which 
means he intermittently draws upon (neo) isolationist themes.”613  
On liberal internationalism, Trump’s doctrine has roots in some of the 9/11 traditions of his 
predecessors. Like George W. Bush's offensive liberal strategy that extols democracy 
promotion but eschews multilateralism and favours unipolarity, Trump’s internationalism is 
assertive of America’s economic, military, and post-Cold War hegemony but rejects the 
international institutions, binding treaties, and agreements that facilitate it.614 This is akin to 
President Nixon's administration’s emphasis on American national interest as the basis to 
ensure its greater power in waging renewed and heightened competition in world affairs.615 
The tenets of Trump’s liberal internationalism were captured in the remarks of his Secretary of 
State, Mike Pompeo, while delivering a speech at Brussels Forum. He notes that while Trump 
seeks to build a new liberal order that asserts American leadership and democratic values, it is 
distrustful of international institutions.616 This has raised speculations similar to Obama’s first 
term on the retrenchment of Washington’s power position in the post-Cold War order and the 
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possibilities his stance will alter the existing balance of power in the global security landscape. 
For instance, Trump reduced America’s funding for the United Nations, backed out and sought 
to re-negotiate many long-standing multilateral trade agreements such as the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), pushed for Russia’s readmission to the G-7, and rejects 
climate change as a pressing issue (by backing out of the 2015 Paris Agreement)  
On isolationism, Trump’s doctrine exemplified a transactional approach to international affairs, 
akin to the Jacksonian isolationist approach of the 1930s – that advocated an American foreign 
policy that is uninvolved and partly disentangled from international politics.617 Clarke and 
Ricketts conceptualized Trump’s ‘transnationalism’ as his inclination to “boil politics down to 
discrete deals and holding an unnerving belief in his ability to strike the best bargain, defined 
in accordance with his perception of America’s national interests; in the international order.”618 
This was boldly expressed in his 2016 foreign policy speech where he promised to put 
‘America First,’ increase its defence spending, end US global humanitarian missions, and 
terminate the lopsided existing security relationship with allies. He avers: 
“No country has ever prospered that failed to put its own interests first. Both 
our friends and our enemies put their countries above ours, and we, while being 
fair to them, must start doing the same. We will no longer surrender this country 
and its people to the false song of globalism. The nation-state remains the true 
foundation for happiness and harmony. I am skeptical of international unions 
that tie us up and bring America down.”619 
On principled realism, Trump’s doctrine manifests strong realist tenets that accentuate a 
muscular economic and military approach and a zero-sum view of intra strategic competition. 
This is reflected in his 2017 National Security Strategy that construed the international sphere 
as an “arena of competition between sovereign states, engaged in an incessant competition over 
quantifiable power resources, which takes place in various domains, of which great powers are 
the most important.”620 Pompeo, in a speech delivered on Washington’s policy toward Latin 
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America on 2 December 2019, re-affirmed this when he summarized Trump’s foreign policy 
as consisting of three core principles: realism, restraint, and respect, or altogether known as 
“principled realism.”621 
The NSS document defined ‘principled realism’ as a combination of realism and idealism – 
one that emphasized the maximization of state power in an anarchic and competitive system 
and respect for American principles and how other countries uphold theirs. This is equally 
embodied in the four pillars of the NSS, namely: (i) protecting the homeland, (ii) promoting 
American prosperity, (iii) preserving peace through strength and, (iv) advancing American 
influence.622 President Trump invoked this principle in the relocation of America’s Embassy 
in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, averring “the foreign policy of the United States as 
grounded in principled realism, which begins with an honest acknowledgement of plain 
facts.”623 Trump appeared to give a justification for this approach in his second address to the 
UN General Assembly when he declared America “will no longer be held dogmas, discredited 
ideologies and so-called experts who have been proven wrong over the years, time and time 
again.”624 
Though Trump’s principled realism has been critiqued as a “mere slogan,” “bumper sticker,” 
and a “shallow doctrine” without any meaningful foreign policy depth to it,625 for Trump and 
his team, the term is more than a catchphrase and an expression of America’s predominance in 
the arena of competition among sovereign states over quantifiable power resources.626  
On populist sovereignty, Trump’s foreign policy thinking espoused a doctrine of political 
action and government priorities that is premised on political instincts.627 Populist sovereignty 
under Trump’s doctrine, as Aaron Ettinger argues, is a “reformulation of sovereignty along the 
lines of state-society relations embedded in a vision of an international order composed of 
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independent and strong countries free from restraint; on their own course of action.”628 In 
essence, it is sovereignty that views government matters as serving the interest of its own 
people and should be prioritized.  
Stanley Rehnson describes Trump’s doctrine as “conservative American nationalism” to 
explain the intersection between his psychology, thinking, orientation to the use of force, and 
view about the world. He identified five key elements that characterized it. First, it places 
America first in its policies. The second is that it exalts American national identity as the basis 
for its interaction with the world. Third, it places a high premium on America’s strengths, and, 
fourth, it champions the goals of highly selective engagement with the world. Fifth, it espouses 
the doctrine of maximum repeated pressure in pursuit of maximum tactical and strategic 
goals.629 
Thus, from the preceding analysis, Trump’s doctrine can be summed as a composite of 
“principled realism” with isolationist undertones – that embraces a conservative American 
nationalism and a zero-sum worldview – premised on a materialist conception of power, and 
international order and a recrudescence of populist sovereignty.  
7.1.1 Does Trump have a Coherent Doctrine? 
There are speculations in academic literature that question if Trump had a coherent foreign 
policy at all. It is not surprising that Zenko and Lissner630 declared Trump had no foreign policy 
before his inauguration. Reuben Steff and Alan Tidwell’s analysis, based on a three-frame 
analysis, described Trump’s foreign policy as “disruptive and iconoclastic” due to his 
exceptional behaviour, unusual qualities, and worldview about politics and the global arena. 
This they explained from the ambit of Trump’s foreign policy outlook, which they argued 
reflected three ideals: “Art of making deal,” “Making America Great Again” (MAGA), and a 
projection of the president as a “Stable Genius.”631 In a similar assessment, Peter Dombrowski 
and Simon Reich632 also pose the question regarding the nexus between Trump’s eccentricities, 
rhetoric, and leadership qualities as a determinative criterion for establishing his foreign policy 
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formulation. According to them, “there is a significant gap between what the political 
leadership often says and the way in which the military operates, between rhetoric and 
behaviour.”633 
Thus, in attempting to analyse Trump’s grand strategy, in their argument, a consideration of 
the shifting external environment, the vagaries of America's expanding national security 
bureaucracy (the blob), and, most importantly, the constraints imposed by diverse operational 
demands must be considered.634  This explains John Haine's conception of Trump’s strategy as 
a “divination” process, one of which contains several aphorisms having different pieces of a 
puzzle of his grand strategy, when put together highlights a unilateralist approach in defining 
American interest and a strategic ambiguity in dealing with its adversaries.635  
The chapter now turns to consider the grand strategy of Trump’s presidency.  
7.2 The Grand Strategy of the Trump Administration 
7.2.1 Framing Trump’s Grand Strategy 
There are several framings in academic literature purporting an explanation of Trump’s grand 
strategy. Some view it as a continuation of Obama’s hybrid grand strategy but employing a 
different tone and more ambitious language.636 This stems from Trump’s commitment to 
geopolitical competition with the world’s greatest military powers and the formal and informal 
alliances that comes with it. Trump has threatened new wars to avert nuclear weapons 
proliferation and continued his predecessor’s drone programme, and inherited wars against the 
Taliban, ISIS, Iraq, and Syria. Another analysis construes Trump’s strategy as a composite of 
rollback, offshore balancing, retrenchment, and selective engagement637 with vestiges of 
primacy.638 Most of these analyses have stemmed from Trump’s willingness to decisively 
engage the utility of America’s power (although he was very restrained with its use, except for 
eliminating ISIS and for his drone program), they, however, fail to provide an encompassing 
frame to understand some critical aspects of his strategy. For example, President Trump, in a 
speech delivered at the United Nations General Assembly on 24 September 2019, declared he 
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was a “globalist and nationalist”639 Peter Harris, however, argued that this characterization as 
exaggerated, as Trump was sceptical of isolationism due to “multilateral security partnerships 
that are essential to defeating and deterring foreign threats to US national security, and the 
reliance of US domestic prosperity on the existence of an open world economy, which also 
required the unstinting application of US power abroad.”640 Also, it was never realistic Trump 
would become isolationist; instead, he sought to reposition the US within international 
structures – reducing ties to some (like the World Health Organization and the Paris 
Agreement) and adjusting ties to others (NAFTA and NATO). 
A framework model for explaining Trump’s grand strategy as put forward by Hal Brands, 
however, fits with the focus of this chapter. It is outlined and analysed below.  
7.2.2 ‘America First’ and ‘Fortress America’ Grand Strategy 
Brands consider Trump’s grand strategy along a spectrum, with Fortress America at one end 
and America First at the other. He defined “Fortress America” as “a hard-line approach that 
espouses a scaling back of the post-Cold War international order with elements of unilateralism 
and Jacksonian isolationism of the 1930s.”641 This is predicated on three premises that 
underscored Trump’s near zero-sum approach to world affairs: (i) the notion that other 
countries have over the years exploited America’s economic, political and military largesse, 
(ii) the contention that globalization has left America weaker and more susceptible to forces 
that undermine its sovereignty and promotion of liberal values, and (iii) that America should 
readily express the fungibility of its power by being aggressively prepared to use its enormous 
military strengths to protect its national interests instead of protecting allies or enforcing 
international security.642  
The key elements of Fortress America are rooted in several ideas. The overarching pillar being 
economic nationalism. This was reflected in Trump’s inaugural address, which stated, 
“protection will lead to great prosperity and strength.”643 The main goal was to engender 
economic sovereignty and achieve a unilateral advantage over trade competitors such as China 
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instead of embracing the global economic principles of “rules of the road.”644 The second 
element is the rollback from Washington’s alliance and security commitment, which in his 
view, weakened rather than strengthened Washington’s predominant power position. Third and 
relatedly is the emphasis on the pursuit of muscular but aloof military strength – with a narrow 
focus on US defence. This means a reversion to nationalistic policies that embody vestiges of 
isolationism. This was expressed in Trump’s speech to a Joint Session of Congress where he 
remarked that “…to those allies who wonder what kind of friend America will be, look no 
further than the heroes who wear our uniform.”645 
Fourth, it advocated the withdrawal of some US overseas commitments. Fifth, it embraced a 
“win and go home” approach to CT. Sixth, and relatedly, it rescinds from military and non-
military democratic promotion. Seven, it espoused a stringent measure to strengthen American 
sovereignty that cuts back refugees, particularly from Muslim countries. Eight and finally, it 
frees America from the shackles of international laws, multilateralism, and international 
institutions on the grounds that it inhibits the US from exerting its unmatched power.646  
The “America First” spectrum advanced a more disciplined approach to asserting US interests. 
The model emphasized striking better deals, a more even burden sharing, and better protection 
of American sovereignty and finite resources while still preserving – even strengthening – 
America's global role in proactively sustaining the international system.647 It rejects the pursuit 
of US national interests from an internationalist standpoint, instead advocated for a stark, 
pugilistic form of nationalism that steers America away from post-war grand strategic 
traditions.648 
Brands identify several key elements of the “America First” model. First, it holds that the US 
would lead an open global trading system to act more aggressively to combat discriminatory 
measures and ensure fair access and equal opportunity for US companies and goods. Second, 
it advocated for a burden-sharing arrangement between the US and its allies – based on a 
renegotiation of existing agreements to align with US strategic interests. Third, it pushed for a 
significant military build-up to address the US relative military decline. The fourth element is 
the intensification of military campaign efforts against radical Islamic elements that pose 
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immediate threats to the US. This leads to the fifth element: cooperation with America’s 
Muslim partners and providing military and non-military support in aggressively combating 
terrorist finances and ideology and funding post-conflict reconstruction.649 
The sixth element advocated for pragmatic cooperation that upheld US interests, restrained 
great-power rivals, and pushed back more sharply when cooperation is infringed. The final 
aspect of this strategy stressed America’s stance in international institutions – that is, using its 
leverage to shape and reform them – through funding cuts and withdrawal of its membership.  
In sum, Trump’s grand strategy sits between the two spectrums incorporating the elements of 
the former and not dismissive of the former. His policies have often reflected Fortress America 
in stricter immigration laws, a trade war with China, the building of the ‘wall’ along the US-
Mexican border, a new Afghan strategy, and in the escalation of drone warfare in targeted 
states. Also, it has been manifested in the relocation of the US embassy in Tel Aviv, in the 
increased funding for the US military, and in cutting off funding and ties with WHO due to its 
‘handling’ of the Covid-19 pandemic – and electing instead to blame China. In contrast, 
America First has been reflected in the renegotiation of the NAFTA agreement and in the 
review of existing agreements that stifle America’s economic potentials and national interest. 
Thus, Trump’s grand strategy can be summed up as a “nativist-isolationist vision for America 
couched in a populist America First slogan that defies Washington’s consensus on liberal 
hegemony.”650 It espoused a muscular CT strategy with the further expansion of drone strikes, 
expressed confidence in the fungibility of America’s military power, and committed to 
promoting America’s economic, political, and strategic interests when dealing with other states 
in international affairs.  
The next section examines Trump’s drone warfare and the linkages to his grand strategy.  
7.3 Trump’s Drone Warfare 
Trump’s drone warfare has reflected some critical aspects of his grand strategy that embraces 
a commitment to protecting America’s interest and continuing the war against the transnational 
terrorist threat. At the tactical level, Trump’s drone warfare seeks to advance the strategic goals 
of US CT – focused on the expansion of information sharing, border security, combating 
terrorist financing, recruitment, and mobilization, and countering transnational terrorist 
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threats651 – that are largely unchanged in the longer trajectory of post-9/11 statecraft. Under 
President Trump, drones have significantly expanded in use, target, and lethality, especially in 
the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia, with Afghanistan as the epicenter of his drone combat 
operations.652 There are, however, some continuities and discontinuities in Trump’s drone 
policy that are worth highlighting. 
7.3.1 Continuities in Trump’s Drone Warfare strategy 
As aforementioned, the use of drones under Trump is not new or surprising. Trump drone 
policies, however, have some degree of continuities in terms of their use that coheres with the 
policies of the Bush and Obama administrations. For instance, the core rule of law authority 
for the use of drones overseas is firmly set in the Bush era, while the actual strategy for using 
military force (including drones) in Iraq and Syria find some levels of parallel to Obama’s final 
military strategy of using indigenous forces backed by American airpower and Special Forces 
to combat ISIS.653  
The continuities in Trump’s drone discourse have also been manifested in his administration’s 
CT policies. As Biegon and Watts puts it,  
“… despite Trump’s rhetoric of isolationism and alleged break with the past, 
current US operations resemble a fusion of George W. Bush-era “world is a 
battlefield” global militarization doctrine with Obama-era “tools of remote 
warfare, with “light footprint” and aversion to ground operations….”654  
Instead of sharp reversals, considering his penchant for rhetoric and maverick bombast, the 
Trump administration has maintained Obama’s CT playbook and embraced the objectives of 
his predecessor’s CT efforts, particularly in the utility of drones for American statecraft. Like 
Obama, Trump has ordered more drone strikes, widened the geographical latitude of drone 
warfare, deepened the use of Special Operation Forces (SOF), continued reliance on security 
                                                             
651 White House (2018) United States National Strategy for Counterterrorism. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/NSCT.pdf  
652 Rubin, G. (2020). Donald Trump, Twitter, and Islamophobia: The End of Dignity in Presidential Rhetoric 
About Terrorism. In Presidential Rhetoric on Terrorism under Bush, Obama, and Trump (pp. 105-128). 
Palgrave Pivot, Cham. 
653 Biegon, R., & Watts, T. F. (2020). When ends Trump means: continuity versus change in US 
counterterrorism policy. Global Affairs, 6(1), 37-53. 
654 Watts, T. (2019). Foreign policy issues for America: The Trump years; Counterterrorism from the Obama 
administration to President Trump: caught in the fait accompli war. pp.6 
155 
 
cooperation, and expanded DoD funding on counterterrorism-related security cooperation 
programmes.655 
As a component of an America First strategy, Trump’s approach to transnational terrorism 
called on partners of the US to commit more resources in the fight against radical Islamic 
extremism. Also, under Trump, the focus of Congressional interest in the drone program was 
still limited to the tactical rather than the strategic aspects of their use – regarding who is being 
targeted, what their importance is, and the drone platforms and weapons that are used.656 The 
emphasis on the tactical over the strategic has sustained the same blind spots in Congressional 
oversight akin to the Obama drone policy management approach in his first term. 
However, there were several aspects of Trump’s drone warfare that are contra to previous 
administrations. These discontinuities, as the next section argues, are radically aligned with the 
‘American First’ and some aspects of ‘Fortress America’ notions of his grand strategy.  
7.3.2 Discontinuities in Trump’s Drone Warfare strategy 
7.3.2.1 Return of Covert Drone Strikes 
Trump’s drone warfare loosened the Obama-era second term restraints on the CIA that 
prevented them from conducting covert drone strikes in targeted states. Trump’s national 
security advisers replaced Obama’s PPG on drones – which established new standard operating 
procedures for lethal and non-lethal uses of force against terrorist targets outside the US and in 
areas of active hostilities657 – with what they termed Principles, Standards, and Procedures 
(PSP), which gave the US military, a broader latitude to conduct covert drone operations 
outside conventional battlefields, than the PPG.658 Under the PSP, the military and the CIA no 
longer needed a high-level vetting of the targets of proposed strikes or required to show that 
potential targets pose a specific threat to America’s interest.659 It also set back the trend towards 
drone transparency that started in the second term of Obama’s presidency in 2013, which 
sought to disclose more about its drone program – that is, its highly classified rules, its 
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implementation, policies, and strategies – that guided their use in view of the changing 
domestic and international perception to drone strikes. 
Contra to the above, Trump’s PSP pushes the limits of the geographical latitude of drone strikes 
and has engendered a reversion to covert strikes in non-combat theatres. This has led to the 
renewal of CIA strikes in Libya, Somalia, Syria, Yemen and pushed the limits on other forms 
of covert operations outside conflict zones, including in Syria and Iran. This meant a reversal 
to the era of non-transparency, lack of public acknowledgment of successful drone strikes, and 
a revivification of secretive drone kills.  
7.3.2.2 Reporting of civilian deaths 
On 6 March 2019, President Trump signed Executive Order on Revocation of Reporting 
Requirement that revoked the short-lived requirement, formulated in the second term of the 
Obama administration, that required US intelligence officials to publicly report the number of 
civilians killed in CIA drone strikes outside declared war zones. It also removed: (i) limitation 
of drone strikes to HVTs in declared combat theatres, (ii) the need for interagency approval 
before drone strikes can be authorized outside of active war zones and, (iii) the prerequisite for 
government assessment regarding civilian and combatant casualties from drone strikes.660 
This resembled George W. Bush's presidency and the first term of Obama’s presidency, where 
the US government did not publicly acknowledge the intended targets of drone strikes. Though 
under Trump’s PSP, the Obama’s PPG’s standard of “near certainty” that civilians would not 
be injured or killed in a strike was maintained, the new executive orders run contra to the 
aforesaid. This is because the lower threshold of drone targets engendered the possibilities of 
collateral damage, unintended deaths, and accidental drone hits.  
7.3.2.3 Deregulation of remote warfare 
Compared to the previous administration post 9/11, Trump entrusted drone warfare command 
and operations to his generals. Whereas Obama operationally expanded but bureaucratically 
constrained drone use. This way, military commanders were allowed to conduct drone strikes 
without requiring approval for the ‘kill order’ from the White House. Inadvertently, this 
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allowed hawkish officials and senior military commanders to release the throttle on America’s 
immense capabilities for global strikes.661  
For instance, upon taking office, Trump granted requests to declare three provinces in Yemen 
to be “areas of active hostilities” – this allowed military commanders to conduct covert strikes 
for six months without requiring Congressional approval.662 Likewise, in March 2017, Trump 
designated large parts of Somalia as areas of active hostilities for at least 180 days in which 
local commanders were given the authority to carry out offensive strikes against al-Shabaab 
militants.663 
Bruce Hoffman offered a potential explanation for the Trump administration’s decision to 
outsource drone warfare to military generals. He posits that “the operational loop in CT is very 
small, and you have to give the commanders on the ground the authority to act very quickly to 
take advantage of opportunities.”664 In other words, the lower the bureaucracy in the drone 
strike authorization process, the higher the chances for timely strikes, which eliminates both 
LVTs and HVTs.665 This also makes sense from an operational standpoint, as terrorists operate 
without borders and in lawless frontiers – thus making quicker deployment of targeted strikes 
tactically sound. 
7.3.2.4 A New Authorization for AUMF 
The Trump administration pressurized Congress to pass a new AUMF to authorize drone 
strikes outside the territory of al-Qaeda, and associated forces – which are outside the ambit of 
US declared war zones.666 While the 2001 AUMF was expanded under Obama to include Syria 
and Libya, further expansion of drone warfare outside non-declared war zones under Trump 
necessitated a new AUMF. Hitherto, the Obama administration designated Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Syria, and parts of Libya as “areas of active hostilities” Trump added Yemen, Somalia, 
Pakistan, and the entirety of Libya to the list, giving the US a broader latitude to conduct 
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targeted drone operations.667 The Trump administration announced it was considering new 
rules that could permit the Pentagon’s African Command (AFRICOM) to carry out offensive 
ground combat operations and drone strikes in North and West Africa, escalating deployments 
in a region that key lawmakers seem to have been unaware of before the deaths of the four US 
Special Operations Forces soldiers in the Tongo Tongo ambush in Agadez, Niger in October 
2017.668  
The Trump administration moved closer to arming surveillance drones that will fly over Niger 
and Mali in search of suspects and expanding archipelago of outposts and drone bases that 
AFRICOM has set up to patrol the Sahel and Central Africa region as part of US expanding 
remit in Africa.669 The introduction of drones to target terrorist groups is part of the Pentagon’s 
expanding footprint in the African continent to increase its strategic interest in Washington. 
This led to the $110 million installations in Agadez, Niger, that houses C-17 American 
transport planes and the MQ-9 Reaper drones.670  
These new developments are, however, outside the purview of the existing AUMF, which 
allows the president to unilaterally declare war on terrorists in declared war zones. While a new 
AUMF is not fully in place, the expansion of drone warfare under Trump created such 
possibilities, particularly as the US declared it would permanently station weaponized drones 
in South Korea and announced that it had begun deploying upgraded UAVs in the Philippines 
to assist the growing confrontation with Islamist militants there.671 Though intentions can 
change, these deployments have the potential to embolden China’s aggressive military 
expansion in SCS. However, if finally deployed, drones in these locations could be used by the 
US to expand its strategic objectives in Southeast Asia, the SCS, and Northeast Asia. 
7.3.2.5 A new Afghan strategy 
Trump’s drone strategy for Afghanistan differed remarkably from Obama’s. In comparison, 
Obama focused on escalating drone strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan. For Trump, the 
cornerstone of his drone strategy concentrated on rooting out al-Qaeda and radical Islamic 
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extremists’ groups mainly in Afghanistan based on his new Afghan strategy declared at Fort 
Meyer, Virginia, on August 21, 2017, which focused on ensuring American security beyond 
the elusive siren song of nation-building: 
“The American people are weary of war without victory. Nowhere is this more 
evident than with the war in Afghanistan, the longest war in American history 
– 17 years. I share the American people’s frustration. I also share their 
frustration over a foreign policy that has spent too much time, energy, and 
money and most importantly lives, trying to rebuild countries in their own 
image, instead of pursuing our security interests above other considerations.”672 
President Trump then went on to explain the core pillar of the new Afghan strategy as: 
“A core pillar of our new strategy is a shift from a time-based approach to one 
based on conditions. I have said many times how counterproductive it is for the 
United States to announce in advance the dates we intend to begin, or end, 
military options. We will not talk about the numbers of troops or our plans for 
further military activities. Conditions on the ground – not arbitrary timetables – 
will guide our strategy from now on. America’s enemies must never know our 
plans or believe they can wait us out. I will not say when we are going to attack 
but attack; we will.”673 
His strategy also jettisoned the Obama’s phased withdrawal strategy that was tied to a calendar 
timetable rather, replacing it, howbeit grudgingly and against his instincts (as he has shown 
greater determination to pull the US out of Afghanistan in recent years), with an open-ended 
strategy that boosted the troop level to recognize, ‘local political and security conditions on the 
ground.674  
In the next section, the phases of Trump’s drone warfare are assessed, and its role in supporting 
his grand strategy is analysed. 
7.4 Phases of Trump’s Drone Wars 
Two phases categorized Trump’s drone war: an escalation phase and a spike phase. The 
escalation phase took place within the first 18 months of Trump’s presidency and was 
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characterized by a surge in drone strike operations globally, particularly in Yemen, Somalia, 
Afghanistan, Libya, and some parts of Pakistan. The surge signals, paradoxically, an embrace 
of both Obama’s drone warfare and a stark militarization of Bush's pre-emptive and preventive 
warfare. It also underscored Trump’s drone warfare as a reflection of Fortress America – due 
to its hard-line muscular posture on terrorist groups. In both tempo and geography, Trump’s 
drone warfare during this period, in many measures, surpassed that of President Obama, who 
was regarded as the ‘drone king.’675 According to a 2018 report in The Daily Beast, Trump 
launched 238 drone strikes in Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan and 1300 strikes in Afghanistan 
alone within his first two years in office.676 This is much higher than the 186 drone strikes 
launched under Obama (see figures 11, 12, and 13 below). TBIJ counted 2,243 drone strikes in 
the first two years of Trump’s drone warfare compared to 1878 in the entire eight years of 
Obama’s administration.677 Another estimation puts it that in his first 74 days in office, about 
75 drone strikes have been launched by Trump – one strike a day on average – which represents 
a five-fold increase over Obama’s rate.678 
Figure 11: Trump drone strikes in Afghanistan (Jan. 2017-March 2020) 
 
Source: TBIJ (2020).679 
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Outside of America’s official battlefields, Yemen has been the central target of Trump’s drone 
bombardment. In Yemen alone, the Trump administration had carried out 176 strikes in just 
two years, compared to 154 strikes during the entire eight years of Obama’s tenure, according 
to a count by The Associated Press and TBIJ.680 Most of these strikes have been targeted against 
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in central Yemen and the emergent ISIS branch in 
Yemen. 
Figure 12: Trump drone strike in Yemen (Jan 2017- June 2019) 
 
Source: TBIJ (2020).681 
 
In Somalia, Trump’s drone warfare focused on al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabaab and a small local 
branch of ISIS that has emerged in the north (see figure 13 below). Aside from Operation 
Odyssey Lightning, the US under Trump had earlier not considered Libya an area of active 
hostilities (which became a CT focus under Obama following the intervention of the US and 
its European allies in the civil war, ousting Gadhafi and, in the process, opening the country up 
to chaos and terrorism). However, in 2017, the Trump administration designated the rest of 
Libya as an “area of active hostilities.” This led to the conduct of drone strikes on the ISIS 
training camp in Libya by AFRICOM. So far, more than 15 strikes have been conducted, which 
is a 20 percent increase from Obama’s administration and points to Trump’s perception of 
Libya as a harbinger of radical Islamic terrorism.682  
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Figure 13: Trump drone strike in Somalia (January 2017 - February 2020). 
 
Source: TBIJ, (2020)683 
The peak phase of Trump’s drone operations began in September 2018 and continued through 
to February 2020, and focused on Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria (as part of US coalition 
strikes), and was mostly carried out by JSOC. In Afghanistan, there was a marked increase in 
US drone strikes in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region following the rollout of the new 
Afghan strategy, in which he vowed to “no longer be silent about Pakistan’s safe havens for 
terrorist organizations.”684 The US military, within this period, dropped three times as many 
bombs on the Taliban and the newly formed branch of ISIS in Afghanistan than it did in the 
escalation phase.685 From about 868 in previous years to about 4280 drone strikes in the spike 
phase.686 Likewise, in Somalia, the drone strike figures doubled in 2019, further exceeding the 
drone strikes figure of the first two years of Trump’s presidency.687 
Having examined the ambit, continuities, discontinuities, and dynamics of Trump’s drone 
warfare, the next section explores the intersection with his grand strategy. 
7.5 The Role of Drones in Trump’s Grand Strategy 
One of the arguments of this chapter is that the expansion in the lethality, target, and use of 
drones under Trump served strategic purposes for his statecraft. The strategic goal is consistent 
with the doctrine of his administration which espouses a ‘nativist, protectionist, and nationalist-
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isolationist vision for the US under the populist slogan ‘American First,’ that challenges the 
post-Cold War US consensus on liberal hegemony. From this lens, drone use under Trump 
serves the following purposes: (i) dronification as an ‘America First’ approach (ii) drones and 
Fortress America (iii) instrument of post-9/11 statecraft. These are discussed below. 
7.5.1 Dronification as an “America First” Approach 
Dronification, as conceptualized by Shaw and Ahkter, refers to the distinctly bureaucratic 
conduct of targeted killings. That is defined by: (a) the relocation of sovereign power from the 
uniformed military to the CIA and Special Forces; (b) the technopolitical transformations 
performed by the Predator drone; (c) the bureaucratization of the kill-chain; (d) the 
individualization of the target.688 The concept is related to Kreig and Rickli’s conceptualization 
of “surrogate warfare,” which describes a “patron’s outsourcing of the strategic, operational, 
or tactical burdens of warfare, in whole or in part, to human and/or technological substitutes in 
order to minimize the costs of war.”689  
To a large extent, Trump’s drone use establishes a dronification logic in his American First 
strategy, evident in the dramatic change in US CT policy discourse. Trump’s drone warfare 
promotes an America First approach premised on the notion that, in putting America first, the 
US must avoid being “taken advantage of” in its CT commitments, whether by allies, 
international organizations, or adversaries.690 The ‘America First’ frame is designed to project 
an image of an unabashed nationalism, conveying the sense of a clear break with the 
internationalism (or “globalism”) of successive administrations post 9/11. In a broader sense, 
it undermines US security by ignoring allies and multilateralism, particularly in its CT 
missions. Hence, while the notion of America First is on a scale more isolationist than globalist 
and ostensibly less burdensome security arrangement, Trump’s drone warfare suggests 
otherwise. Discursively, it rolls back the Bush administration’s expansive WOT discourse and 
rejects Obama’s restraint, rather than espousing a commitment to hegemony and a muscular 
military strategy for combating “Radical Islamic Terrorism.”691 The role of drones, from this 
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prism, is akin to performing the strategic functions of entrenching US structural power in 
international relations. 
7.5.2 Drones and Fortress America 
Trump’s CT policy has so far continued to serve a larger agenda for his Fortress America grand 
strategy.692 Beyond the rhetoric often obscured in his personalized political style, tweets and 
eccentricities, the Trump administration’s approach to statecraft blends security and economic 
interests in a traditional manner. This has manifested in his drone warfare that has emphasized 
the military-centric and strategic components of this strategy. President Trump’s particularly 
combative stance toward ISIS has underscored the Jacksonian worldview inherent in his grand 
strategy, which combines a practice of overwhelming force against powers that have directly 
harmed the US with powers that do not intrude upon American affairs.693  
This has been evident in Trump’s appetite for military spending that has ramped up the 
acquisition of drone munitions by more than 40 percent from 2016.694 This move was consistent 
with the President’s intention to intensify US military campaigns and capabilities. For instance, 
the DoD budget for 2018 was $648.80billion – a 7.1 percent increase from 2017. This was 
increased by 3.5 percent in 2019 to $686.1billion, with $69 billion alone for war funding 
efforts.695 As Trump put out on Twitter, “I will make our military so big, powerful, and strong 
that no one will mess with us.”696 Thus, reiterating his continued commitment to the idea of the 
US having a larger military. 
Trump’s generals and others in his national security leadership have shown strong inclinations 
in prosecuting a “long war” against terrorists, extremists, and instability, however covertly 
through drones.697 This has been demonstrated with Trump’s penchant for initially appointing 
active-duty and retired military officers to key civilian positions, as well as his reported 
willingness to grant the military considerable discretion on the use of force and further 
deregulating the drone battlefield. While it can be stated that Trump’s outsourcing of drone 
operations, and more widely, CT functions to his national security team is a demonstration of 
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his belief in America’s military general. The irony of the process engenders what Steve Bannon 
terms the emergence of ‘globalists’ within the military leadership of Trump’s administration 
(akin to the hawkish neo-conservatist in the Bush-era).698 Krats Michael and Edward Marks 
describe these globalists such as Gary Cohn, the former Director of the United States National 
Economic Council, and Jared Krushner, Senior Advisor to Trump, as “pragmatic 
internationalists deeply committed to the United States’ leadership role within the global 
alliance structure…with a penchant for military solutions to global problems.”699 They embrace 
what Micah Zenko has described as a CT ideology within the national security state whose 
mindset is bipartisan and transcends presidential administrations, and which “is virulent and 
extremist, characterized by tough-sounding clichés and wholly implausible objectives.”700 As 
military historian Andrew Bacevich critically notes, “the same group of generals who oversaw 
the counterproductive WOT is also spearheading a more muscular version of a military-centric 
‘Fortress America’ approach.701  
7.5.3 Instrument of post-9/11 statecraft 
As an instrument of statecraft, drone use under Trump fits with one of the elements of his 
Fortress America strategy – which seeks to lower the US military commitment threshold 
overseas based on a ‘win and go home’ approach. It is predicated on the notion that the use of 
force is critical to defending core US interests, and a large US military presence abroad has the 
dangerous unintended effect of weakening US relative power by increasing military spending 
and overcommitting US troops to stabilization and nation-building missions.702  
The tactical utility of drones has been manifested in their continued use under Trump. Drones 
provide air support, contain local insurgencies, and facilitate targeted killings while at the same 
time achieving the CT goals of his administration. In Afghanistan, drone strikes have been 
conducted against the threat of ISIS at the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Specifically, to 
eliminate HVTs and to dismantle terrorist safe havens while at the same improving internal 
security. In Yemen, drones have been valuable in targeting AQAP leadership and provided a 
policing mechanism for rooting out insurgent operations and local Islamist factions, which the 
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Yemeni government was unable to undertake following the group’s seizure of its capital 
Sana’a.703 They have also been used to help Yemeni ground forces expel al-Qaeda forces who 
had taken advantage of the Arab Spring to seize a swath of territory in the south of the country. 
In Libya and Syria, Trump’s utilization of American airpower (including drones) has also been 
used for coalition strikes and to support local surrogates and allies. Likewise, in Somalia, the 
escalation of drone strikes against al-Shabaab has destabilized their operations and curtailed 
their spread. 
Having examined the strategic and tactical utility of drones, the next section examines the 
argument that drones hamper aspects of Trump’s grand strategy. 
7.6 Dilemma of Drone Warfare for Trump’s Grand Strategy 
7.6.1 The outsourcing quagmire 
The outsourcing and delegation of targeted drone strike authority to military commanders in 
the Trump administration further compound the concerns relating to the lack of oversight, 
transparency, accountability, and justice that have pervaded the US drone programme.704 This 
approximates to what political geographer Ian Shaw described as “rationalized death 
management”705 to buttress how the delegation of war-making authority and the final decision 
on who dies or lives in targeted states negate international laws of war. 
However, while it can be stated that delegating these functions to military commanders 
facilitate targeted killing operations (due to its effectiveness against terrorists, which in turn 
reduces the terrorist threat to the US and to the Middle East/Northeast region), it removes the 
bureaucratic requirement and minimizes political interference in military matters in US 
leadership, it undermines the saliency of oversight and introduces new dynamics to the use of 
drones that are not covered by the AUMF or international laws of war.706  
As many critics have pointed out, drones enable a form of remote killing that removes the 
realities of war from those who pull the trigger and the various sectors of the public who 
allegedly authorize them.707 Gregoire Chamayou posits, “drones change the nature of warfare 
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from a martial dual or conflict between two sides, to a unilateral form of war as man hunting – 
a predator-prey relationship – that transforms warfare into preemptive campaigns of 
extrajudicial executions.”708 This has been evident in how Trump has utilized drones within 
and outside targeted states, which not only deepens the notion of surrogate warfare – that 
prioritizes killing adversaries faster than they can regenerate and fosters a machine-like nature 
of US CT operations that champions zero transparency and non-reporting of civilian 
casualties.709  
Furthermore, it eroded mechanisms for democracy oversight that are necessary to ensure that 
drone warfare is taking place within the legal bounds of the use of force in the theatres they 
occur. The effect, as Krafts and Marks posit, engenders a “highly complex, morality-straddling, 
multifaceted use of deadly force by America around the world.710 For Trump’s grand strategy 
that purports to put America First and to ‘Fortress America,’ the controversial legacy of 
Trump’s drone strikes sets a dangerous and negative precedent at the global level and for US 
rival competitors on how America uses drones in waging wars. 
7.6.2 Civilian Casualty  
The Trump administration’s reversal of Obama’s PPG rules has taken US drone warfare two 
steps backward – a period of non-transparency, secrecy, devoid of public acknowledgement, 
disregard for civilian casualty, and lack of Congressional oversight on how drones are used in 
prosecuting the WOT in targeted states. Research shows that non-transparency leads to the 
disproportionate use of drones.711  Under Trump, the re-institutionalization of CIA drone 
strikes has exacerbated the tragedy of civilian deaths living in targeted states. Trump’s drone 
policy has caused more civilian casualties (see next paragraph for statistics) and had put drone 
controversy back in the limelight – like the first term of the Obama era – where support for 
drones diminished when they were used in targeted killings of Americans abroad and following 
the accidental killing of two hostages – an American and Italian citizen in 2015.  
The civilian casualty figures from Trump’s drone wars are evidently glaring, setting record 
figures higher than his predecessors. For example, in the overall course of the first and second 
terms of the Obama administration, only 5 percent non-combatant deaths were recorded in 
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Somalia, 12.9 percent in Yemen, and 18.6 percent in Pakistan.712 Despite these numbers, the 
Obama administration saw a general decrease of non-combatant deaths in Yemen, Somalia, 
and Pakistan over its second term, decreasing from 12.54 percent non-combatant deaths at its 
highest in 2013 to 2.75 percent non-combatant deaths at its lowest in 2015.713 The first year of 
strikes under the Trump administration has not demonstrated much improvement in 
minimizing or reversing non-combatant fatalities. While the Trump administration saw a 
decrease in non-combatant deaths in Yemen and Pakistan, a larger percentage of civilians have 
died from drone strikes in Somalia in 2017 than the average deaths over President Obama’s 
second term. Overall, the Trump administration saw a percentage of 6.52 percent non-
combatant deaths in Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan in 2017, and this figure has more than 
doubled by 2019 (see table 12 below). This number is up from the overall percentage of non-
combatant deaths under the Obama administration in 2014 (4.23 percent), 2015 (2.75 percent), 
and 2016 (3.07 percent).714 715 
Table 12: Civilian casualty deaths from drone strikes under Trump (2017-2020). 
S/N Country Strikes Total Killed Civilian Deaths 
1 Yemen 336 1020-1389 174-225 
2 Pakistan 9 27-37 None reported 
3 Afghanistan 12837 3144-8642 516-1622 
4 Somalia 176 1119-1272 42-74 
Source: TBIJ, 2020. 
Several other independent reports record different counts of civilian deaths under Trump’s 
drone warfare. According to the UNAMA, US drone strikes in Afghanistan have killed more 
than 150 civilians in the first nine months of 2018.716 Amnesty International reports drones 
have killed at least 14 civilians in Somalia since 2017, and as of January 2020, US drone strikes 
fighting ISIS in Iraq and Syria have killed at least 1,257 civilians.717 From a Fortress America 
standpoint, these deaths may be justified as inevitable consequences of war, from the view of 
“fight them over there” so that (terrorists) are deterred from getting back to the Fortress 
(American homeland).  However, from a moral prism, it highlights the foibles of Trump’s 
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grand strategy. Besides, every civilian death has the unintended likelihood of incentivizing 
reprisal attacks and motivating terrorist groups to carry out retaliatory attacks on US interests. 
A case in point is the 2 January 2020 drone strike ordered by Trump against the head of Iran’s 
elite Quds Forces, General Qassem Soleimani. The General’s death inflamed major protests, 
sparked violent protests, and threatened to raise the tempo for an unpredictable conflict in the 
Middle East and renewed hostility between America and Iran. 
7.6.3 Soft Power Declinism and Global Leadership 
The trajectory of President Trump’s isolationist-nationalism undertones, as espoused in his 
grand strategy, ran counter to the post-1945 American tradition of global leadership and liberal 
interventionism. There are three inherent pitfalls in Trump’s grand strategy that affects US soft 
power and global leadership. First, by defining American power narrowly in terms of material 
capabilities, the administration eschewed the importance of legitimacy and soft power tools as 
important components of America’s global role. Second, Trump’s penchant for military 
expansionism risked escalating regional tensions and further contributing to a drone arms race 
(this is examined in greater detail in the next chapter). 
Third, the transactional nature of his grand strategy, which embraced the ‘Art of the Deal’718 
over long-term strategic thinking, undercut the potential for the prudent use of American power 
– this is due to Trump’s penchant to reduce politics and matters of national interest to “making 
and securing deals” with other states which have underlying boomerang effects. This has been 
evident in his engagement with multilateral systems, bilateral communication with other world 
leaders, which have proved devastating in alienating international powers and allies and further 
causing a decline in America’s reputation on the world stage. Trump’s withdrawal from the 
Paris Agreement and his refusal to allow the appointment of appellate members to the World 
Trade Organization further underscore this view. A global public opinion poll organized by 
Pew Research Center determined that 64 percent of the 32 countries surveyed stated they 
lacked confidence in the Trump administration, with only 29 percent giving his administration 
approval ratings. In the Middle East and Africa, these perceptions are more negative, with only 
one-in-five expressing a favourable opinion of the US.719 
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Considering these shortcomings, Trump’s grand strategy engender a detrimental outcome for 
the future of US global leadership in an increasingly complex post-9/11 security environment. 
It is also reflective of the same pattern of poor results at home and abroad that the US has 
experienced since the end of the Cold War. As Barry Posen asserts: 
“…Trump’s administration is overcommitted militarily; it is cavalier about the 
threat of force; it has no strategic priorities whatsoever; it has no actual plan to 
ensure more equitable burden-sharing among US allies; under the guise of 
counterterrorism, it intends to remain deeply involved militarily in the internal 
affairs of other countries, and it is dropping too many bombs in too many places 
on too many people.”720  
With the intensification of drone strikes throughout his administration, the cost-benefit analysis 
for US power, particularly in undeclared war zones, is already showing telling results akin to 
Bush’s failed democratization mission in Iraq.  
7.6.4 Hegemonic Overreach 
One of the central contradictions of US foreign policy for the past century has been between 
the imperatives of hegemony and the sense of messianic mission (overstretch) developed in 
America's formative years and enlarged in scope as US power expanded. These two basic 
elements do not always conflict; however, in certain key crises, the American belief in its 
special mission in the world causes it to make foreign policy choices that ultimately undermine 
its hegemonic position.721  
Despite Trump’s preference for principled realism, it is far from preordained that it will 
successfully resist the perennial pull of hegemony in the long run. Currently, this raises three 
dilemmas that are likely to engender a dangerous precedent for US power predominance. The 
first of these derives from Trump’s drive to foster international respect for the US by 
concentrating on the build-up of material power capabilities.722 The second is tied to the power 
and purpose connected to Trump’s pugilistic nationalism and isolationist rhetoric and what it 
means for US security arrangements. The third emerges from his transactional mindset that 
adversely affects the prudent use of American power when addressing foreign policy 
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problems.723 Though deployment of drone capabilities does not always equate to their use, it, 
however, risks escalating ongoing tensions in regional theatres. Thus, the increased deployment 
of drones in South Korea is likely to provoke retaliation from China and hamper US strategic 
interests in Asia akin to Obama’s Pivot to Asia strategic policy failure (these issues are 
examined in the next chapter). 
7.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has examined the intersection of Trump’s grand strategy with its drone warfare. 
One of the key arguments is that drones served strategic purposes in supporting the America 
First grand strategy of the Trump administration – that challenged the post-Cold War US 
consensus on liberal hegemony. As the preceding argument in this chapter has shown, the 
aftermath of drone strikes in targeted states engendered the same pattern of inimical outcomes 
evident in Trump’s predecessor’s CT operations. For the Trump administration, the aftermath 
has been manifest in the decline of US soft power, diminution of US global leadership 
credentials, civilian deaths, and hegemonic overreach. 
In the next chapter, the dilemma of drone warfare in targeted states is analysed and critically 
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The Dialectics and Dilemma of US Drone Warfare in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
  “Drones are industrial-scale counterterrorism killing machines….”724 
    
8.0 Introduction 
After examining the impact of drones in targeted states from the lens of successive US 
administrations post 9/11 in the preceding chapters, an in-depth analysis of the dilemma of 
drones from the lens of targeted states is undertaken in this chapter. This is undertaken by 
investigating the impact of drone strikes based on four impacts: (i) blowback effect, (ii) civilian 
casualties, (iii) terrorist retaliation/violence, and the (iv) counterterrorism paradox.  These 
impacts are analysed based on a critical exploration of the aftermath of drone attacks in the two 
case countries and their impact in facilitating or impeding US strategic objectives. The two 
countries – Afghanistan and Pakistan – were selected based on three reasons. First, the post 
9/11 legacy of drone strikes in these countries. Second, the two main types of US drone 
operations – CIA and JSOC – have occurred in them, respectively. Third, the availability of 
anecdotal and published evidence assessing the impact of drone strikes in these states. While 
there are other case studies like Iraq (where drones have been integral in decimating al-Qaeda 
and ISIS), which provide useful insight to explain the use of drone warfare in targeted states 
since 9/11, this thesis considers the two selected case studies to have the most available data 
set that best assesses the impact of drones. 
This chapter argues that local factors within targeted states such as domestic politics, 
insurgencies, religious and tribal affiliations, and public opinion about US drone warfare 
undermine US strategic objectives. In building these arguments, this chapter is structured into 
five parts. The first part examines US drone targets in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The second 
part explores the argument for and against the use of drones as a CT tool in targeted states. The 
third part contains an in-depth analysis of the impact of drones in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
based on the four themes mentioned above. In the fourth part, the impact of drones on US 
strategic objectives is analyzed. The conclusion highlights the key findings and re-litigates the 
argument that drones undermine US grand strategy in targeted states based on the evidence 
assessed in this chapter. 
 
                                                             




8.1 US Drone Targets in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the US has carried out drone operations for targeted killing 
operations in more than ten states, mainly in North Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Two 
countries have remained at the epicenter of these operations – Afghanistan and Pakistan – and 
there are ominous signs that they will remain the key focus. While the DoD conducts direct 
military and ISR operations using drones in Afghanistan (a declared war zone of the US since 
2001)725, the CIA conducts drone operations in Pakistan, particularly over FATA for secretive 
targeted killings. Though differing in the mode of operation and public acknowledgement of 
strikes, both operations remain focused on eliminating terrorist threats. In the next section, 
drone targets in Pakistan and Afghanistan are examined, and the utility and efficacy of drones 
are analysed.  
8.1.1 Drone Targets in Pakistan  
There are three main terrorist groups in Pakistan that have been targeted by US drone strikes 
since 9/11: Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), al-Qaeda in Pakistan, and the Haqqani Network. 
These groups, though divergent in name, objective, and mode of operations, espouse similar 
ideological belief in Salafi Jihadism – a distinct ideological movement in Sunni Islam that 
propagates a radical version of Islam and rejects westernization as an abhorrent concept or 
haram (forbidden).726 These groups mainly operate in the FATA region of Pakistan (made up 
of Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan, and South Waziristan.727) 
– often described as a “lawless frontier” due to its quasi-autonomous status distinct from the 
Pakistani state.728 
The emergence of al-Qaeda in Pakistan or the Pakistani Taliban can be linked to the Soviet-
Afghan War of the 1980s (when Russia sought to introduce communism into Afghanistan).729 
Shortly after the war, the Mujahideen, or “freedom fighters” who fought against the Soviets, 
returned to the FATA and constituted a militant force in the region.730 Following the US 
invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the most senior leaders and core fighters of al-Qaeda sought 
shelter away from America’s aerial bombardment in Northwest Pakistan and consequently 
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formed al-Qaeda in Pakistan.731 Since its inception, the group has been consistently targeted 
by CIA drone strikes as part of US CT operations against al-Qaeda – for sponsoring the 9/11 
terrorist attacks. The group’s primary objective is to spread Salafi Jihadism across the Muslim 
world and to conduct terrorist attacks against the West.732 Al-Qaeda in Pakistan extends from 
the second strata of the core al-Qaeda enterprise. Mendelsohn Barak identifies a five-part 
structure to al-Qaeda’s formation: (i) the al-Qaeda core, (ii) al-Qaeda allies in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, (iii) its affiliates in other parts of the Muslim world, (iv) its sleeper cells and 
sympathizers around the globe, and (v) the idea of global Jihad itself. 733 
The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) emerged in 2007 when forty (40) Islamic militant leaders 
and other militant groups within the FATA and Khyber region joined forces to oppose Pakistani 
military operations against al-Qaeda militants in their region. Since its formation under the 
leadership of Baitullah Mehsud of South Waziristan (later killed by a drone strike in 2009 near 
the Afghan border), the group has morphed into a rampaging and dangerous Islamist militant 
organization – and have been targeted by US drone strikes.734 TTP’s primary objectives revolve 
around three core elements: (i) overthrow the Pakistani government and replacing it with a 
Sharia regime predicated on Salafist ideals, (ii) carrying out Jihad against the Pakistani army 
and the government, (iii) seeking the release of their leaders and uniting against NATO 
forces.735 Though TTP claims to be ideologically different from al-Qaeda in terms of its 
objectives, it embraces similar ideological beliefs in Salafi Jihadism and anti-westernization. 
The Haqqani Network emerged in the 1980s, and it derives its name after Jalaluddin Haqqani, 
the founding leader. The group is a Sunni Islamist organization operating in the South-Eastern 
region of Afghanistan and North-West FATA. Though the group is autonomously from TTP 
and al-Qaeda in Pakistan, it aligns ideologically with the objectives of other terrorist groups 
and has been reported to engage in joint tactical cooperation and attacks in the pursuit of these 
objectives.736  
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Since 9/11, Pakistan has been the focal point of US drone strikes (mainly in the FATA). In 
2012, the CIA regarded FATA as “the most dangerous region on earth” that gives sanctuary to 
thousands of Taliban militants who are actively plotting terrorist threats against the US and its 
interests.737 Several factors account for the FATA’s notoriety as a lawless entity and harbinger 
for terrorist activities. One, it is a characteristically mountainous region which makes 
conventional combat operations difficult. Two, the Frontier Crimes Regulation of 1901 
constrained the government of Pakistan from conducting asymmetric warfare or deploying 
military assets into the region (this was replaced in 2018 by the FATA Interim Governance 
Regulation – which is an interim rule set for two years meant to govern FATA till it merges 
with Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa). The third is the geographical contiguity of the FATA with 
Afghanistan, making it easy for terrorists to traverse the two countries across the Durand 
(border) line with ease (see figure 14 below). 
Figure 14: Map showing the proximity of FATA with Afghanistan 
 
Source: Congressional Research Service, (2018).738 
These factors made drones the ideal counterterrorism weapon of choice for dismantling 
terrorist groups in Pakistan. This is because, compared to manned aircraft, drones can hover 
over a target for weeks before the targeted killing is initiated, thus, making its weaponry best 
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for achieving leadership decapitation. Second, deploying American soldiers to the FATA 
region increases the risk of soldier and civilian deaths as well as the political costs for US 
leaders, while the remote capabilities of drones greatly minimize this risk. More of these 
arguments are examined in the latter part of this chapter. 
8.1.2 Drone Targets in Afghanistan 
There are four main targets of US drone targeted killing operations in Afghanistan: al-Qaeda 
in Afghanistan, Afghan Taliban, al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), and the Islamic 
State in Afghanistan or the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP). 
The al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, like its Pakistani counterpart, traces its evolutionary origin from 
the Soviet-Afghan War (1979 – 1989). The aftermath of the war incentivized the rise of both 
Islamic Jihadism and militant Mujahideen groups, initially backed by the US.739 The ousting 
of the Taliban regime on December 9, 2001, by US forces and its allies, caused the further 
spread of al-Qaeda, particularly in Eastern and Southwestern Afghanistan. With the 
intensification of drone attacks, the al-Qaeda core in Afghanistan modified its operations from 
one focused on openly championing al-Qaeda’s global and anti-American agenda in the context 
of local insurgencies to working more covertly through local proxies.740 This signalled an 
approach that further buoyed the proliferation of al-Qaeda terrorist groups within the Indian 
subcontinent, the Middle East, and North Africa.741 
The second group, the Afghan Taliban, emerged in the 1990s, developed its military 
capabilities by taking advantage of sanctuaries in Pakistan’s FATA, especially in the Khyber-
Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces, including Karachi and Quetta.742 Following the US-
led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the group moved deeper into Afghanistan and maintained strategic 
strongholds in Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan provinces while also operating freely in 
Pakistan’s Quetta Shura province.743 The Afghan Taliban group, though distinct from the al-
Qaeda core in terms of mode of operation, share a similar belief in Salafi Jihadism.  
The Islamic State in Afghanistan, also known as Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP), 
emerged in 2014, and it is a Salafi militant group composed of different Taliban splinter groups 
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and other militant formations. This group operates predominantly from the Eastern Nangarhar 
province in Afghanistan and also parts of Pakistan. Though they share parallel ideology with 
ISIS and claim allegiance to it, they are not affiliated.744 The group’s ideology is rooted in the 
extremist interpretation of Islamic scripture and anti-Shiite sectarian views. Particularly, it 
propagates a strict version of Salafism called Wahhabism – a puritanical form of Sunnism 
practiced mainly in Saudi Arabia and Qatar.745 The overarching goal of ISKP is to maintain 
Khorasan province as a global IS caliphate in Afghanistan and to support the expansion of the 
IS in Iraq and Syria.746  
The fourth group is al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) which is an Islamic militant 
organization operating in Afghanistan from al-Qaeda core, with a sole mission of establishing 
an Islamic State and waging Jihad against the government of Pakistan, India, Myanmar, and 
Bangladesh.747 Its overarching goal has remained to strengthen the Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan, defending it and bringing stability to it. Over the years, the operation of the group 
has extended from the Shobarak district in Kandahar to Eastern and South-eastern Afghanistan.  
Before exploring the role of drones in Trump’s grand strategy, it is important to examine the 
geopolitics of the US drone pact/agreement in these countries and how it has shaped drone use. 
8.2 Geopolitics of US Drone Pact in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
The US has drone pacts with both Afghanistan and Pakistan for facilitating its drone warfare 
and obtaining approval from domestic governments of targeted states. Drone pacts here refer 
to bilateral agreements between the US and the states authorizing the use of drones over their 
governed spaces. In Pakistan, the first of these agreements was signed in 2004 during the Bush 
administration. This pact, referred to as the US-Pakistan drone pact, confined US drone strikes 
to within certain demarcated flight boxes in FATA, particularly the Khyber and Mahmood 
agencies but excluded South and North Waziristan – which was the hub for terrorist activities 
in the region and mostly populated by Pashtuns.748 The restriction of drone strikes in these 
areas was against the backdrop that the Bush administration might use drone ISR capabilities 
to conduct unrestrained surveillance and espionage on sites critical to Pakistan’s national 
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security interest.749 The agreement also had other caveats. First, it stated that the final 
authorization for a drone strike in the designated flight box would lie with the Pakistani 
government. Second, the pact, limited drone strikes to narrow corridors of the tribal areas to 
ensure the US does not venture into Islamabad’s nuclear facilities and mountain camps that 
housed Kashmir militants (training to repel possible Indian attacks).750 The effect of this pact 
accounted for the limited amount of drone strikes in Pakistan under the Bush era.  
This, however, changed under Obama with the signing of a new US-Pakistan drone agreement 
in 2009. The pact expanded the scope of US drone operations in the FATA region, extending 
into the Waziristan agency and allowing unlimited ISR missions. Though the agreement 
exempted the Bajaur agency, as the Pakistani government feared public backlash, it, however, 
allowed the Obama administration to tap into their radio and land-line communications 
system.751 This consequently led to a higher number of drone strike authorizations in Pakistan 
compared to his predecessor (from an average of one strike in 40 days to one in every four days 
by mid-2011).752 Negotiations with the Taliban and changes to US drone policy (see previous 
chapters) in the last years (2014-2016) of the Obama administration led to the denouement of 
drone strikes in the FATA region, Pakistan. This trajectory has continued under the Trump 
administration, with Pakistan no longer the main focus of the US CT campaign; rather, the 
focus has shifted to Afghanistan, particularly the Haqqani Network (due to their role in 
providing terrorist safe havens) (see figure 15 below). 
Unlike Pakistan, Afghanistan is a declared war zone of the US and the first state in which the 
US conducted lethal drone strikes. Since the inception of the US-Afghan War in 2001 against 
the Taliban regime, the US has conducted airstrikes with coalition forces in the region but has 
also carried out several JSOC drone strike operations. The peak of US drone strikes in 
Afghanistan occurred during the Obama administration based on his Af-Pak strategy. The 
strategy led to the expansion of drone operations into Kandahar, Kabul, Helmand, Nangarhar, 
and other provinces in West Afghanistan that were initially safe havens for al-Qaeda terrorist 
groups.753 Under Trump’s ‘New Afghan Strategy’ as captured in the 2017 NSS, Afghanistan 
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remains the focal point of his drone campaign for dismantling al-Qaeda and ISIS influence in 
the country. 
 
Figure 15: Percentage of Drone Strikes in Pakistan by Successive US Administrations since 
9/11 
 
Source: Brookings Institution.754 
The US had initially, under Obama, entered a bilateral security partnership (Enduring Strategic 
Partnership Agreement) with Afghanistan in Tokyo in 2012 to facilitate a peace deal. The deal 
aimed to: (i) facilitate the reconciliation of the Taliban with the Karzai government and (ii) 
scuttle radical mobilization of Taliban fighters. However, it has not been successful in ending 
hostilities, preventing insurgencies, and forging lasting peace in the region.755 The prospects 
for peace in Afghanistan appeared to grow under President Trump with the signing of a peace 
deal in Doha, Qatar, in February 2020. The agreement signed on 29 February 2020 between 
the United States and the Taliban consented to a complete withdrawal of US and allied forces 
in Afghanistan within 14 months of its signing. In exchange, Taliban leaders acceded to 
breaking ties with terrorist organizations in the region that frustrate US operations, a permanent 
ceasefire, and open talks for peace with the Afghan government. It is too early to ascertain this 
agreement will prevent further drone actions against terrorists in Afghanistan as analysts 
believe the chance of peace is low, and the Taliban are stringing along the US with the intention 
to betray any agreement once US force leaves.756 Second, two annexures of the deal were 
classified by the Trump administration and kept away from Congressional oversight and public 
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scrutiny. This makes it difficult to ascertain how both parties have agreed to live up to their 
end of the bargain. There is evidence that since the agreement was signed, aerial attacks from 
the Afghan military against the Taliban have continued, further highlighting the inherent gaps 
in the deal. 
Next, the arguments for and against the use of drones in targeted states are examined. 
8.3 Arguments for Drone use in Targeted States 
Since the 2001 terrorist attacks, drones have played an important yet controversial role in the 
CT strategy of the US. There are several arguments in the literature outlining the rationale for 
drone use in targeted states, namely: tactical effectiveness, light footprint to warfare, precision 
targeting, preventing dangerous deployments, and projecting US power.757 The ISR and 
combat readiness of drones in hard-to-reach areas and their ability to process battlefield 
information rapidly further establish their preference over humans in targeted states.758 
Compared to manned aircraft, they are more likely to discriminate between civilians and 
combatants – as their Hellfire missiles are likely to cause less unwarranted deaths than cluster 
munitions. For instance, a typical Hellfire missile carries a 20-pound explosive charge 
compared to the AGM-65 Maverick, which carries a 126-pound warhead.759 While collateral 
damage due to drone strikes has been reported in several instances, the impact of their damage 
is still lower compared to the AGM-65 munitions due to the explosive charge of their strike 
radius.760 
Drones further give the US the tactical latitude to wage remote wars and re-assign its troops to 
regional theatres where great power competitions occur while delegating CT functions to 
machine surrogates (UAVs). For instance, a single MQ-1 Predator or MQ-9 Reaper can replace 
the function of 20-30 soldiers in battlefield deployments.761 Also, MQ-1’s can also carry two 
AGM-114 Hellfire air-to-ground missiles, and the MQ-9 can carry two 500-pound bombs and 
Hellfire missiles, which gives these drones the equivalent firepower of an F-16 against small 
targets and the fighting power of more than 50 soldiers.762  
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Empirical evidence based on data obtained from US drone operations in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan indicates that drones are effective tools for achieving leadership decapitation and 
organizational splintering – as terrorists have found it harder to train, operate, and relocated to 
mountainous regions for fear of drones.763 Anecdotal evidence indicates that drones instil a 
climate of fear and uncertainty among terrorists and have made it harder for terrorists to freely 
move, openly train their operatives, or plan operations further afield 764 Describing the 
devastating effect of drones, one al-Qaeda operative acknowledged, “they cause carnage, 
destruction, pursuit... but they themselves remain unseen, just like Satan and his ilk who see us 
while remaining unseen.”765 
8.4 Arguments Against the Use of Drones in Targeted States 
While drones have been effective CT tools in eliminating HVTs such as Saad bin Laden 
(Osama bin Laden’s third son); Abu Laith al Libi (highly ranked member of the al-Qaeda core); 
Osama al Kini (al-Qaeda chief operations officer); Khalid Habib (commander of the Lashkar 
al Zil); Abu Khabab al Masri (al-Qaeda’s weapons chief) and Saleh al Somali (head of al-
Qaeda’s operations outside Afghanistan), controversial aspects of drone use since 9/11 have 
called into question the political, tactical, and strategic benefits of drone strikes for the US 
government. The morality of drone strikes, unintended death of non-combatants, generation of 
anti-American sentiment, alienation of the US from targeted states, dent in US global image, 
and the possibility that drone strikes facilitate militant recruitment have questioned the utility 
of drones for facilitating US strategic objectives. For instance, while drones have been used in 
eliminating “bad guys” and drawing down troops in the Middle East, it also generates adverse 
outcomes such as terrorism recruitment and anti-drone protests.766 Thus, highlighting the 
inherent paradox of their use. 
There are also legal, moral, political, and ethical concerns that have further questioned drone 
use. The legal questions surrounding drones have centered around territorial encroachment, 
sovereignty intrusion, and violations of war conventions. Most of the debates stem from 
whether drones comply with the principle of distinction under international law, as provided 
by Article 48 of the Additional Protocols of the Geneva Conventions of 1977. The protocol 
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establishes the importance of protecting non-combatants during war and issues limitations on 
the prosecution of the war.767 There are currently no specific international conventions or 
regulations that proscribe the use of drones; as Emmanel Bossious posits, this has caused the 
US to “engage in a largely covert campaign of targeted killings engendering, in effect, a secret 
war governed by a secret law (referring to the AUMF) beyond the purview of international 
laws of war.”768 Relatedly, the legal question of whether drones or the human operator in the 
loop should be held accountable for collateral damages and accidental kills following drone 
strikes in targeted states is also a key concern.769 Related to this, drones facilitate the 
deprivation of life without the due process of law and impinge on the right to self-defence by 
facilitating the dronification of state violence.770 However, considering that US drone strikes 
have been largely covert and unacknowledged, they “evade” these legal spotlights.  
From an ethical standpoint, drones remove human personnel and states from the potential 
consequences of international law violations. These ethical concerns were evident in the 
Obama administration’s preference for the use of drones to eliminate HVTs, rather than 
capturing and bringing them to justice. While the former makes sense from a tactical and 
strategic standpoint, it fosters the arbitrary use of US power – that neglects the territorial and 
sovereignty rights of states to maintain internal security and protect their citizenry. 
Furthermore, the notion that drones can be “suitable” for targeted states but generate 
controversy and negative public opinion in the US when their citizens are killed underscore the 
lopsidedness of US drone warfare. Like Obama, the expansion of drone warfare under 
President Trump also continued to ignore the ethical concerns of drone use in targeted states. 
Former Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, describes drones as introducing a “bloodless, 
painless, and odourless type of warfare that desensitizes as well as dehumanizes.”771 
Considering that drones are likely to remain the de facto counterterrorism strategy, the long-
term impact of their ethical and moral violations in targeted states potentially overshadows 
their short-term uses. 
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From a political perspective, drones avert the need for direct military confrontation and serve 
as a cost-effective strategy that prevents dangerous rescue and recovery operations (like the 
embarrassing Blackhawk Down incident in Somalia) in combat zones. However, their negative 
aftermath has elicited reactions from citizens and government officials in targeted states – that 
further point to their countervailing effects.772 Based on the proviso of international laws, 
targeted killing – defined as the “deliberate killing of an individual, specified in advance as a 
target approved by an authorised part of government bureaucracy without an independent 
judicial process”773 – permissible in states under certain conditions. Rogers and McGoldrick774 
identify them as follows: 
i. Targets are legitimately classified as combatants. 
ii. The targeted location lies within the lines of battle. 
iii. Civilian casualty can be minimized. 
iv. The threat is clear, imminent, and not distant, unviable, and unforeseeable 
v. The targeted individual is actively involved in the imminent attack and not punished 
due to past events 
vi. The collateral damage has been weighed 
vii. The government carrying out the targeted killing has articulated the legal basis for 
their intended action. 
US drone strikes in targeted states have violated some of these criteria. One of the major issues 
emanates from the drone authorization process by governments in targeted states. According 
to Michael Fowler, sovereign countries may choose to grant drone strike authorization privately 
or publicly.775 The challenge, however, with private authorization is that it leads to a “do not 
ask, do not tell”776 policy, in which case, the striking country conducts targeted killing 
operations without public acknowledgement.777 The blowback of this process is that it 
perpetuates a “shadow weapon that operates based on secretive conditions to achieve covert 
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goals.” This has been most reflected in CIA drone operations in non-declared traditional 
battlefields. 
The cumulative impact has elicited reactions from targeted states. For instance, on 13th May 
2013, a Peshawar High Court sitting in Pakistan ruled that the US has not received proper 
consent from the Pakistani government to conduct drone strikes.778 The basis of this ruling was 
predicated on findings that former President Musharraf gave only verbal consent to US drone 
operations. Though the court failed to determine if written consent was required to facilitate 
drone strike operations, it was unanimous in its decision that the legacy of drone operations in 
Pakistan had violated the doctrine of sovereignty and self-defence codified in Article 2(4) of 
the UN Charter.779 Furthermore, as Fowler adds, the secretive nature of the drone strikes in 
Pakistan and elsewhere engenders plausible deniability and limits the targeted countries’ 
liability for perceived and actual violations of its sovereignty.780 Carl Levin, former Chair of, 
Senate Armed Services Committee, however, criticized the Pakistani government for their 
lopsided view of US drone operations, noting that “Washington was hamstrung by Pakistan’s 
frequent criticism of its drone program.”781 He stated that the Pakistani government “…give us 
(the US) the green light privately for drone strikes but condemn their impact publicly...”782 
The next section takes an in-depth analysis of the arguments against drones in targeted states 
by assessing their impact based on four themes central to this thesis. 
8.5 Assessing the Impact of Drone Strikes in Pakistan and Afghanistan 
This section examines the impact of drone strikes in targeted states based on four themes: 
blowback effect, terrorist violence, civilian casualty, and counterterrorism paradox. The 
analysis gauges how local factors within targeted states such as domestic politics, insurgencies, 
religious and tribal affiliations, territoriality, and public opinion, and their nexus with drones 
impact US strategic objectives. 
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8.5.1 The Blowback Question 
The term “blowback” was originally coined by the CIA to explain the unintended and negative 
effects (such as retaliatory attacks and increase in terrorist violence) following covert 
operations.783 In reference to US drone strikes and their blowback effect in targeted states, Shah 
avers that “each miss that kills civilians, or even each hit that kills a militant, angers locals near 
the blast zone and inflames national sentiment against the US in ways that aid militant 
recruitment.”784  
There is, however, a lack of consensus in the literature on whether drones trigger blowback 
effects in targeted states. Those who support the blowback thesis opine that drones spur terrorist 
reprisal attacks rather than reduce the overall number of attacks.785 Blowback due to drones 
have been conceptualized786 to occur on three different levels: 
i. Locally, when family members are killed by drone strikes which then become the 
basis for retaliation and anti-American sentiments. 
ii. Nationally, when drone strikes occur in countries that oppose their use due to the 
humiliating impact on sovereignty and territorial integrity. This inadvertently 
arouses national sentiments and mobilizes militant actions against drones – that 
translate into anti-drone protests geared at exerting pressure on national 
governments to stop drone authorizations. 
iii. Transnationally, when other targeted states where drone strike radicalizes against 
their use in the Muslim world. This also means drones serve as a propaganda tool 
that arouses anti-American/Western sentiments that promotes Salafi-Jihadism at the 
transnational level. 
The above arguments are well established in the existing literature. One of the arguments is 
that drones incentivize militant and insurgent groups to seek revenge for the death of their 
relatives or Muslim brothers.787 This is tied to the concept of Pashtunwali, also known as 
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familial or tribal revenge. It is a Pashtun tribal code concerned with maintaining an honourable 
reputation. The code is what led Mullah Omar, the founder of the Afghan Taliban, to continue 
to shield Osama bin Laden from the US following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.788 The Pashtunwali 
tenet of Badal was also invoked in TTP’s attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar that 
led to the death of 150 people on 16 December  2014.789 A spokesperson of the TTP, speaking 
after the incident, stated the attacks were a response to drone strikes in the FATA region and 
anger towards the overbearing incursion of the Pakistani military in the region.790 
The Pashtunwali code reflects the nexus between ethnic and religious identity and, according 
to Jonathan Hawkins, serves as an explanation why Sunni Muslims perceive any “external 
threat to their tribe as a parallel threat to Islam and a provocation to incite Jihad.”791 While 
establishing the connection between religious and ethnic identity and Salafi Jihadism is not 
within the scope of this thesis, it offers possible explanations on why Pashtuns living in targeted 
zones may seek to avenge the death of relative kin or family members that have been killed by 
drone attacks.792 This leads to the question of whether drones cause blowback. 
8.5.1.1 Do Drones Cause Blowback in Targeted States? 
Though the argument that drones inflame anti-American sentiments and spur militant 
retaliation in targeted states is well documented in the literature, the cognitive effects in 
targeted states are difficult to empirically measure; however, a critical assessment of their effect 
is based on available evidence is possible. 
A number of authors argue that drones cause blowback. According to Audrey Kurth Cronin, a 
founding director of the Centre for Security, Innovation, and New Technology state, “drones 
increase the likelihood of attacks over the long term by embittering locals and cultivating a 
desire for revenge.”793 According to two other prominent experts, Kilcullen and Exum, “drones 
have a negative net effect on terrorism – as some of those who support terrorist groups or 
become terrorists may be motivated by the desire to seek revenge for loved ones killed in drone 
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strikes.”794 Boyle draws a connection between blowback and civilian casualty figures based on 
the impact of every unintended death following drone strikes. According to him, “every dead 
non-combatant represents an alienated family, a new desire for revenge and an incentive for 
militancy to grow exponentially.”795  
In an assessment of drone strikes in Pakistan, Bergen and Tiedemann determined a plethora of 
potential sources of militant mobilization, namely: radicalization, social factors, psychological 
reasons, and religious/ideological reasons. They, however, argue that drones give a recruitment 
boost (as a propaganda tool) for terrorists, as the carnage left after targeted strikes encourage 
relatives and friends of the victims to join terrorist groups to fight the US and the Pakistani 
government (for their complicity in authorizing such strikes).796 For instance, increase in the 
membership of TTP, as Mahmood notes, has been from “new groups pledging their allegiance 
and from new recruits joining the rank and file of the terrorist group, some of whom were 
motivated by the rise of the ISIS and others by the revulsion over drone strikes.”797 
Anecdotal evidence establishing the intersection between drones and blowback has been based 
on poll data from citizens living in targeted states. For instance, a 2010 Pew Research based 
on a sample of 1000 FATA residents showed that 76 percent opposed drone strikes, and only 
16 percent thought that targeted strikes accurately hit their intended target. Forty-eight percent 
believed that strikes killed civilians largely.798 In the same poll, 60 percent of the residents 
thought suicide attacks against the US were “sometimes” or “always” justified.799  
Similarly, a survey conducted by Bergen and Tiedemann, based on reported data of drone 
strikes in Northwest Pakistan from 2004-2010, determined that “one of the motivations 
spurring anti-American sentiments arise from the anger at drone strikes on militants living in 
the area.”800 Their data share parallel findings with poll data published by the Brookings 
Institution on the number of FATA residents who support or oppose military action against 
terrorist organizations in the region. The result showed (see figure 16 below) that more of the 
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residents supported Pakistani military action (69 percent) compared to 7 percent that believed 
US actions were justified.  
Figure 16: FATA Residents who support or oppose military action against al-Qaeda and 
Taliban in their region. 
 
Source: Brookings Institution.801 
A 2018 report published by Shah discredits the credibility of the blowback hypothesis of drone 
impact in Pakistan. His claims were based on 147 interviews conducted in North Waziristan, 
Pakistan – regarded as one of the most targeted drone strike districts in the FATA region – and 
on a survey involving 500 detained terrorists from Southern Sindh province. His findings 
determined that 79 percent of the respondents support US drone campaigns, with the majority 
sharing the view that strikes rarely killed non-combatants. Furthermore, his research findings 
stated there is a lack of overwhelming evidence establishing drone strikes as the basis for 
terrorist recruitment or retaliation.802 From his research, the main sources of militant 
recruitment in Pakistan are namely: (i) identity crisis of young immigrants, (ii) political 
grievance, (iii) weak governance structures, (iv) inadvertent exposure to radical extremist 
ideologies online and, (v) coercive recruitment by militant groups.803 Furthermore, Shah further 
debunks the blowback claims made by previous studies. He asserts that Kilcullen and Exum's 
research lacked empirical data to back up their blowback claims. Likewise, he dismisses 
Bergen and Tiedemann’s study on the basis of social desirability bias – or socially acceptable 
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responses – which, in his own opinion, prejudiced their findings. However, Shah’s critique of 
the blowback thesis is dismissive of a number of considerations. 
i. Blowback does not require universal opposition to be tenable. Hence, when few 
young men join terrorist groups or act as a determined lone bombers in carrying out 
attacks in retaliation to drone strikes, this counts as blowback. 
ii. His interviews, as he admits, were not scientifically representative. Yet, he used it 
to draw his research conclusion regarding blowback for the whole of the FATA. 
Even if the plausibility of statistical representation can be made, his conclusion on 
the absence of blowback is a giant leap. Also, his study lacks an empirical basis to 
generalize the blowback hypothesis, as the cognitive impact of drone strikes in other 
targeted states may confirm otherwise. 
iii. Shah opines that a high level of support for drone strikes (79 percent) in the FATA 
refutes the blowback hypothesis. However, this does take into consideration the 
degree of blowback – which can range from little, medium, or large – depending on 
the threshold used in analysing it. This prejudices his findings. As John Feffer 
argues, “blowback would exist even if only 0.1 percent of the FATA’s residents 
joined TTP out of anger over drone strikes” (see table 13 for blowback threshold). 
As Feffer further adds, “there are over 4 million people living in the FATA region. 
A fighting force composed of 4,000 people is one percent of the entire population 
– and that easily falls within the 21 percent of the respondents that disapprove of 
drones in Shah’s findings.”804 
iv. Lastly, his findings ignore the human side of war and suggest that little blowback 
is no blowback. 
Table 13: Threshold of Blowback 
Blowback Threshold Examples 
Small A lone-wolf attack or reprisal attack over 
the death of a family /terrorist member. 
Times Square Bomber, 
Faisal Shahzad 
Medium A coordinated attack by a terrorist group 
that results in significant casualty figures 
Charlie Hebdo; Peshawar 
school attacks 
Large A transnational terrorist attack that results 
in large civilian casualty figures 
9/11 terrorist attacks 
Source: Author’s Adaptation 
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A recent study by Jaegar and Siddique, analysing the effect of drone strikes in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan (based on empirical data collected from NAF, Worldwide Incidents Tracking 
Systems, and the National Counterterrorism Centre from 1 January 2007 – 3 September 2011), 
suggest that drones cause blowback effects in targeted states. Their study was conducted based 
on a critical examination of different time periods and lag structures of drones in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan based on a vector autoregressive approach. Their findings established a positive 
correlation between drones and blowback. According to them, 
“There are stronger effects of drone strikes on subsequent Taliban and al-Qaeda 
attacks in Pakistan than Afghanistan. In Pakistan, the probability of a terrorist 
attack was determined to increase in the first week following a drone strike. 
However, the impact is negative in the second week when considered against 
the backdrop of terrorist attacks by the Taliban and al-Qaeda.”805 
In addition, they determined that drone strikes in North Waziristan had an impact on Taliban 
violence in parts of Afghanistan under the control of the Haqqani Network. Likewise, in South 
Waziristan, drones caused retaliatory action by the Meshud faction of the Taliban – by targeting 
citizens they believed assisted the US in enabling drone strikes.806  
8.5.2 Civilian Casualty Question 
A key concern relating to drone weaponry has been the civilian casualty figures in targeted 
states and its impact in altering the perception of US drone operations. Civilian casualty can 
occur as a result of accidental kills, collateral damage (death as an inevitable consequence of 
war), double strikes (ordering a second strike after the first, the latter is mostly imprecise and 
leads to unintended deaths), direct targeted killing, missile miss, and from post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) of drone operators (due to the tension, moral injury, and negative mental 
impact of sustained operations of drone killing machinery).807 
The utility of drones as discriminate weapons is worth highlighting. “Discriminate,” as applied 
to the context of the above discussion, questions the efficacy and propriety of drones in 
distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants in targeted states. The ability of drones 
to discriminate, as Brunstetter and Braun contend, is based on “the extent that their human 
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operators choose to employ them.”808 Thus, if applied correctly, drones, due to their in-built 
functions and operational capabilities, can prevent unintended deaths. Kenneth Anderson’s 
explanation on the linkage between drones, discrimination, and civilian casualty puts it more 
clearly: 
“If the intended use of the weapon is only against remote military targets where 
civilians are not likely to be present, then the weapon, in that context, will be 
perfectly discriminate. If the intended use of the weapon is against relatively 
sizeable military objectives, such as military bases or fortifications where 
civilians may be close but generally not close enough to be within the weapon’s 
blast radius, then there too the weapon can be expected to be discriminate. If, 
however, the weapon is intended to be used in densely populated urban areas 
against terrorists or insurgents, then the weapons could be expected to be 
indiscriminate even if a drone missile, which is exceptionally accurate and much 
less destructive compared to most aerial weapons and is expected to kill 
everything within a blast radius of 15-20 meters.”809 
The technological features of drone weaponry, however, support the idea that it discriminates 
effectively between civilians and combatants and minimizes collateral damage due to its 
precision capabilities.810 The is based on the capabilities of drones to effectively discriminate 
against its target due to: (i) accuracy of visual identification, (ii) physical proximity, (iii) 
discernment of clear rules of combat by a human operator(s), and (iv) ISR capabilities of the 
drone itself.811 However, if the argument that drones are effective at discriminating between 
civilians and combatants is to be upheld, the legacy of drone strikes in targeted states post 9/11 
suggest the contrary, as evidenced by the glaring figures of civilian deaths (see previous 
chapters on the civilian death figures following drone strikes in successive US administrations 
post 9/11). 
This links back to the civilian casualty question from drone strikes and their impact on US 
strategic objectives. In the preceding chapters, this has been discussed in the context of 
successive US administrations since 9/11. However, understanding the dynamics of civilian 
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death from the perspective of local factors and impact in targeted states is important. Evidence 
on civilian casualty figures from drone strikes has been published by the CIA and several other 
journalistic and academic databases such as the NAF, TBIJ, and LWJ. These databases report 
different figures. The US government disputes these figures and classifies the casualty figures 
(except for those released between 2014 and 2016 under Obama’s PPG). Table 14 below 
reflects some of these discrepancies. 
Table 14: Estimate of Civilian Casualty between CIA and other Sources. 
Source Estimated civilian casualty figure 
(%) 
Source of Information 




Media and local intelligence 
LWJ 8.5 – 10 Media and local intelligence 
TBIJ 13 – 34  Media and local intelligence 
Others 20 – 35 Media reports 
Source: Author’s Adaptation. (Others*** here refers to sources outside the ones identified 
above). 
 
Apart from these sources identified above, other sources include Brookings Institution, the New 
York Times, Human Rights Watch, Air Wars, Reuters, and Washington Post. Their estimates 
fall within the range of the three main databases identified above. From the table above, it is 
evident that the CIA figures are statistically lower compared to other databases (this has been 
answered previously in Chapter 6). This has made it difficult to empirically determine the 
accurate number of drone strikes, the military necessity of such strikes and the success rate, 
thus, making the outcome partly speculative.  
For example, in an interview conducted with American officials in 2011 by Scott Shane, an 
American journalist with the New York Times, the US government claimed it had killed more 
than 2,000 militants and only 50 non-combatants since 2001.812 This figure is, however, 
statistically lower when compared to other sources. The TBIJ, for instance, estimates that from 
2004 – 2012, drone strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan have resulted in more than 550 deaths 
of non-combatants.813 Table 15 below further reflects some of the contradictory statements and 
disparities in the reported casualty figures of drone strikes in targeted states. 
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Table 15: Contradictory US statement on drone strikes Sept 2010 – circa April 2012 
Drone strike 
Date 







Sept 2010 – 
May 2011 
A US official speaking to the National Journal 
states that only 30 civilians have been killed 
from drone strikes since the beginning of 
2009 and none recently. 





John Brennan, the former Deputy National 
Security Advisor for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism, posits that there has been 
no single collateral death because of the 
exceptional capabilities of drones. 
87-223  7 deaths (CNN) 
Sept 2010- 
July 2011 
A senior US official asserts there have been 
no single civilian casualty in the last year and 
the inaccuracies of other journalistic sources. 






The US government agreed on the difference 










A US official, while responding to CNN, 
refutes claims from Pakistani intelligence 
services that the April 22 drone strike killed 
any civilian in North Waziristan.  






John Brennan refutes claims that civilian 
deaths have occurred from US drone 
operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
elsewhere 





A US official told ABC News that the CIA 
drone strike killed two militants and did not 
kill 16-year-old Tariq Khan  







President Obama claims that drones are kept 
on a very tight leash and does not inflict a 
civilian casualty 






Anonymous US counterterrorism official 
acknowledges the US has no reliable evidence 
of civilian deaths following a drone strike 




Brennan stated that the US had no 
information about a single civilian being 
killed. He acknowledged that “sometimes you 
have to take life to save lives.” 
117- 284+ Nil. 
Adapted from Human Rights Watch (HRW, 2012).814 
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Relatedly, Ben Emmerson, UN Special Rapporteur, citing Pakistani Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs data on drone strikes in his 2013 report, estimated that since the inception of drone 
strikes in Pakistan in 2004, about 330 strikes have resulted in more than 1200 deaths and cases 
of serious injuries.”815 This figure is corroborated by other Pakistani-based media sources. For 
instance, in April 2009, The News, a local newspaper in Pakistan, published figures provided 
by Pakistani government officials stating that 687 civilians have been killed by drones. It 
further reported that “for every al-Qaeda terrorist targeted, 50 civilians are killed.”816 Similarly, 
another Pakistani newspaper puts this figure higher as “140 innocent civilians killed occurring 
for every Taliban and al-Qaeda targeted.”817 The chances of overestimation of deaths are likely 
in these media reports, due, in part, to what Beswick notes as “self-serving accounting, 
anonymously sourced and politically manipulated figures fed by the Pakistani Army.”818 
Furthermore, considering that the Pakistani public reads reports from their own local media 
than American studies, the disparities of civilian casualty reportage contribute to the local 
blowback on drones in Pakistan. 
The impact of a civilian casualty in targeted states has necessitated legal reactions from 
Pakistani courts. In December 2013, for instance, the National Assembly of Pakistan 
unanimously approved a resolution to prevent further drone strikes in their territory, citing 
violations of international and humanitarian laws of war and the guiding UN charter. This 
marked the first time the Pakistani government ruled against the illegality of drones since the 
inception of targeted killings in their country in 2004. The court ordered the Pakistani 
government to make the following pleas to the UN Security Council: 
i. Constitute an independent war crimes tribunal to investigate US drone operations  
ii. Request that the UN General Assembly passed a resolution condemning drone 
strikes 
iii. Prohibit the further use of force that violates the territorial integrity and political 
independence of Pakistan 
Though this did not stop further drone strikes in Pakistan, it, however, coincided with the period 
Obama changed the PPG in his counterterrorism playbook, which led to the de-escalation of 
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drone strikes and stricter rules to prevent unintended civilian death (see discussion in Chapter 
6). Essentially, the new approach required that “prior to lethal use of force, it must target an 
individual or individuals who pose a continuous and imminent threat to the US.”819 
While civilian casualty is inevitable in war, as modern conflicts – such as the 1991 Sri Lankan 
War, 1999 Chechen War, and the 2006 and 2009 Israeli Wars with Hezbollah and Hamas, 
respectively – have all recorded civilian casualty figures in large numbers, the key concern for 
drone weaponry is that its continued use by the US has led to further civilian deaths in targeted 
states. According to the Global Terrorism Databases (GTD), one of the most comprehensive 
unclassified databases tracking terrorist attacks in the world reported that since 2012, “more 
than 60 countries experience terrorist attack each year.”820 Furthermore, based on the 
uncertainty that terrorism incidences will drop to their pre-9/11 levels in the near future, drones 
are more likely to be deployed as a de facto CT tool in targeted states. However, mounting 
civilian death cases under the Trump administration following the expansion in lethality and 
targeting of drone operations portend adverse effects for US strategic objectives in the long 
term if clear rules of engagement are not codified to regulate their use. 
8.5.3 Quagmire of Anti-Americanism  
A key question of US drone warfare in targeted states has revolved around its impact on 
spawning anti-Western and anti-American sentiments in its wake. Critics of the US drone 
campaign decry its dehumanization of war amid the point that the US needs to respect the 
democratic desires of the targeted states.821 This burgeoning issue relates to the concern that 
US counterterrorism campaigns in Pakistan and Afghanistan seem to be diverting from their 
core objective and engendering negative feedback from targeted states. 
In Pakistan, the issue of anti-Americanism and drones is split. According to Shah’s recent 
interview, most of the residents in the FATA support drone strike use and are more dreadful 
of the Pakistani military instead.822 However, a 2012 Pew Research report indicates 82 
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percent of Pakistanis find drones to be unjustified.823 Other Pakistani media sources back this 
claim. A study by Glyn and colleagues aver that Pakistani media tend to have an inherent 
anti-American bias and proclaim the pronouncements of the Taliban as facts. Thus, 
considering that these facts are not easily ascertainable by outsiders, drone attack reportage 
gives Pakistani journalists materials to incite public opinion locally against the US.824 
Furthermore, anecdotal evidence of the killing of innocent children and women (although 
families that house terrorists are not entirely innocent in the broadest sense) in Pakistan have 
already caused significant outrage among the locals predisposed to anti-Americanism. 
Former Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani describes drone strikes as disastrous 
and counterproductive to efforts to isolate extremists and militants from the tribal 
population.825 In addition, he avers the strikes were generating anti-American sentiments and 
engendering local outrage and uproar among the people and further “driving a wedge between 
the government and the tribal people.”826 A former Pakistan foreign spokesman, Abdul Basit, 
further expressed a similar view. According to him, “we believe drone attacks are 
counterproductive; they involve collateral damage and are not helpful in our efforts to win the 
hearts and minds of the people.”827  
In addition, Ashal Iqbal, a member of the National Assembly of Pakistan and Secretary-
General of the Pakistani Muslim League, argues that “the aftermath of US drone strikes has 
spurred thousands of large protests across the country and most especially in Punjab, North 
West Frontier Province and Sindh.”828 Former Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari also called 
for the end of drone strikes in Pakistan due to its impact on altering the political climate of 
the country.829 These views are similar to those shared by Nathaniel Fick of CNAS, 
highlighting the persistence of drone attacks in Pakistan as “offending the people’s deepest 
sensibilities, agitating instinctive hostility and alienating them from their government and 
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contributing to a precarious security situation.”830  
More so, drone strikes are a powerful political signal to the population of a targeted state as 
it engenders a perception that their government is powerless to stop drone attacks on its 
territory. More precisely, it reflects the failure of the state to uphold its statutory obligation in 
the social contract theory. According to social contract theorists such as Jean J. Rosseau and 
John Locke, when governments fail to secure the natural rights, guarantee the security and 
wellbeing of their citizenry, or satisfy the best interest of the society (general will), the citizens 
can withdraw their obligation to obey and withdraw the legitimacy conferred on their 
government.831 The disapproval from Pakistani people over their government’s handling of 
drone strikes has reflected this characterization. According to a 2013 Pew Research report, 
87 percent of all Pakistanis are dissatisfied with the direction of the country and with the 
overbearing powers of the Pakistani military.832  
Figure 17: Pew Research on US opinion in Pakistan 
 
Source: Pew Research, 2012 
A Pew Research (see figure 17 above) conducted in collaboration with the Pakistani 
government also reported that only 12 percent of Pakistanis surveyed in 2012 had a 
favourable view of US drone strikes.833 This represented a drop by 50% from 1999/2000 
opinion on US perception in Pakistan. Though the same survey reported that about 55 percent 
of Pakistani’s reported they had heard little or nothing about drone attacks, of the 45 percent 
who acknowledged its operation, 97 percent considered it a bad thing.834 Thus, drones 
undermine Pakistan’s democratic government rather than help prop it up, which, in theory, 
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ought to have been done by America (as a bastion of liberal democracy). This is due to what 
has been described as the “appearance of powerlessness, incompetence and the legitimacy 
crisis drones engender for the Pakistani people towards their government.”835  
Several studies have identified several ways in which US counterinsurgency operations in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan undercut regional US support and inflame anti-American 
sentiments in the Muslim world: 
(i) the view that drone strikes drain the credibility of the Pakistani government and the 
perception they collude with the US in killing its own people;836  
(ii) the view that the ‘tacit consent’ of the Pakistani government for US COIN operations 
elicit the visceral opposition from militant groups against the deployment of the 
Pakistani Army in the tribal areas;837  
(iii) that the US has been willing to provide details of drone strikes but has refrained from 
providing advanced warning of an attack to the Pakistani government for fear that 
information might be leaked or compromised – hamstringing the Pakistani 
government from having much say in the finality of US drone operations;838 
(iv) the view that drone strikes circumscribe the Pakistani government from appearing as 
a credible competitor for the loyalties of the population in the tribal region. This is 
supported by a survey by the Brookings Institution, which determined that the FATA 
residents were favourably disposed to the presence of Afghan Taliban fighters (28%) 
than the US military (12%). Also, most of the residents (84%) opposed the US 
military presence in the region (see figure 18 below). 
 
James Traub argues that the public outrage over drones has made it almost impossible for the 
US to achieve its goals of helping Pakistan become a stable civilian-run state capable of 
policing its territory.839 Thus, drones portend conflicting strategic objectives – disrupt terrorism 
through drone strikes but undermine the existence of a strong and legitimate government in 
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Pakistan by sidelining its government and treating them as accomplices to the brute exercise 
of American power. In a speech in September 2012, former Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina 
Rabbani Khar captured this dilemma, saying that, “this has to be our war. We are the ones who 
have to fight against them. As a drone flies over the territory of Pakistan, it becomes an 
American war again. And this whole logic of this being our fight, in our own interest is 
immediately putting it aside, and again it is a war which is imposed on us.”840 
Figure 18: FATA Residents who support or oppose the presence of various entities inside 
FATA 
 
Source: Brookings Institution, (2018).841 
 
However, there are contrary reports that drone strikes are accepted by Pakistani politicians. 
This was captured in a report by NAF researchers Bergen and Tiedemann. They aver: 
“For Pakistani politicians, the drone program is a dream come true. They get to 
posture to their constituents about the perfidious Americans even as they reap 
the benefits from the U.S. strikes. They are well aware that neither the Pakistani 
Army’s ineffective military operations nor the various peace agreements with 
the militants have done anything to halt the steady Talibanization of their 
country, while the U.S. drones are the one sure-fire way to put significant 
pressure on the leaders of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. This is called getting to 
have your chapati and eat it too.”842 
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The above is analogous to a poll conducted in the FATA by Pakistani-based Aryana Institute 
for Regional Research and Advocacy in 2016. The result showed that those living in tribal 
areas where drone operations took place favoured its operations. The poll found that: (i) only 
45 percent of the Pashtun respondents believed that drones brought fear and terror, (ii) 52 
percent thought drones were accurate, (iii) 58 percent thought drones did not inflame anti-
Americanism, and (iv) 60 percent thought drone strikes killed militants successfully.843 A more 
recent study by Shah (2018) shared similar views with the 2009 poll results. However, the findings 
of these polls did not consider: 
i. The impact of individual differences on the perception of drone strikes. A study 
reported this anomaly in findings. It indicated that anti-Americanism relating to drones 
in targeted states was more from areas outside where drone strikes occur than 
within.844 This was the case in Pakistan, where those outside the FATA were more 
opposed to drone strikes than the Pashtuns living in the region.845 
ii. The degree to which anti-drone sentiments, political opposition, and visceral 
antagonism in targeted states should constitute anti-Americanism. 
As discussed in chapters 5 and 6, the mounting drone protests lend credence to the prevalence 
of anti-Americanism in targeted states.  
Like Pakistan, Afghanistan has not been exempted from anti-Western sentiments (due to the 
protracted American occupation, allegations of prisoner abuse of Afghans at detention 
facilities, NATO aerial bombings, and mounting civilian deaths), particularly in provinces 
where drone strikes occur, such as in Nangarhar, Paktia, Paktika, Kunar, Nuristan, Khost, 
Farah, Helmand, and Logar. However, most of the drone operations have been conducted 
unilaterally by the American government without clear agreement with the Afghan political 
leadership – this was clearly absent in the bilateral security agreement between the two 
countries. The widespread concerns against drones in Afghanistan have elicited calls from 
current President Ashraf Ghani to end the extrajudicial killings of Afghans by “unmanned 
machines of our so-called strategic partner.”846  
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Former Afghan President Hamid Karzai also protested the civilian casualty of drone strikes 
and opposed its continued use.847 The impact of drones in Afghanistan has been acknowledged 
by former American Deputy Ambassador to Afghanistan, Ann Wright, stating, “drones are 
jeopardizing US national security by creating a large number of people who despise it.”848 
While there is a litany of cognitive effects motivating anti-Americanism in targeted states, the 
impact of drone strikes on the perception of America and its CT operations is irrefutable, based 
on the evidence examined above. The impact for future US strategic objectives is dire – as it 
increases susceptibilities and vulnerabilities in the international sphere that hamper the soft and 
hard power influence of the US (the national and global impact for US grand strategy is 
explored in the next chapter). 
8.5.4 Drones and the Counterterrorism Paradox 
Terrorism is a tactic deployed by terrorists to increase the vulnerability of people and to elicit 
government reaction with measures intended to restore social order. However, counterterrorism 
strategies that are meant to make citizens feel safer often create more insecurity and exacerbate 
the existing situation.849 One of the drawbacks of CT campaigns is the use of state machinery 
of violence against suspected terrorists and their abettors. This, however, as Piazza and Wilson 
argue, undermines the safety of individuals by causing “loss of their physical rights, 
extrajudicial killings, and fear of death.”850 The underscores the likelihood of CT actions to 
unintentionally cause dislocation, oppression, and repression in states where they occur. This 
effect has been evident in Afghanistan, where drones caused the deaths of civilians, generated 
blowback effects in Pakistan, and worsened the governance and military structures they 
purported to defend. Also, drone use for CT operations in targeted states has also perpetuated 
this dynamic. From another lens, CT operations often engender counterproductive impact in 
the long term beyond their short-term success.851 According to Franke, “the institutional 
apparatus of drones rests on totalitarian, not democratic principles… lethal drones hovering 
above in the sky poses a threat to persons on the ground in the targeted zone with the arbitrary 
termination of their lives and as such represent a form of terrorism no less than the suicide 
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bombers.” 852 As Peter Chalk warn, “counterterrorist responses run the very grave risk of posing 
even more of a danger to underlying liberal and democratic postulates and freedoms than does 
extremist political violence itself.”853  
As Jeremy Shapiro and Daniel Byman argue, “from a policymaker's perspective, use of the 
word ‘war’ usefully mobilizes the public, but for a domestic issue, it conjures up images of 
civil strife and violations of civil liberties.”854 However, while securitization an issue can 
bolster public approval for CT measures, they also lead to greater insecurity in its aftermath. 
The securitization theory developed by the Copenhagen School of International Relations 
explains why some issues are securitized and while others are not. They construe securitization 
to mean “an act in which an issue is deemed as an existential threat to a referent object and 
requires emergency measures in response.”855 In this regard, it could be argued that portraying 
terrorism as a securitized issue establishes an immanent securitization framing of its purported 
threats. This is because securitization evokes fear and exigencies and beckons on key audiences 
and stakeholders with the caveat that “only a willingness to act can forestall grave catastrophic 
consequences.”856 The idea is, if people or the targeted audience are sufficiently touched by the 
urgency and cataclysmic framings of an issue, it will incentivize actions.857 Succinctly put, 
issues relating to grave security would always inflame strong emotions and prompt the need 
for extraordinary measures to curb them. 
Related to the above is the question of whether drones are effective instruments for leadership 
decapitation in targeted states. Jenna Jordan’s article on leadership decapitation provides some 
important information to consider this question. Her study examined three factors: (i) terrorist 
organizational collapse, (ii) terrorist operational dissolution and terrorist group degradation, 
and (iii) the efficacy of leadership decapitation for terrorist collapse.858 Based upon the 
available data (298 decapitation cases from 1954-2004), her findings determined that: First, 
leadership decapitation is more likely to cause the cessation of religious terrorist groups 
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compared to ideological terrorist groups. Second, decapitation is an effective strategy that 
results in terrorist organizational collapse. Third, the larger, older, religious, and the more 
separatist the terrorist group, the less likely decapitation will be effective in causing its 
demise.859  
The above assessment shares parallel with drones and their efficacy for counterterrorism in 
targeted states. Analysing her findings with the legacy of US drone strikes, it can be seen that 
while drones have dismantled, disrupted, and in some cases decapitated HVTs, it has not led 
to the organizational collapse of terrorism formations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Revisiting 
Audrey Cronin’s criticism of drones here underscores this point. She argues that “drones are a 
strategic failure, in part, due to the misunderstanding of the nuanced difference between 
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency.”860 
8.6 Illusion of US Strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
There are a number of factors when considered within the broader lens of US strategic 
objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan that underscore the shortcoming of US CT operations 
– that have also affected the efficacy of drone warfare. The impact of these considerations 
generates inimical outcomes that undermine the ability of the US to achieve its 
counterterrorism goals in targeted states.  
First, the historical relationship between the US and Pakistan engenders what Husain Haqqani 
termed “an illusion of a strategy.”861 The basis of his argument is predicated on the faulty 
historical legacy of US-Pakistani relations rooted in mismatched purposes – implying an 
interplay of inherent diametrically opposed objectives in the existing US-Pak relations.862 As 
Haqqani posits, Pakistan relies on the superpower status of the US to balance out its 
geopolitical competition with India and the wider region, whereas Washington’s historical 
Cold War competition with the Soviets and the WOT informs the reason for its alliance with 
Pakistan. Hence, Pakistan’s machinations and the US past delusions serve as obstacles to a 
successful outcome for its strategic objectives.863 Qadir contends that US-Pak interests were 
most aligned during the Soviet-Afghan war (though fraught with imperfections) but misaligned 
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after 9/11 – when the US sought Pakistan’s help in defeating the Taliban insurgents.864 The 
effect of this, as Carlotta Gall argues, has spurred a ‘mistaken rhetoric and wrong strategy.’865  
Second, the Pakistani army and its Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) had long 
patronized numerous Deobandi militant groups such as the Afghan Taliban, Jaish-e-
Mohammad (Army of Mohammad), Harkat-ul-Jihadi-Islami (Movement of Islamic Jihad), as 
partners in pursuing Pakistan’s objectives in Afghanistan and India. The Pakistani state is, 
however, engulfed by the same violent Islamist groups it created. The TTP, for instance, has 
launched sustained attacks on Pakistan’s military, police, intelligence, and civilian officials and 
infrastructure, in addition to ongoing offensives against Shia, Ahmediyas, and increasingly 
Barelvis—a sect of which a majority of Pakistanis are believed to be members of.866 Likewise, 
despite the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, militant groups have continued to weaken 
government structures and create a chaotic space for Afghanistan’s fledgling democracy. A 
disproportionate amount of this terrorism, however, links back to Pakistan. This is further 
explained by Christine Fair’s analysis of the strategic culture of the Pakistani army and its 
intersection with Islamic terrorist sponsorship.867 The central assertion is that the Pakistani 
army is imbued with an obligation to defend Islam and employ Islamist militants to further 
Pakistan’s policy and interests towards the goal of revising its regional status quo in South 
Asia.  
Analogous to the above, Kapur contends that Pakistan had used Jihad as a grand strategy to 
cultivate, export, and employ Islamic militants for the pursuit of its internal and external 
security policy in South Asia based on two strategies.868 According to Usman and Schofield, 
“externally, Pakistan had relied on Islamic militants to pursue its policy of revising the status 
quo by confronting India and asserting its influence over Afghanistan and internally, Islamic 
militants were used to promote domestic cohesion and give meaning to compensate for the 
tumult and weak political foundations related to the partition.” 869 
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The above further underscores the weak governance structure and capacity of the Pakistani 
government to assert control in the FATA region or the militant groups operating within it, 
highlighting the inherent imbalance of the US-Pak alliance – one which Gall Cassidy termed 
“the imbalance of strategy.”870 This explains the cost of US continued military assistance to 
dismantle terrorism in the region, putting Pakistan in a difficult position of reneging on its debts 
and historical alliance with fellow jihadists and denying operational basis to militant groups 
that had hitherto helped it fight India.871 The effect of this was apparent in Pakistan’s 
unwillingness to launch a military operation into North Waziristan to dislodge the Afghan 
Taliban in the FATA, despite years of intense U.S. pressure under Bush. And when the 
Pakistani military finally went into North Waziristan in 2014, the Afghan Taliban and the 
Haqqani’s escaped into Afghanistan. 
8.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter assessed the impact of drone strikes on US strategic objectives from the lens of 
targeted states. It determined that inherent dynamics within targeted states generate the 
conditions that hinder US grand strategy. This assertion was analysed based on four factors: 
anti-Americanism, civilian deaths, counterterrorism paradox, and the blowback effect of 
drones. The blowback hypothesis was examined, and though there was contrasting evidence in 
the literature that refuted its validity, it was determined that in the absence of any threshold to 
effectively determine what constitutes a blowback, there is no sufficient empirical basis to 
refute its credibility. Also, on the question of whether civilian casualty impacted US drone 
operations in targeted states, it was determined that the countervailing impact of civilian deaths 
engendered opposition at the political and public level against the continued use of drones. This 
relates to the next issue on the quagmire of anti-Americanism and its impact on the perception 
of US drone warfare. It was determined that while cognitive effects of anti-Americanism and 
the individual perception of what constitutes it cannot be clearly determined, anecdotal 
evidence based on the impact of drone strikes in targeted states demonstrated the nexus 
between anti-American and suicide bombings, retaliatory attacks, and propaganda tools for 
terrorist mobilization and recruitment. This also links to the CT paradox of drones – which 
established actions intended to enhance security often cause greater insecurity – as US drone 
precedents show in targeted states.  
                                                             





The Implications of Drone Proliferation for US Grand Strategy 
“Drones cause the epochal transformation in international security due to the detachment of 
brutality from humanity in future warfare.”872 
9.0 Introduction 
In the preceding chapters, this thesis examined drone use by successive US administrations and 
their impact in targeted states, another critical facet of their impact is proliferation. As 
previously highlighted, the negative precedent set by US drones in CT operations has created 
incentives for other states to adopt them. The fact that the US has continued to drive the armed 
drone market and is selling drone technology to other states creates a security dilemma that 
causes more paradoxes and deficiencies for the US grand strategy. While this chapter does not 
delve into the academic debates about arms trade and transfers, the issue of proliferation is 
important for these reasons. This chapter seeks to build another layer in understanding how 
drones undermine US strategic objectives and highlights the perils and adverse effects of the 
proliferation of drones’ vis-a-vis grand strategy. 
This chapter argues that the continued proliferation of drones among state and non-state actors 
in the post 9/11 security environment engenders countervailing effects for US grand strategy 
at two levels: national and global. At the global level, unchecked diffusion of drone technology 
risks re-ordering the balance of power and great power competition in a way that hampers US 
strategic objectives. At the national level, as the ‘race’ to acquire and operate drones continue 
unhindered, it foreshadows a security dilemma that heightens uncertainties and vulnerabilities 
for US national security. To this end, this chapter makes three interrelated arguments: The first 
is that unrestrained drone diffusion among US rival competitors creates a blowback effect for 
US strategic objectives at the global level. The second is that the advanced proliferation of 
drones, mainly as it occurs alongside the weaponization of AI, engender damaging 
consequences for US grand strategy by potentially exacerbating existing threats in international 
affairs. The third is that the proliferation of drones among non-state actors such as Hezbollah 
and regional powers such as Iran introduces new dynamics to strategic balance and warfare 
that hinder US CT operations. 
In fleshing out these arguments, this chapter is divided into four sections. The first part 
examines the current dynamics of drone diffusion. Next, the US drone policy is examined. In 
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the third part, the debate on drone proliferation is revisited, and the inexorable linkages with 
the US grand strategy are explored. The fourth part undertakes an assessment of the impact of 
drone proliferation for the US grand strategy at the global and national security level. 
9.1 Drone Proliferation 
Since the 2001 terrorist attacks, successive US administrations have used drones in the quiver 
of US CT weaponry in targeted states. This has, in effect, created what John Nagl, former US 
counterinsurgency advisor termed, “an almost industrial-scale counterterrorism killing 
machine.”873 The surge in global demand for drones has been reflected in UAV sales. From 
2005 to 2009, global UAV sales were up at 1.5 percent and further increased to 2.6 percent by 
2010-2014. This figure more than doubled by the end of 2019, climbing to 5.5 percent874 , and 
it is expected to hit a double-digit percentage increase by 2024.875  
Available data published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), a 
database that catalogues arms sales globally, show that more than 90 countries possess drones 
(armed and unarmed) – of this figure, only 22 countries (including Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, 
Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Israel, Nigeria, United Kingdom, India, China, Russia, France, Germany, 
Italy, Kazakhstan, Myanmar, South Korea, Turkmenistan and Ukraine, United States, 
Switzerland, and Australia) have armed drone capabilities, with 20 more countries currently 
developing this capability.876 (see table 16 below). The Teal Group, an aerospace research firm, 
predicts in its 2019/2020 market study that worldwide production of UAVs will increase from 
$7.3 billion annually in 2019 to $10.2 billion in 2029 and is expected to reach $98.9 billion in 
the next ten years. It also projected that military UAV research spending would rise 
exponentially to $61 billion by 2030.877 
Table 16: States operating armed drones 
S/N Continent Countries 
1 North America The United States and Canada. 
2 Africa South Africa, Nigeria, Libya, Egypt, and Algeria. 
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3 Asia Israel, China, Iran, United Arab Emirates, North Korea, Pakistan, 
Iraq, Kazakhstan, India, Turkey, Singapore, Taiwan, Indonesia, 
Georgia (Caucasus), Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkmenistan, 
Azerbaijan. 
4 Antarctica None yet 
5 South America None yet 
6 Europe  Italy, Spain, Greece, France, Poland, Netherlands, Russia, 
Ukraine, Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium, and Belarus. 
7 Australia Australia 
Source: Author’s adaptation from Centre for New America Security.878 
 
Over the last decade, the US and Israel have enjoyed a monopoly of armed drone technology. 
This is, however, fast-changing, with more countries increasingly acquiring, advancing, and 
operating drones, including non-state actors. The spur behind global drone diffusion is not 
unconnected to the perception of their use internationally as an effective instrument of power 
projection. This has been demonstrated by America’s use of drones post 9/11 – which 
inadvertently demonstrated the potential transformative utility and military significance of their 
weaponry for modern warfare.879  
A recent study by Horowitz and colleagues880 analysed the evolutionary phases/period of drone 
proliferation and the factors that account for the changes in global demand and supply of drone 
technology. Their key findings were: 
i. Period 1 (1994 – 2010) was when the US and Israel held sway as the leading 
suppliers of drones globally, with Israel alone supplied 41 percent of the global 
stock. Both countries supplied drones without consideration for the regime type. 
However, America only supplied to the UK, and drone sales were constrained by 
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines which prohibit sales 
of Category 1 (weapons that can travel for more than 300km and have a payload of 
more than 500kg) systems such a drone from exports. 
ii. Period 2 (2011-2019) was an era that ushered China’s dominance in the 
development and export of armed drone weaponry globally, particularly with the 
CH-3, CH-4, CH-5 models. The surge in demand for China’s drones resulted from 
its non-membership to the MTCR, which exempted it from Category 1 restrictions. 
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The absence of any constraint gave China an asymmetric advantage of drone 
technology, especially for non-democracies. As of 2019, China supplied 181 armed 
drones to 13 of the 22 countries that currently possess armed UAVs. This included 
sales to US allies such as NATO member countries, Australia, South Korea, and 
Japan.881 Though the US is still a global leader in the instrumentation and export of 
drone technology (supplying 55 percent of global UAVs), this position is 
increasingly threatened by China’s ascendancy (currently supplying 37 percent of 
global UAVs). 
In the ‘race’ for global drone proliferation, China has the edge over the US. This is due to 
Beijing’s approach to the sale of armed drone technology as one requiring “no questions 
asked”882 in accordance with the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs of foreign 
countries regardless of the regime type.883 Furthermore, China imposes a minimal end-user 
restriction on their drones, meaning it is less concerned about how states deploy or use their 
drones once purchased. This has made it more attractive to non-democracies.884 On the other 
hand, US drone sales impose a constrain on which countries can buy drone technology and puts 
in place rules on how recipient states deploy them. This has caused its drone export policy to 
be marred by slow, bureaucratic, and vague guidance with competing priorities.885 For instance, 
US drone policy requires recipients of its drone technology to “use them in accordance with 
international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, 
and prohibits the use of drones for conducting unlawful surveillance or unlawful use against 
domestic populations.”886 (President Trump, however, adjusted this policy as explained later 
in the chapter). Ironically, the legacy of US 9/11 drone warfare has not conformed to these 
rules but requires recipient states to comply with them when they purchase US drone 
technology. 
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China’s UAV export policy is lax and embraces a laissez-faire approach to its drones sales by 
selling to authoritarian regimes, conflict hotspots such as Nigeria (Rainbow CH-4 drones sold 
in 2012), and Iraq (Wing Loong II) (the implications are discussed later in this chapter). In 
2017, Saudi Arabia struck a deal with Beijing to set up the first Chinese drone factory in the 
Middle East and domestically manufactured around 300 Wing Loong-IIs and CH-4 drones.887 
Currently, five countries in the Middle East (Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq) possess 
Chinese drones. The most famous types being the medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) 
drone families: Wing Loong manufactured by the Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group (CAIG), 
and Cai Hong “Rainbow” built by the Chinese Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation 
(CASC).888 The 2019 report of the US Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) acknowledges 
China’s niche in armed drone pre-eminence, particularly in the Middle East, to emanate from 
its non-membership to international export control body, which makes it face little or no 
competition.889 
The danger of China’s UAV sales to non-democracies (and their ‘affordability’ compared to 
the US) is that it risks making the technology widespread, ubiquitous and increases the 
possibility of states engaging in extraterritorial drone strikes based on the precedent set by US 
CT missions in targeted states.890 It may also lead to new uses of drones in theatres of 
war/conflicts, such as swarming – which refers to interconnected or cooperative drones that 
can work together to overwhelm potential adversaries.891 For instance, Turkey has used 
Chinese drones domestically against Kurdistan Workers’ Party members, Nigeria has used CH-
4 against Boko Haram, Iraq has used the Wing-Loong II against the Islamic State, Saudi Arabia 
and UAE have carried out deadly attacks in Libya and Yemen using Chinese CH-4 and CH-5 
drones. Azerbaijan also used Chinese drones in great effect in the war against Armenia, 
especially against tanks and artillery.892 
This is besides the risk that non-state actors and other non-democratic actors can use drones in 
ways that stymie America’s competitiveness and innovation, making it difficult for the US to 
                                                             
887 Li L and Matthews R (2017) Made in China: An emerging brand in the global arms market. Defense & 
Security Analysis 33 (2): 1–16. 
888 Johnson, J. (2019). Artificial intelligence & future warfare: implications for international security. Defense & 
Security Analysis, 35(2), 147-169. 
889 Department of Defense (2018) Assessment on U.S. defense implications of China’s expanding global access. 
Available from: https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/14/2002079292/-1/-1/1/ExpandingGlobal-Access-Report-
Final.Pdf. 
890 Bunker, R. J. (2015). Terrorist and Insurgent Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: use, potentials, and military 
implications. Army War College Carlisle Barracks PA Strategic Studies Institute. 
891 Ibid. 
892 Boyle, M. J. (2015). The race for drones. Orbis, 59(1), 76-94. 
211 
 
maintain its technological edge in the rapidly changing global security arena. This will likely 
increase the propensity for states to deploy drones for ‘grey zones’ operations – to test an 
adversaries deterrence posture or resolve, but without tipping the threshold into warfare with a 
more powerful opponent.893 Lin Greenberg termed this “Game of Drones” to explain the effect 
of remote warfighting technology on conflict escalation in international affairs894 due to the 
potential unintended effect of eroding US military predominance and its post-Cold War unique 
power preeminence.  
More so, the unchecked proliferation of drones portends inimical consequences for US grand 
strategy that are difficult to dispel. This is mainly on two levels: national and global. At the 
global level, the diffusion of drones among near-peer competitors (Russia and China), regional 
US competitors (Iran), among non-state actors, and to regions where conflicts are endemic 
(Pakistan, Turkey, Nigeria) fosters new dynamics that re-orders the balance of power and 
strategic competition in a way that hampers US strategic objectives (this is explored in the latter 
part of this chapter). 
9.2 US Drone Policy on Proliferation 
Further global proliferation and advancement of drones seem inevitable, and while the US can 
limit the export of sensitive military components linked to drone technology such as stealth, 
protected communications, advanced autonomy, and other military features, the basic drone 
technology is already too diffused to be halted.895 
The Obama administration crafted several unilateral and multilateral policies as a 
countermeasure to reduce unchecked drone diffusion and to influence the way they are used by 
recipient states to protect US strategic interests. These policies: (i) the February 2015 Export 
Policy for Military Unmanned Aerial Systems – that required recipients of US drones to adhere 
to the principles of their proper use, and (ii) the October 2016 Joint Declaration for the Export 
and Subsequent Use of Armed or Strike-Enabled UAVs – which laid out the main principles 
that govern US export and the use of armed drones, as anchored on five core objectives896:  
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(i) Preserving legal and political freedom of action for US drone use 
(ii) Maintaining US military technology advantage over potential competitors 
(iii) Improving the military capabilities of key partners and allies 
(iv) Preventing the diffusion of harm drone technology 
(v) Shaping the behaviour of how others use drones. 
However, as Horowitz and colleagues posit, these policies did not “reflect the realities of a 
world where many actors have access to and use drones.”897 This led to the failure of these 
policies to either stem the tide of further drone proliferation globally or stymied their use, 
manufacture, and export by allies. As Zenko argues, Obama's drone policy “prioritized 
immediate military action over long-term strategic consideration, thereby making his approach 
appear less restrained, transparent, or accountable.”898 Hence, until the US puts in place 
appropriate regulatory and export control mechanisms to roll back unchecked drone diffusion 
in order to ensure their responsible and transparent use globally, Horowitz and colleagues assert 
that questions relating to the propriety, legality, transparency, and accountability of drones will 
continue to come to the forefront of the debate due to the negative antecedents of US drone 
programme.899 For instance, America may be constrained to criticize China if it sends armed 
drones into Kazakhstan or uses it against minority Uighur Muslims – that it classifies as 
terrorists. Likewise, Russia may deploy armed drones in the Caucasus against militants, and 
India may use drones against the Pakistani state in Kashmir. 
The Trump administration has, however, made a number of policy changes that remove the 
constraint of the MTCR requirement for US drone sales to countries around the world. The 
new policy revised what the MTCR categorized as Category I weapons. It considered drones 
that travelled under 800km/per hour (instead of 300km/per hour as required by MTCR 
guidelines) to be classified as Category I and anything higher as Category II.900 The impact of 
this change to the MTCR guidelines allowed the following: First, it allowed drones to be sold 
directly by the US State Department’s Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) program, meaning the 
industry can negotiate contracts with recipients (states) without interference from the US 
government. Second, it removed the special scrutiny required for laser designators so that US-
made strike-enabled drones can be mass-produced and widespread. Lastly, it reduced oversight 
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on the use of US drone sales.901 This meant that drone exports will be treated the same as most 
other defense articles and will no longer require special export conditions – which required 
drones to comply with an obligatory enhanced end-use monitoring.902 The term ‘obligatory’ 
under the new policy was replaced with ‘possible’ – meaning fewer restrictions on who can 
buy US drone technology thus, increasing US competitiveness in the global drone market.903 
In defence of this new policy change, Clarke Cooper, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-
Military Affairs, remarked, “…this reform is necessary in order to respond to a rapidly 
changing technological environment with the proliferation of drones, particularly by China, 
coupled with growing demand for UAVs…adjusting US policies is imperative in addressing 
US national security concerns.”904 However, while these policies put America in the cockpit of 
drone proliferation, it has failed to address the impact associated with US drone warfare and 
the broader strategic implication of unchecked drone proliferation among non-democracies in 
spheres of conflict and war.905  
Next, the contra-arguments on drone proliferation and its impact on US strategic objectives 
are examined. 
9.3 Drone Proliferation and US Grand Strategy: A Self-Inflicted Wound 
The debate about the possible impact of drone proliferation on global security architecture has 
brought about two dominant schools of thought. The first group, comprised of the sceptics, 
believe that the consequences of drone proliferation are likely to exacerbate conflicts with dire 
consequences for domestic and international security.906 This view is premised on the notion 
that the post 9/11 legacy of US drone operations in targeted states have set a far-reaching and 
dangerous precedent that other countries are likely to emulate in conducting drone strikes on 
their own. The ripple effect they envisage is more prone to deepen the already fractured stability 
in East Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East – where US CT operations have occurred in 
the last two decades.907 On the contrary, another school of thought shares the view that the 
purported threats associated with drone proliferation are exaggerated. This is because states are 
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rational actors, and decision-making on the use of force is mostly predicated on strategic 
ends.908  
These competing perspectives were examined in a recent article published in International 
Security by Horowitz and colleagues. Their assessment which was based on six different 
contexts that reflect the utility of drone weaponry in broader statecraft, namely – interstate 
conflict, CT, deterrence, coercive diplomacy, domestic control/repression, and use by non-state 
actors – examined whether drone proliferation altered military outcomes or cause changes to 
balance of power at the international realm.909 Their study determined that drones are likely to 
have a significant impact on armed conflicts due to their tactical and operational capabilities 
that makes them well-suited for such purposes.910  
However, on the contrary, they debunk the claim that drones are likely to have transformative 
impacts as a game-changing technology to the ways wars or conflicts are fought.911 The premise 
for their argument is anchored on the susceptibilities of current-generation drones to the hostile 
airspace at the global level – as it can be easily shot down with anti-drone missile systems. 
Thus, except in targeted states where drones have thrived so far, the expectation that further 
drone proliferation will create complexities in the global security environment is overstated.912 
As Horowitz argues, “there is the tendency by analysts to conflate the drones of today with 
those of tomorrow under the same umbrella.”913 Thus, since there is no way to empirically 
determine how future drones may thrive in a conflict situation, any anticipatory effects of their 
likely impact cannot be easily conjectured. 
Currently, militaries around the world are investing in different forms of UAVs, including 
unmanned amphibious and submarine systems. These advancements are likely to bring about 
three changes in the military application of drone technology with broader implications for war 
planning and operations.914 The first is swarming technologies – that introduce an era of drone 
miniaturization and their greater coordination in taking down enemy defense systems. The 
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second is stealth drones – that are capable of operating without radar detection and surviving 
enemy air defences such as anti-access systems. The third is the introduction of drones with 
greater speed, range, and manoeuvrability from enemy firepower – all of which are likely to 
change the dynamics of interstate conflict and competition.915 The pace at which these 
technological changes to drone weaponry occurs is, however, not cast in stone. Yet, resurgent 
powers such as China are intent on pushing the envelope and speeding up the development of 
these new systems.916 There is, however, no telling on how these developments are likely to 
change the balance of power or trigger a security dilemma. Horowitz and colleagues share the 
view that these advancements create possibilities for the use of drones as deterrence against 
threats917 due to ‘mutually assured strikes’ that possessing these new generation drones confer 
states.  
The admission that technology has always been a defining element in warfare is well 
established in the literature. From bows, arrows, gun powders to nuclear weapons, all had a 
profound and transformative impact on warfare. The lethal weaponization of drones following 
9/11 placed the US at an advantage as being the “first movers” of drone technology 
instrumentation. However, as history shows, this may have a boomerang effect. For instance, 
during WWII, the UK introduced aircraft carriers, but the Japanese figured it out before the 
UK did and used them in facilitating strategic bombing operations against them. The import of 
this is that, currently, the global drone market is growing significantly without the agency of 
the US government, and there are strong indications that other states are going to outpace the 
US in the advancement of drone weaponry. Hence, unless the US continues to develop this 
technology or devise an offset strategy that outwits other competitors from taking the lion share 
of the global market, unregulated control of the drone market may put the US at the mercy of 
the forces of demand and supply. From a security standpoint, this upends the strategic 
advantage of drone weaponry for the US and undermines its broader security objectives at the 
global level.918  
This raises the question of whether the US should be more assertive in the way it regulates, 
exports, sells, and/or manufacture drones. Also, what agreements or protocols need to be 
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jettisoned to ensure it maintains its post-Cold War technological advantage and superiority in 
the emerging great power competition foreshadowed by drone proliferation among resurgent 
powers. This emerging scenario creates a dilemma – of two complementary yet problematic 
ideas. On the one hand, the US can enter into negotiations with current world powers to stop 
further drone diffusion. This would bring about a win-win situation that prevents rival 
competitors from seeking to outmatch US technological advantage. However, as history shows, 
great power hardly abides by the letters of an agreement; rather they often, ignore or circumvent 
them. For instance, China has neglected the treaty requirements of the Convention on the Law 
of Seas because it proved deleterious for its strategic interests. Likewise, President Putin 
ignored the Intermediate-Range Forces Treaty – which was meant to limit arms control 
between Russia and China.919 On the other hand, in the unlikely event, rival competitors agree 
to enforce greater transparency and responsibility of the sales, export, and use of their drone 
technology, there is no certainty that it will address the risks surrounding the propriety of 
drones for targeted killing operations. 
In addition, when non-authoritarian allies such as NATO countries buy Chinese drones instead 
of American drones, the US potentially loses the strategic opportunity to deepen its defense 
relationships and interoperability. This also saps US defense companies, the competitiveness 
and innovation it needs to dominate the drone making – the cumulative effect of which makes 
it harder for the US to maintain its technological edge and its post-Cold War unique power 
position.920 Analysing the dynamics of US drone sales in the wider greater power competition, 
Horowitz asserts that,  
“The US mostly sells its drones to NATO allies, increasing the interoperability 
and common supply chains within the alliance.  US sales to India are an attempt 
at supplanting Russia’s influence – part of the larger US focus on Asia, 
including countering China. Also, Israeli provision of drones to India is part of 
larger defense cooperation between the two, while their exports to Azerbaijan 
provide a presence just north of the largest regional rival, Iran.”921 
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Furthermore, even if the US can manage to stay ahead technologically in the many spheres of 
military-technological competition (as it has done since WWII), the trajectory of economic 
growth suggests China will overtake the US later in this decade (these projections have been 
brought forward as a result of the economic implications of the Coronavirus, that will likely 
hurt the US economy for a longer duration than China), and with that one can speculate that 
the relative advantage in key areas of military technology could switch from the US to China. 
For instance, according to the UAV guideline published by the Chinese Ministry of Industry 
and Information Technology (MIIT), the ministry plans to establish and revise more than 200 
rules covering research, production, application, and safety regulation of civilian drones. China 
also projects its UAV industry to take off to $27 billion in total output by 2025.922 
In sum, while technological development can potentially bring out a transformative impact of 
drones for interstate competition, the debates surrounding their use demonstrate that beyond 
the tactical and strategic efficacy, their real impact is likely to be seen in the mid-to-long term 
rather than in the short-term. 
 
9.4 The Implications of Drone Proliferation for US Grand Strategy 
 
While the sale of drone hardware to US allies in Europe and North Asia, such as Japan and 
South Korea, may, in fact, strengthen Americas’ grand strategy vis-à-vis Russia and China, 
unchecked drone proliferation potentially impacts US strategic objectives at two levels: global 
and national. As this chapter argues, this can manifest in three ways: (i) the likelihood that 
near-peer or regional competitors may use drones outside declared theatres of war based on the 
negative precedent of US 9/11 CT operations, (ii) enemy states and non-state actors deploying 
drones in conducting reprisal attacks, or to perpetrate terrorist acts, or weaponize it for 
biological attacks, (iii) a security dilemma arising from unrestricted proliferation among world 
powers.923 At the national security level, drone proliferation fosters changes to a military power 
that is likely to heighten uncertainties, inflame tensions and create vulnerabilities among states 
– particularly as states deploy drones to advances their national and strategic interests. 
9.4.1 Global Security Level 
9.4.1.1 Near-Peer Competitors 
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As drones continue to proliferate among near-peer competitors with more nations developing 
active drone programmes globally, analysts believe it will further exacerbate US military 
vulnerabilities and foster strategic imbalance in the global security landscape.924 This is 
because, in contrast to human-operated automation systems, drones complicate the ability of 
states to anticipate and attribute attacks.925 This portends an adverse consequence for US grand 
strategy from the standpoint of international engagement. This is due to the possibility that 
drones potentially impact well-understood state behaviours, distort sovereignty norms, and 
engender a crisis of stability in the global security landscape.926  
This also includes the risk that drone proliferation creates the possibility of an unbridled arms 
race among revisionist and revanchist powers such as China and Russia to counter the 
technology edge and the asymmetric military advantage of the US drone programme. For 
instance, anti-drones defense systems and stealth drones, which hitherto were exclusively 
owned by the US, are now in the Chinese and Russian military fleet. In 2016, for example, 
Russia deployed remotely piloted tanks – Uran-9 and Vehar for reconnaissance missions, and 
China has used drones to a guided missile via satellite technology.927  
Furthermore, Russia's growing UAV system further underscores this. According to a recent 
estimation by Russia’s Ministry of Defense, the former Soviet power has more than 2,100 
UAVs.928 This means that besides the US that currently has more than 10,000 types of 
unmanned systems, only Russia and China come close to boasting of this number.929 The 2019 
Defense Procurement Plan stated Russia’s intentions to acquire on an annual basis 300 short-
range UAVs. The growth of the Russian UAV programme underscores the burgeoning utility 
of drone weaponry as a military asset. While Russia, compared to China, Israel, and many 
NATO states, arrived late to the scene in the race to acquire drones, the type of drones in its 
fleet indicates how Russia has further advanced this technology.930 One of these drones – the 
Orlan-10 – functions like the US MQ-9 and Predator drones. It has also been regarded as the 
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workhorse of Russia’s UAV fleet due to its aerial and long endurance capabilities.931 However, 
the main utility of Russia’s UAV has been for ISR missions and for targeting operations. There 
is the likelihood that this will change in the coming years due to the unpredictability of the 
international sphere. 
Likewise, China’s military assertiveness and posturing have grown in recent years. Beijing has 
deployed more military assets to the SCS and currently operates a military facility in Djibouti 
to conduct naval patrols in the Indian Ocean.932 Furthermore, China’s UAV advancement, 
despite starting decades after the US, poses one of the greatest threats to US procurement plans. 
According to Weizman and his colleagues, “China’s rapid modernization is increasingly 
forcing the Pentagon to face the challenges in its own procurement pipeline arising from 
shifting program goals, endemic cost overruns, and delays.933 Compared to Russian drones, 
China possesses fast, long-range, and supersonic drones – such as the DR-8 and the Sharp 
Sword stealth. According to Horowitz, “The People’s Liberation Army is playing a massive 
game of catchup with the US, and it although it does not expect to reach parity with the US 
military until 2050, China’s military budget is growing – officially at $177.61billion, more than 
60 percent increase from its budget ten years ago ($105.64billion).934 China’s economic growth 
also suggests it might pose a broader economic challenge to the US in driving technological 
innovation agenda capable of counterbalancing US military might and advantage. 
The above has also been reflected in the race to develop AI, with China fast becoming a true 
peer competitor in this domain with the likelihood of overtaking the US. According to a RAND 
2018 report, the US, China, and Russia are currently working on weapons with advanced 
capabilities enabled by AI. China and the US have both experimented with AI methods that 
enable drones to hunt together in packs (swarms) and select targets for attack based on 
recognisable, unique characteristics.935 As James Johnson notes, “the rapid proliferation, 
diffusion, and synthesis of AI, together with the opacity and dual-use features associated with 
the nascent technology, could generate a destabilizing and potentially intractable AI arms 
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race.936 As with drones, the race to innovate with AI creates uncertainties in the international 
sphere with potentially destabilizing ramifications for strategic balance and global security. 
Johnson posits that the current trend in drone proliferation among US near-peer competitors 
potentially affect international security in three interconnected ways: (i) amplifying the 
uncertainties and risks posed by existing threats, (ii) transforming the nature and characteristics 
of these threats and, (iii) introducing new threats to the security landscape.937 This is due to the 
risk that drones can be deployed in swarms to carry out pre-emptive attacks, bomb a nuclear 
site, or be used to launch nuclear-powered ballistic missiles.938 
9.4.1.2 Vulnerabilities and Susceptibilities 
 
As earlier conceptualized in this thesis, grand strategy deals with an international system that 
is characterized by competition and dynamic interaction. This means states must contend, with 
living, thinking rivals that seek to control events their way, as well as allies and other actors 
that are focused on pursuing interests all their own.939 Hence, grand strategy both influences 
and is influenced by the behaviour of others. As Gaddis argues, any effective grand strategy 
will try to shape the country’s interaction in the most advantageous way possible, but the choice 
of cohering around or implementing a single grand strategy will unavoidably be affected by 
the fact that adversaries, as well as allies, are trying the same thing.940 Posen argues that one of 
the main threats of US grand strategy today is the presence of powerful and autocratic states 
that can threaten the global liberal order.941 
Current drone proliferation among world powers reflects this and points to an emerging 
security dilemma. Revisiting Tang’s analysis is useful here. Tang explains the security 
dilemma theory as a fulcrum of defensive realism. Hitherto, the US has championed the use of 
drones post-9/11 as a light footprint approach to warfare and as an effective CT tool and in 
facilitating its broader statecraft. The tactical and strategic efficacy of drones based on their 
secretive targeting criteria and precision and remote capabilities is, however, contributing to a 
security spiral process among world powers in a ‘race’ to outdo the US in the development and 
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proliferation of armed drone technology. This is manifest in the stockpile of drone weaponry 
and increases in the defense budget and research investment for the advancement of drones and 
AI-related technologies in China and Russia (see preceding paragraph highlight). 
Thus, though the US did not intentionally set out to spur a drone arms race from its 
counterterrorism missions using armed drones, other states, particularly revanchist and 
resurgent powers, have interpreted this as an asymmetric imbalance in the military-
technological edge in US favour. This, as Tang’s security dilemma purports, manifested in a 
situation where an increase in the proliferation of drones in military systems has caused other 
states to respond with similar measures to re-establish the balance and prevent the arming state 
from upsetting the balance in the first place.942 For instance, in China, the website of the 
People’s Liberation Army linked a US plan to sell drones in Southeast Asia as a threat to 
contain China’s claim to the South China sea (Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and 
Vietnam dispute this). Though China does not disclose details of its drone deployments, it 
indicated that it sees drones as crucial hardware in the maritime dispute. The 70th celebration 
of the founding of the People’s Republic of China was one characterized by the display of new 
military hardware. One of these were two large HSU-001 unmanned underwater vehicles – 
which are long-range autonomous robot spy submarines designed to patrol the depth of the 
ocean without human direction, faster, deeper, and quieter than a submarine.943 This made them 
a potential threat to US naval ships patrolling the SCS – by making the US vulnerable to 
Chinese naval warfare and to these weapons.  
In response to China’s assertiveness, the Pentagon sold 34 ScanEagle drones to Malaysia, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam in 2019. This also included the sale of the MQ-9B Sea 
Guardian – a maritime surveillance variant of the Reaper drones to Taiwan as part of a weapons 
package worth about $4.5billion.944 US defense experts justified this drone sale as a strategy to 
deter the invasion or counter a blockade by China. Taiwanese military experts posit that these 
drones, once armed, can target Chinese naval ships on their way to Taiwan and may embolden 
Chinese retaliation.945  
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Likewise, the Russian military has been jamming US drones operating over Eastern Syria using 
Silok drones in a bid to protect Moscow’s installations in the country. This is not entirely new, 
as Russia had jammed US drones in Ukraine in 2014. Interestingly, Kremlin has also developed 
its first ground-based unit specializing in defeating enemy drones. The proliferation of these 
jammers and Russia’s increasing drone capabilities threaten the US military expanding UAV 
fleet and strategic balance. For instance, in 2011, Iran used a Russian-made Avtobaza jammer 
to force down a US RQ-170 stealth drone along the Afghanistan-Iran border.946 The Pentagon, 
aware of this risk, together with the Defense Advanced Research Project’s Agency (DARPA), 
developed “signal detection and reasoning technology that allows radios to recognize 
interference and jamming and adapt to maintain communications — even in the presence of 
severe and/or adaptive jamming.”947 
Susceptibilities 
The nations of Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan, Turkey, and Kazakhstan share one 
common trait – they have all had or continue to experience some levels of conflict; ironically, 
they all possess armed drone capabilities. The 2019 Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) 
assessment of which of these countries are like to remain war-related hotspots identified four 
wars that are likely to endure: (i) the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq/Syria between the US-
led coalition and insurgents (ii) the war between Yemen and Saudi Arabia; and that (iii) the 
Kashmir crisis between the Indian and Pakistan nations, and (iv) Turkey and Kurdistan 
Workers Party (PKK). Interestingly, most of these countries currently possess some armed 
drones mostly supplied from either Turkey or China.  
Additionally, drone aerial imagery may inflame crisis situations if it is deployed for propaganda 
purposes by encouraging retaliatory actions. For example, after India conducted a series of 
“surgical strikes” on militants in Kashmir on 26 September 2016, they released the drone 
surveillance video to the public to show how effective the strikes were. However, then 
Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif condemned the strikes as an “unprovoked and naked 
aggression,”948 and on November 20, Pakistan retaliated by shooting down an Indian drone 
along the Line of Control in Kashmir.949 
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This raises the concern on the dynamics of drone proliferation for conflict escalation or as an 
instrument of deterrence in de-escalating tensions. Zenko avers that “the diffusion of armed 
drones increases the prospects for conflict exacerbation and the prospects for the US to 
maintain lasting peace in the Middle East.”950 For instance, since 2015, Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates have used Chinese and American drones extensively for tactical 
airstrikes and targeted assassinations in Yemen.951 The UAE has also used drones to eliminate 
a Houthi leader, Saleh Ali al-Sammad.952 In Libya, Chinese-made drones have been deployed 
to support the Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar against the internationally recognized government 
(GNA) in Tripoli. The aftermath of the strikes, apart from civilian casualties and a breakdown 
of government structures, escalated existing tensions with GNA, which equally deployed 
Turkish-made drones in reprisal attacks.953 Thus, unless the US promulgates a new drone policy 
that manages the challenges posed by drone proliferation, near-peer competitors may take the 
lead in establishing a normative framework (that advances their national and regional interests) 
that may be harmful to US national security interests. 
9.4.1.3 Non-State Actors 
Scholarship on the proliferation of drones mainly focuses on states’ use, sidestepping the 
consequential proliferation of drone technology by violent non-state actors. The source of the 
gap is that existing proliferation models overlook civilian drone technologies (home-made 
drones that are being deployed by local militia or terrorist groups).954 Although non-state actors 
often do not possess military-grade drones, they mostly reconfigure or retrofit commercial 
drones with explosives to serve this purpose. This, in effect, demonstrates that non-state actors 
have the resources, capacity, and interest to effectively incorporate drone programs in 
advancing their objectives by shifting from cost-prohibitive, inaccessible, and technically 
complex military technologies to cheap, simple civilian platforms.955 
Studies have shown that drones psychologically boost the status of the non-state actors and 
their capacity to cause harm and terror.956 Wong and colleagues predict that as drone 
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technology matures, payloads will increase, prices will decrease, and attacks involving drones 
based on their current trajectory would likely become more common weapons of war.957 
Furthermore, as export laws loosen internationally and drone technology proliferates, nations 
mired in internal conflict (i.e., insurgent and terrorist threats) may also choose to strike within 
their own borders at higher rates, which may inflame more conflict situations.958 For example, 
the September 2019 bombing of Saudi-owned Aramco oil processing facilities by Iranian 
drones inflamed tensions between the two countries. 
The sale of Chinese drones to non-democracies risks adversely impacting the US CT mission 
in the next decade. This is because non-state actors can buy, hijack, or steal drones in carrying 
out coordinated air attacks in gray zone conflicts. In recent years, non-state groups like Hamas 
in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthi Rebels in Yemen, and ISIS have used drone-like 
quadcopters and semi-military grade drones to carry out tactical assaults in their respective 
countries.959 This is based on the notion that. “UAV capabilities hold substantial destructive 
potential that terrorist organizations and other disruptive actors are likely to exploit.” This 
approximates with what Yochi Dreazen describes as “the next evolution of warfare-by-remote-
control when weaponized robotic planes give terrorist groups de facto air forces.”960 
As a result of the proliferation of drone technology in the last decade, non-state armed actors 
are increasingly able to create a threat from above (see table 17 below), a threat that remained 
until recently the exclusive domain of states against non-state actors.961 Hezbollah, for 
example, the oldest non-state or semi-state actor to use drones in the region, has a fleet of more 
than 200 drones.962 Some of them were used against Israel between 2004 - 2016 and against 
Syrian rebels in 2014 and 2015.963 In the future, non-state armed groups equipped with 
military-grade drones provided by state sponsors – such as those supplied to Hezbollah and to 
the Houthis by Iran – are likely to pose a far greater threat from above due to airstrike capability 
and support from modified UAV use.964 
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Table 17: Non-state actors with drone capabilities 
 
S/N Non-state actors Type of 
group 
Country Year Drone Type 
1. Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad 
Militant  Palestine 2019 Re-configured hobbyist 
drones 
2. Venezuela military 
defectors 
Militant Venezuela 2018 Re-configured hobbyist 
drones 
3. Boko Haram Terrorist Nigeria 2018 Hobbyist drones for 
surveillance purposes. 
4. Harakat Tahrir al-
Sham 
Militant Syria 2018 Swarm-like drone attack 
5. Partiya Karkerên 
Kurdistanê  
Militant Turkey 2017 Re-configured hobbyist 
drones 
6. Libyan National 
Army 
Opposition Libya 2017 Medium range and long-
range military drones 
7. Maute Group Opposition  Philippines   Re-configured hobbyist 
drones 
8 Cártel de Jalisco 
Nueva Generación 
(CJNG) 
 Militant Mexico 2017 Re-configured hobbyist 
drones 
9 Houthi Rebels Rebel Saudi 
Arabia 
2017 Re-configured hobbyist 
drones 
10 Islamic State (ISIS) Terrorist Syria and 
Iraq 
2016 Medium range military 
drones 
11 Faylaq al-Sham Rebel Syria  2016 Re-configured hobbyist 
drones 
12 Taliban Terrorist Pakistan 2016 Hobbyist drones for 
surveillance purposes. 
13 Donetsk People's 
Republic (DPR 




Opposition Syria 2015 Hobbyist drones for 
surveillance purposes. 
15 Suqour al-Sham 
Brigades 
Opposition Syria 2015 Hobbyist drones for 
surveillance purposes. 
16 Al-Qaeda Terrorist Afghanistan 2015 Hobbyist drones for 
surveillance purposes. 
Source: Author’s adaptation from New America Foundation. 
 
The 2019 Defense Intelligence Agency report determined that Iran, a US rival competitor, has 
rapidly developed its air capabilities.965 An assessment of Iran’s drone capabilities revealed it 
is the leading supplier of armed drones to non-state actors in the Middle East. 966 It has been 
determined Houthi militia operating in Yemen, Hezbollah militant group in Lebanon, and 
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Shiite in Iraq, have all sourced lethal drone technology from Iran. 967 A recent attack on a Saudi 
oil installation in September 2019 was conducted using Iranian drones. Like Iran, Turkey is 
also another key player in drone proliferation in the Middle East. Presently, it exports its drone 
technology to Qatar, Ukraine, and Libya.968 The consequence for US strategic objectives to wit 
grand strategy is dire. First, it engenders a precarious situation for US CT operations. Second, 
it increases the risk that some of these drones will potentially be used by non-state actors in 
reprisal attacks. Third, it underscores the CT paradox – which establishes how the use of drones 
to increase US security inadvertently causes a boomerang effect that undermines it. More 
importantly, it further underlines how current drone proliferation creates susceptibilities at the 
global level that are likely to spur transnational terrorism that moves beyond suicide bombing 
to the deployment of machines (drones) against US installations, its strategic interests, and for 
disrupting the efficacy of US drone campaign. Also, this does not preclude the risk that drones 
will be deployed more strategically by states joining forces with non-state actors to escalate 
ongoing conflict. For instance, the geopolitical tension between Syria and Iraq can escalate 
when the former acquires Russian drones and the latter, Turkish UAVs. This can further 
exacerbate existing skirmishes and the already fragile situation in these states. 
 
9.4.2 At National Security Level 
From the preceding analysis, the nexus between drone proliferation and their ramification for 
US grand strategy at the global level has been examined. Another key consideration, however, 
concerns how drones hamper US strategic objectives at the national security level. This stems 
from the concern that drone diffusion fosters changes to a military power that is likely to 
heighten uncertainties, inflame tensions and create vulnerabilities among states – mainly as 
states deploy drones to advances their national and strategic interests. These changes emanate 
from the advancements in the weaponization of artificial intelligence and the miniaturization 
of automated robotic technologies969 , which are likely to broaden the latitude of how other 
nation-states fight their wars and what targeted decisions are based on for retaliatory or 
preemptive attacks. Related to this is the objectionable concern that drones foster the notion of 
dehumanization and desensitization of warfare – and based on the precedent set by the 
institutionalization of targeted killings by the US CT operations, other states are likely to use 
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drones in eliminating HVTs instead of resorting to policing mechanisms. The implication for 
the US grand strategy is the burden it puts on policymakers in thinking ‘grand’ about the long-
term implications of how military instruments are used beyond the short-term success they 
accomplish. Further miniaturization of drone technology and the likelihood of being buoyed 
by Beijing’s laissez-faire approach increases the propensity for new dynamics in crisis 
escalation in new theatres of war. For the US, this has the unintended consequence of stretching 
its defence spending and pursuing a grand strategy predicated on muscular internationalism 
globally.970 
Horowitz and colleagues argue that “as drones shrink in size and spread commercially, they 
can more readily be used by governments as a deterrence and compellence for rivals.”971 
However, as Tang’s security dilemma theory suggests, this necessitates reciprocal action on 
the part of the ‘rival’ states to acquire drone technology as counterbalancing instrument. For 
instance, since 2014, North Korea has conducted surveillance and reconnaissance missions on 
South Korea’s defense. This resulted in the shooting down of a North Korean flying over the 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) by South Korean forces in January 2016. However, as North Korea 
develops more drone capabilities, the dynamics of their use over the DMZ may cause changes 
to South Korea’s deterrence – for a more defensive posture. 
The increasing use of drones forces other countries to engage in sophisticated deception 
techniques to hide their military capabilities. South Korea, for instance, intended to procure 
America's Global Hawks, which cost US$250 million, as a strategy to “keep an eye” on North 
Korea.972 It is foreseeable what North Korea’s response would have led to drone procurement 
from Russia or developing its drone technology as a counter-response to South Korea’s 
surveillance. Apart from the fact that selling Global Hawks to South Korea was prohibited by 
the MTCR, its arrival in South Korea's arsenal would be unlikely to be welcomed by China – 
thus exacerbating the vicious security spiral.973 So, instead of greater military transparency, 
drones risk promoting more deception, thereby increasing the risk of countries stumbling into 
conflicts.  
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9.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter has examined the implications of drone proliferation for US grand strategy at the 
global and national levels. One of the key arguments made in this chapter is that left unchecked, 
the continued spread of drones, particularly among world powers and non-state actors, triggers 
potential adverse implications for US strategic objectives. This argument was examined based 
on the current nature and dynamics of drone proliferation globally and its intersection with the 
security dilemma theory. The second argument unpacked the impact of drone diffusion for US 
grand strategy at the national security level. It also assessed the implications of the 
advancement and weaponization of AI in exacerbating existing security risks and in 
engendering an unbridled great power competition.  
In the final analysis, the chapter demonstrated that the current pattern of drone proliferation 
portend harmful consequences for US grand strategy based on the precedent it has set by how 
it uses this technology and the risk that rogue states and non-democratic regimes may use 
drones in ways that alter the strategic balance and increase tension. While it is argued that 
drones may, in fact, benefit the US when it supplies it technology to allies and partners to carry 
out US security objectives at the international sphere, a grey area remains the restrictions 
imposed on the sale of US drone technology, which China is exploiting in selling drones based 
on its laissez-faire approach to non-democratic regimes. As more countries possess armed 
drones, particularly countries in conflict zones or rogue states willing to use this weaponry 
outside the confines of international war, the emerging dynamic poses new concerns for US 















This thesis has investigated the role of drones in US grand strategy from their use as a CT tool 
and instrument of statecraft in targeted states. It examined this based on how successive US 
administrations post 9/11 utilized drones for achieving US strategic objectives. The analysis 
was based on a critical exploration of the different typologies of US grand strategies, including 
neo-isolationism, primacy, selective engagement, cooperative security, and restraint, its basic 
assumptions, core elements, and how it intersects with drone use. This informed the research 
questions, which investigated drones' political and strategic utility for US grand strategy and 
whether drones undermine or support US grand strategy based on their use in targeted states as 
a counterterrorism tool by successive US administrations post 9/11. 
Based on this, a research hypothesis was formulated, which stated that continued use of drones 
by the US as a counterterrorism tactic and an offensive war strategy in targeted states 
undermines US grand strategy. It does so by creating contradictory outcomes: on the one hand, 
it eliminates terrorists, but on the other, it causes anti-Americanism, the death of non-
combatants, and generates unintended blowback. To explore this, the thesis set out to do the 
following: (i) analyse the evolutionary development of drones from WWI to the Clinton era, 
within the gamut of successive US grand strategy within this period, to determine whether 
drones historically supported US grand strategy, (ii) assessed the use of drones by successive 
US administration post 9/11 from George W. Bush to Donald J. Trump, to ascertain based on 
available anecdotal and empirical evidence of reported drone strikes, the impact on the different 
grand strategic objectives pursued by these administrations, (iii) conducted a case study 
analysis of drone strikes in two targeted states – Afghanistan and Pakistan – and the impact on 
US strategic objectives in these countries and lastly, (iv) the implication of drone proliferation 
among near-peer and regional competitors, and non-state actors for US grand strategy at the 
national and global level. 
The research hypothesis was weighed and assessed based on rigorous analysis of exploratory 
data through four themes: civilian quandary of drones, blowback from anti-Americanism, 
counterterrorism paradox, and security dilemma of drone proliferation. The research findings 
are elaborated on below. 
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10.1 Research Findings 
The role of drones in US grand strategy 
This thesis explored the ramifications of drone use as an instrument of statecraft and how it has 
supported US grand strategy before and after 9/11. This was analysed based on the historical 
assessment of drones before 9/11, precisely from WWI to the Kosovo War. The analysis 
reveals that though the precision capabilities of drones were still rudimentary in its 
development, the ISR capabilities of drones during this period proved useful as an instrument 
of warcraft. The analysis determined that although drones had a limited role in facilitating US 
grand strategy before the inception of the Cold War, in the wake of the Korean and Vietnam 
War, the tactical utility of its weaponry became important for military operations and for 
advancing the offensive aspects of US grand strategy. The precedent set using drones post-
Cold War laid the groundwork for the development and consequently the lethal weaponization 
of drones for targeted killing operations under Bush following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. During 
the Bush administration, particularly in the last term, drones were effective instruments for 
personality strikes towards eliminating HVTs. They were also valuable for supporting the 
offensive liberal strategy of the Bush administration in targeted states. This was evident in their 
military utility for targeted strikes, leadership decapitation, disrupting terrorist formations, and 
avoiding the blowback from ground warfare (following Iraq). Thus, it allowed the US to remain 
active in combat zones without risking the political and social costs of protracted military 
engagement.  
Under Obama’s hybrid grand strategy, drone use became strategically entrenched as a double-
edged strategy that served the defensive objectives of restraint and exceptionalism on the one 
hand and as an offensive war tactic on the other. This was evident in their use as a political tool 
for compellence and deterrence in targeted states, facilitating surgical legitimacy at the 
domestic level, and enabling and entrenching the concept of remote warfare in US CT 
operations.  Likewise, during the Trump administration, US drone warfare continued in the 
trajectory established by the previous US administration as an instrument of statecraft and CT 
weapon in targeted states. As our analysis showed, drones were instrumental in supporting the 
grand strategy of Trump’s administration, which espoused a nativist, protectionist, and 
nationalist-isolationist vision for the US – by expressing the fungibility of American power. 
This has been evident in the deregulation of drone strikes on the battlefield, reversion to covert 
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strikes, and the signing of executive orders that deepens the operationality and entrenchment 
of drones as a new element of American warfare.  
However, despite the acknowledged role of drones in the respective US administrations 
aforementioned, this thesis determined that their continued use in targeted states engendered 
unfavorable outcomes that work contra to the fulfilment of the political, strategic, and tactical 
ends of US grand strategy post 9/11. This is due to the countervailing effects engendered by 
drone strikes such as unintended civilian deaths, anti-Americanism, militant retaliation, 
unchecked drone proliferation, and counterterrorism paradox. 
Drones, Civilian Casualty and US grand strategy 
The argument that mounting civilian casualties resulting from the continued use of drones in 
targeted states undermine US grand strategy was examined. While the view that civilian 
casualty and collateral damages are inevitable in warfare, this thesis argued that the precision 
capabilities of drones compared to other manned aircraft's challenge this notion. In addition, 
drone strikes before final authorization are reviewed by military commanders and legal 
officials in real-time before a kill order is made, thus, making each drone strike a component 
of “intended action.” This argument was prosecuted by assessing the civilian casualty figures 
in the aftermath of drone strikes in targeted states such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, 
Somalia, and Libya based on available evidence published since 9/11. 
The findings determined that civilian casualty figures have increased rather than decreased in 
successive US administrations since 9/11. During the Bush administration, the figure was 
estimated to be about 333-350. This surged during President Obama following the sustained 
escalation of drone strikes, which resulted in 1540-2650 civilian casualties. This figure further 
exacerbated under Trump to 1450-1650 (in his first term alone) with the outsourcing and 
deregulation of drone warfare operations outside declared theatres of war. As the evidence 
showed, the consequence of increasing civilian deaths in targeted states resulted in local anti-
drone protests, militant retaliation, political opposition, and terrorist violence, which, as this 
thesis argued, generated adverse consequences that were antithetical to US strategic objectives 
in these states. 
For the Bush strategic doctrine that espoused the goals of offensive liberalism (though not 
aspects of it were liberal), these outcomes were at cross purposes to his administration's stated 
goals for spreading democracy and, in effect, laid a dangerous precedent for the utility of drones 
in counterterrorism. Thus, drones represented a “carrot and stick” strategy, where the US 
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promoted democratic ideals but killed civilians in targeted states. Furthermore, instead of 
dealing with terrorists as a CT problem, an international policing effort that involved a 
multilateralism instead of the Bush-era “coalition of the willing” approach could have changed 
the precedent of US CT engagement for successive US administrations. This is akin to Cronin’s 
assertion that “terrorists should be handled as a counterinsurgency problem and not a 
counterterrorism problem.”974 The difference between the two concepts is that one tackles 
individual recruitment, the primary source of terrorism, while the latter focuses on eliminating 
senior terrorist leaders. Jordan’s analysis on decapitation has shown that this has been largely 
ineffective. Similarly, Wolfendale’s contribution to this re-affirms how CT often engenders 
countervailing effects that catalyze rather than weaken terrorist groups. 
The intensification of drone strikes in the last years of the Bush-era culminated in the escalation 
and reliance on drones under Obama for counterterrorism missions in targeted states. As the 
evidence showed, this also resulted in mounting civilian casualty figures with some 
anticipatory effects such as retaliatory suicide attacks, rise in insurgent retaliation, and revived 
opposition to US drones in targeted states. Furthermore, the controversial policy of signature 
killing and double strikes in Obama's counterterrorism playbook and the covert CIA drone 
operations were antithetical to Obama’s strategic doctrine that promoted America’s 
exceptionalism in a rules-based international order. Civilian deaths and secretive drone warfare 
operated outside declared theatres of war and violated territorial and sovereignty norms of 
targeted states that are contra to international laws of war.  
Additionally, Obama’s drone war more assertively expressed the fungibility of America’s 
power than curtail it. Rather than reversing his predecessor's erroneous hard power stance in 
counterterrorism operations, it expanded and institutionalized it. For his grand strategy that 
expressed an avowal to restraint, drones represented the opposite, as evident in the OCO 
spending and defence budget for drones in targeted states (35 percent increase compared to his 
predecessor in his first term). While the second term of the Obama administration saw the 
introduction of PPG rules and changes in US drone policy, it did not alter the negative legacy 
of the impact of drones in targeted states – which has served as the propaganda machinery for 
terrorist mobilization and the deepening of anti-American sentiments among terrorist groups. 
More so, it did little to reduce anti-government protests in targeted states or alter the perception 
of America’s “imperial overstretch” which violated the territorial and sovereignty rights of 
                                                             
974 Ibid (Cronin, 2013) 
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targeted states in contravention to the Geneva Convention and the statutory laws of war. Thus, 
for Obama’s hybrid grand strategy that championed America’s exemplarism, the use of drones, 
while tactical useful as a CT weapon, undermined the tenets of Obama’s strategic objectives 
based on its negative aftermath in targeted states.  
Civilian casualties also continued under Trump following the reversal to secretive drone 
warfare and deregulation of targeted killing operations. For Trump’s grand strategy that 
espoused a Jacksonian neo-isolationist vision of American, his drone warfare established a 
dronification logic consistent with “America First” – that projects an image of unabashed 
nationalism and a muscular military strategy for combating radical Islamic terrorism. Like his 
predecessor, however, controversies surrounding the lack of transparency and the clandestine 
nature of Trump’s drone warfare led to the increase in civilian casualty figures, particularly in 
Afghanistan (516-1622), Yemen (172-225), and in undeclared battlefields (such as Somalia 
with about 74 deaths). These deaths are reflective of the pattern of anti-American drone 
sentiments that besieged the previous administration. Under Trump, the continuity of these 
deaths raised moral, ethical, and legal concerns for US drone warfare, which dented its soft 
power projection capabilities and the liberal aspects of its grand strategy.  
At the domestic level, drones against American citizens negatively affected public opinion of 
targeted killing operations and queried the surgical legitimacy of CIA covert strike operations. 
At the international level, civilian deaths arising from signature strikes, double kills, accidental 
deaths have created a negative precedent for US counterterrorism operations – which 
establishes a dangerous perception of how the US wages remote warfare. More so, while drones 
have been seen by policymakers and analysts within US policy circles as a ‘lighter footprint’ 
to warfare with the capacity to minimize public scrutiny and congressional oversight of its 
targeted killing operations, the aftermath of drone strikes since 9/11 has so far engendered a 
paradox of casualty aversion – with the increasing cases of civilian deaths.  
Drones, Anti-Americanism, and US grand strategy 
The impact of drones and anti-Americanism was explored in this thesis, and the nexus with the 
US grand strategy was assessed. The investigation was predicated on the three types of 
blowback drones engender – local, national, and international – and its debate. In the context 
of their use in targeted states based on the precedent set by successive US administrations, the 
association between drones and anti-Americanism was established. However, while there are 
contra views in literature refuting the credibility of the blowback hypothesis, this thesis argued 
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that in the absence of an international or national threshold to construe what is blowback, every 
opposition, whether at the local, national, and international level, against drone use, 
underscores an inherent anti-American perception to US CT operations.  
The tactical use of drones is meant to dismantle terrorist organizations and facilitate leadership 
decapitation of HVTs. However, drone warfare in targeted states has shown that their aftermath 
fans the embers of militant recruitment due to anti-American sentiments. In Afghanistan and 
Pakistan and furtherance of the Pashtunwali code, drone strikes have inspired recruits and 
mobilized insurgents to retaliate for innocent killed by drones. 
The drawback of anti-Americanism was most evident in the Obama era, as drones spawned 
militant retaliation, local protests, legitimacy crisis against their use, leading to calls by the 
government of targeted states to reverse existing pacts and agreements with the US that 
authorized drone use over their territories. This impasse was most reflected in Pakistan, where 
pollsters found that 82 percent of FATA residents found drones unjustified. This is besides the 
opposition from former Prime Ministers, the Pakistani court, and top government officials to 
continued drone strike operations, particularly under Obama.  
Though contrary reports disputed the credibility of drones and anti-Americanism in targeted 
states, most of these studies did not consider the factors that affected the perception of drone 
strikes, the cognitive impact of these strikes, and the degree to which local factors spurred anti-
American sentiments. The impact for US grand strategy lay in the impact for increasing 
susceptibilities and vulnerabilities in the international sphere, particularly in the Muslim world, 
which serves as the casus belli for exacerbating local tensions and fueling antagonism that the 
US may be unable to dispel. 
Drones and the Counterterrorism paradox 
The inherent paradox in the use of drones as an instrument of CT operations was analysed 
within the gamut of US grand strategy. First, it was established that while drones are effective 
CT tools, it enhances public perception of insecurity in targeted states and conjures images of 
civil liberty violations which are counterproductive in the long run for the US in winning the 
hearts and minds of people. Second, drones engender a form of domestic militarization which 
ignores the standard policing rules or sovereignty norms in targeted states – that de-
territorializes the local populations and fosters a predatory state of fear (in which case is fear 
from above) for surgical drone strikes. Third, it creates a perception that the institutional 
apparatus of drone warfare rests on non-democratic principles based on its targeting criteria 
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and procedures for CT operations. This is based on the acknowledgement that most US drone 
strikes have operated mainly based on private authorizations and predominantly outside the 
scope of government approval, as seen in Pakistan, Yemen, and Afghanistan. For US grand 
strategy that has consistently championed the tenets of liberal hegemony, its drone warfare 
mimics an ‘absolutist’ mentality and mirrors the concept of imperial overstretching. This is 
fundamentally due to the unrestricted scope of warfare US drone strikes have fostered, 
particularly in non-declared battlefields. Fourth, while drones have been strategically and 
tactically useful in disrupting terrorist organizations, its aftermath has emboldened terrorists in 
two ways: (i) it's force projection capabilities which give credibility to terrorist organizations 
that their activities pose a significant threat to US, thereby validating their threat and cause, (ii) 
fueling the antipathy that has resulted in retaliatory attacks. The impact of which hampers the 
long-term strategic deployment of drones as CT tools and the credibility of US CT operations.  
Security dilemma of drone proliferation 
This thesis has established that the diffusion of drones since 9/11 has spawned a security 
dilemma at the nation-state and international level due to other states acquiring armed drones 
as a strategic military asset to match their technological advantages in warfare, as their use by 
the US for CT has demonstrated. This is evident in targeted states, where non-state actors have 
US-modified drones to attack US installations and allies. This has manifested in a paradox of 
security in targeted states – which holds that continued drone strikes spur retaliatory effects 
among insurgents and terrorist groups against their use.  
At the national level, drones risk reordering strategic calculus and heightening the uncertainty 
that arises due to the accretion of its weaponry as a symbol of military power. This potentially 
introduces dynamics for a new way of war, which, as our analysis shows, would have a 
deterministic impact on strategic competition. For the US, the diffusion of these weapons, 
particularly among non-democratic regimes, necessitates that it pursues a muscular hard power 
strategy with the likelihood to perpetuate neoconservative squander of America’s resources – 
which, according to retrench proponents weaken America’s global power. With advanced 
weaponization of AI underway, the transformative potentials of drones as a critical component 
of national security portents an emerging security dilemma that heightens uncertainties and 
introduces new changes to the use of military power – due to the potentially transformative 
impact of drones for great power rivalry, military balance, and weapon systems development.  
This has the unintended consequence of altering the balance of power in the international realm 
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and for state actors to increase their asymmetric technological advantage in drone advancement 
in a way that outpaces or matches the US. 
At the international realm, the diffusion of drone weaponry among revisionist and revanchist 
powers has further accentuated warfare's dronification. As this thesis determined, the post 9/11 
legacy of drone strikes has established an “arms race” among world powers due to the “need 
to react” to US drone advancement and deployment. A critical vulnerability remains the 
difficulty for other actors to distinguish between the offensive versus the defensive nature of 
US drone warfare – which, as this thesis has demonstrated, is the trigger for the security 
dilemma associated with drone proliferation.  
This thesis revealed that the US had shown near-peer competitors how it utilizes its technology 
through the advancement and proliferation of drones. However, rather than this further 
advancing its technological post-Cold War advantage and strengthening its self-help capacity 
in the post 9/11 security environment, it has fostered a counter-weapons development among 
regional and peer competitors. Against the backdrop of globalization, the current constraints of 
the MTCR, and the increasing proliferation of Chinese-made armed drones (backed by its 
laissez-faire export policy), US post 9/11 drone legacy has created a more significant vacuum 
that America must thrive to close, or risk being edged out. 
10.2 Drones and the Future of US Grand Strategy 
Grand strategy is not a static frame. Thus, individual perception of the security environment 
can significantly influence the overarching grand strategy America pursues or adopts. 
However, in an international security environment that is constantly in flux, cognizance of the 
security dilemma and the inherent CT paradox of drone warfare raise critical concerns that are 
difficult to dispel for the future of US grand strategy. Three issues are likely to emerge in this 
context. The first is new threats arising from more nations increasing developing drone 
technology, especially authoritarian regimes, non-state actors, regional competitors, and rival 
competitors that may seek to use the capabilities of drone technology for domestic or regional 
targeted killings. This includes the likelihood of China using drones against Uighur Muslims 
and Nigeria using drones against Biafra secessionists. Besides the threat that drones can be 
weaponized as a trigger for nuclear weapons and the risk that jamming of drones may cause 
retaliatory actions from states. Considering that more than 90 countries have drones, it may not 
take long before Rickil and Krieg’s dronification of state violence will be a reality, especially 
with AI advancement.  
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Second is the possibility that drones will continue to foster a grand strategy that emphasises 
the use of America’s hard power at the expense of its soft power capabilities, especially in the 
Muslim world. This also creates the likelihood of the DoD developing a Fourth Offset Strategy 
that will not only seek to outmanoeuvre the advantages made by near-peer competitors but will 
seek to rise above them and re-position America to take leadership in the development of these 
technologies. Absent this, post 9/11 US grand strategies will continue to share a characteristic 
that emphasizes drones for CT operations. Cognizant that the current pattern of drone use is 
engendering a negative antecedent for the integrity of US CT operations, future US grand 
strategy ought to consider formulating rules of engagement to moderate the diffusion, use, and 
export of drone technology. Likewise, there are opportunities for a multilateral approach for 
CT operations. Allies of the US possessing armed drone technology can deploy their weaponry 
based on a set of established norms to prosecute the WOT. 
Third, US grand strategy needs to embody long-term strategic thinking on the use of drone 
weaponry. This is given the changing nature of the international realm and the unpredictability 
that characterizes it. Therefore, this means changing how CT operations are prosecuted, or the 
way drones are used. Considering that more non-state actors will likely acquire and weaponize 
light drones and that China will continue to exploit the loophole as a non-member of the 
MTCR, an anticipatory grand strategy would mean taking action that regulates the 
weaponization manufacture and export of drones. A more dynamic approach would mean 
responding to threats as they arise by cohering to a clear strategic goal around that threat. For 
instance, since 9/11, the WOT has been fought by successive US administrations, and while 
these have not led to the demise of terrorist groups, drones have continued to feature 
prominently in the quiver of US stand-off weaponry for CT operations. Based on the argument 
of this thesis, this undermines US grand strategy as it neglects other aspects of its power 
capabilities that could have a resultant effect in diminishing terrorist activities.  
10.3 Avenues for Further Research  
This research logically opens areas of further research that warrant further investigation.  
The first avenue concerns understanding the organizational, political, and cultural explanations 
that prevent the US political system and bureaucracy from seeing the folly in the long-term use 
of drones in targeted states – based on its negative antecedents in these states and the broader 
impact on US security objectives at the international level. While the covert use of drones offers 
238 
 
some explanations, delving deeper into the political machinery that blights this strategic 
thinking is an area worthy of future investigation.  
Second, it relates to why states have not agreed to regulate drone proliferation despite the 
security dilemma it engenders at the international level. This points to the current architecture 
of international conventions of war and weaponry in warfare, including the MTCR regulations 
and domestic policies that are primarily unaddressed in the current drone debate. Third, future 
research can consider how and the extent to which Joe Biden’s CT operations and grand 
strategy follow the pattern of successive US administrations and the utility of drones in it. 
While it is too early to decipher what form or shapes President Biden’s administration grand 
strategy will take, there are strong indications that it will be rooted in the Washington consensus 
of liberal hegemony.  
Fourth, future research can explore the implications of the weaponization of AI for US grand 
strategy while considering how technological drone advancement impacts great power 
competition, regional balance, and moderating conflicts in war zones.  Fifth, future research 
can examine the impact of Covid-19 on terrorist activities and operations and how it shapes 
America’s CT response. Relatedly, this investigation should consider exploring, from the 
perspective of the residents in targeted states, the impact of drones on their perception of 
America and its policies and influence in their countries. Sixth, statistical methods can be used 
by future researchers to examine with empirical data how drones undermine US grand strategy 
by examining data on drone strikes against stated policy using inferential tools. This will allow 
for a degree of measurability of its determinative effects. Seventh is an investigation into why 
US presidents continue to escalate their use in targeted states despite the negative antecedents 
of drone warfare. Lastly, future data can measure the impact of drones and ‘outrage from 
below’ in targeted states and how this has affected the notion of the non-combatant in the 
battlefield and non-battlefield settings. 
In concluding, having considered the claim that drones are manifestly destabilizing for US 
grand strategy and international security, the findings of this study suggest that changes are 
necessary to ensure US policy does not lead to more dangerous global security situations. 
Furthermore, as the trend in drone proliferation underscores, hard power still holds currency in 
international affairs, and states will at times use their advantages for short-term gains, even at 
the expense of long-term stability. Thus, as new technologies are integrated into warfighting, 
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there needs to be a much more robust assessment of their long-term strategic implications – 
especially with the weaponization of AI underway in many countries. 
Lastly, consistent use of drones as military instruments from 9/11 onwards suggests that neo-
realist principles are likely to continue to sway relative to liberal ones. This has been 
underscored by the balancing and counterbalancing of drone technology proliferation, 
highlighting the continued salience of neo-realist understanding of the balancing dynamics in 
a unipolar system.  
On balance, while drones are useful counterterrorism military instruments for facilitating 
leadership decapitation and disrupting terrorist organisations, the aftermath of lethal drone 
strikes in targeted states, as the evidence in this thesis shows, undermines US grand strategy 
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